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Abstract
The role of financial frictions in the propagation of exogenous shocks in the econ-
omy has been subject of much debate in the literature and of significant implications at the
institutional level. The main issue at stake is whether financial frictions are able to trans-
form small exogenous shocks to the economy into amplified and persistent movements in
aggregate output.
This dissertation fits in this line of research by centering its attention on how mi-
croeconomic structures, such as the bank funding structure and the relationship between
banks and borrowers, interact with macroeconomic conditions. It contributes to clarify
the role of bank capital and its regulatory environment in the propagation of business cy-
cles, taking into account the current institutional changeover from Basel I to Basel II bank
capital requirements.
After Chapter 1, that brings together the theoretical literature on the relationship be-
tween bank capital and the business cycle with the literature on the regulatory capital re-
quirements under the Basel Accords, Chapter 2 proposes a dynamic general equilibrium
model in which banks are constrained by a risk-based capital requirement. Taking into ac-
count that bank capital is more expensive to raise than deposits, due to households’ pref-
erences for liquidity, and that this difference tends to widen (narrow) during a recession
(expansion), we explore an additional channel through which the effects of exogenous
shocks on real activity are amplified - the bank capital channel. This amplification effect
is larger under Basel II than under Basel I rules.
To evaluate more accurately the potential procyclical effects of Basel II, we embed,
in Chapter 3, the bank-borrower relationship into a heterogeneous-agent model, in which
firms have different access to bank credit depending on their credit risk. We conclude
that, to the extent that it is more costly to hold bank capital during recessions and that
the bank’s loan portfolio is characterized by a significant fraction of highly leveraged and
small firms, the introduction of Basel II accentuates the procyclical tendencies of banking,
amplifying business cycle uctuations.
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Chapter 1
Bank Capital Requirements, Business Cycles and the Basel
Accords: An Integrating Analysis
1.1 Introduction
The role of financial frictions in the propagation of exogenous shocks in the econ-
omy has been subject of much debate in the literature and of significant implications at
the institutional level. The main issue at stake is whether financial frictions, such as im-
perfect information in credit markets, are able to transform small exogenous shocks to the
economy into amplified, persistent and asymmetric movements in aggregate output.
This dissertation fits in this line of research by centering its attention on how micro-
economic structures, such as the bank funding structure and the relationship between the
bank and the borrower, interact with macroeconomic business conditions. In particular,
this thesis contributes to clarify the role of bank capital and its regulatory environment in
lending conditions and, consequently, in the propagation of technology and monetary and
fiscal policy shocks.
An additional motivation lies in current changes in the banking regulatory environ-
ment. In fact, the study of bank capital - business cycle interactions is quite up to date,
both at the academic and institutional level, due to the implications of the changeover from
Basel I to Basel II bank capital requirements rules, whose implementation have begun in
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January 2007.1 Rather than focusing on questions such as whether bank regulation is it-
self optimal and what type of regulation is most appropriate, we pay particular attention
to the hypothesis that the introduction of Basel II bank capital requirements may accen-
tuate the procyclical tendencies of banking, with potential macroeconomic consequences
(the Basel II procyclicality hypothesis). We thus follow a positive approach, rather than a
normative one: our objective is not to design the optimal regulatory rules, but to analyze
the macroeconomic consequences of a given regulation, namely, the capital requirements
regulation and its potential procyclical effects.
In this context, this first chapter discusses and brings together the theoretical liter-
ature on the relationship between bank capital and the business cycle with the literature
on the regulatory framework of capital requirements established by the Basel Accords.
We conclude that several theoretical studies predict that the introduction of bank capital
requirements, by limiting banks’ ability to supply loans, accentuates the procyclical ten-
dencies of banking, leading to amplified macroeconomic effects of monetary and other
exogenous shocks. However, whether or not Basel II capital requirements will add to this
amplification effect is still subject to much debate, as the discussion in Chapter 1 makes
clear.
The existence of empirical evidence that the bank funding structure, or, more specif-
ically, the bank capital, affects its supply of loans and, consequently, real activity, has
motivated our modelization, in Chapter 2, of the banking relationships in the context of a
dynamic general equilibrium model.
First, one strand of this empirical literature indicates that lending growth after a mon-
etary policy shock depends on the level of bank capital. See, for instance, Kishan and
Opiela [57, 58], Van den Heuvel [93] and Gambacorta and Mistrulli [43], who argue that
the real effects of monetary policy are generally stronger when banks are small and low-
capitalized. Also in this line of research, Hubbard et al. [51] find that, even after control-
ling for information costs and borrower risk, the cost of borrowing from low-capital banks
Basel I refers to the bank capital regulation framework established by the Basel Accord of 1988 and
introduced by the Basel Committee of Banking Supervision. Basel II is the new Basel Accord, released by
the same committee and seeking to improve on the rules set forth in the 1988 Accord, by aligning regulatory
capital requirements more closely to the underlying risks that banks face.
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is higher than the cost of borrowing from well-capitalized banks that is, capital positions
of individual banks affect the interest rate at which their clients borrow.
Second, as mentioned by Van den Heuvel [92], the importance of bank capital on
lending has increased since the implementation of Basel I, which, by imposing risk-based
capital requirements, limits the ability of banks with a shortage of capital to supply loans.
There is a considerable number of papers that test the hypothesis of a "credit crunch" -
a significant leftward shift in the supply curve for bank loans - that may have occurred
in the U.S. during the early 90s, simultaneously with the implementation of Basel I. The
idea behind those studies is that, given the common perception that bank capital is more
costly than alternative funding sources (such as deposits), regulatory capital requirements
can have real effects: in order to satisfy those requirements, banks may choose to reduce
loans and, in such an event, some otherwise worthy borrowers cannot obtain them. The
allocation of credit away from loans can, in turn, cause a significant reduction in macro-
economic activity, given that many borrowers cannot easily obtain other sources of fund-
ing in public markets. On this credit crunch literature, see, for instance, Bernanke and
Lown [18], Berger and Udell [12], Peek and Rosengren [73, 74], Furfine [42], and Sharpe
[85] for a review.
Some studies in this literature are, however, quite skeptical about the role of the credit
crunch in worsening the 1990 recession in the U.S. (e.g., Bernanke and Lown [18]): they
suggest that demand factors, including the weakened state of borrowers’ balance sheet,
were instead the major cause of the lending slowdown. In contrast, Peek and Rosengren
[74], for instance, identified an independent loan supply disruption and argued that this
shock had substantial effects on real economic activity in the U.S..
The model developed in Chapter 2 contributes to evaluate the relative importance of
these loan supply and demand effects, by bringing together, in a dynamic general equi-
librium model, the borrowers’ balance sheet channel developed by Bernanke et al. [17],
with an additional channel working through bank capital, which also amplifies the real
effects of exogenous nominal and real shocks.
Theoretically, our model has been motivated by Bernanke et al. [17]’s suggestion, in
their concluding remarks, to introduce the specific role of banks in cyclical uctuations:
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we explicitly consider the role of banks in financing two entities in financial deficit (the
public sector and nonfinancial firms) using the funds of the households. We also assume
that banks are constrained by a risk-based capital ratio requirement according to which
the ratio of bank capital to nonfinancial loans cannot fall below a regulatory minimum
exogenously set. Banks are, thus, limited in their lending to nonfinancial firms by the
amount of bank capital that households are willing to hold. Taking into account that
bank capital is more expensive to raise than deposits, since households require a liquidity
premium to hold bank capital in their portfolios, and that this difference tends to widen
(narrow) during a recession (expansion), we explore the additional channel through which
the effects of exogenous shocks on real activity are amplified - the bank capital channel.
The liquidity premium effect, through which the bank capital channel works in our
model, is strictly related to the financial accelerator effect associated with the borrowers’
balance sheet channel: when the liquidity premium and the financial accelerator effects
are both present, the external finance premium responds not only to borrowers’ financial
position (as in Bernanke et al. [17]), but also to the liquidity premium required by house-
holds to hold bank capital. This exacerbates the (countercyclical) response of the exter-
nal finance premium to a monetary policy shock, since the liquidity premium also moves
countercyclically and inuences positively the external finance premium, thus amplifying
the real effects of the exogenous shock. According to the model, the liquidity premium
effect amplifies business cycle uctuations the more significantly the closer the regulatory
rules are to Basel II, rather than to Basel I, therefore supporting the Basel II procyclicality
hypothesis.
The potential procyclical effects of Basel II rest on the fact that the minimum bank
capital requirements under the new regulatory framework become dependent on the riski-
ness of each particular bank exposure. Specifically, the risk weights used to compute bank
capital requirements under Basel II are determined both by the institutional nature of bank
borrowers (as in Basel I), and by the riskiness of each particular borrower: the higher the
credit risk of a given bank exposure, the higher the risk weight assigned to that exposure.
The general concern is that if, during a recession, the non-defaulted bank borrowers are
downgraded by the credit risk models in use, the minimum bank capital requirements will
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increase. Consequently, to the extent that it is difficult or costly for the bank to raise exter-
nal capital in bad times, this co-movement in bank capital requirements and the business
cycle may induce banks to further reduce lending during recessions, thereby amplifying
the initial downturn. This hypothesis motivated us to introduce, in Chapter 3, the bank-
borrower relationship into a heterogeneous-agent model, in which firms differ in their
access to bank credit depending on their financial position, that is, depending on their
perceived credit risk.
The Basel II procyclicality hypothesis has recently been subject to some empirical
research - see, for instance, Segoviano and Lowe [84], Kashyap and Stein [56], Altman
et al. [4] and Catarineu-Rabell et al. [28]. These studies generally point out that the
procyclical effects of Basel II will depend on how the minimum capital requirements will
react over the business cycle, which, in turn, depend (i) on banks’ customer portfolios, (ii)
on the approach adopted by banks to compute their minimum capital requirements, (iii)
on the nature of the rating system used, (iv) on the view adopted concerning how credit
risk evolves over time, (v) on the capital buffers over the regulatory minimum held by the
banking institutions, and (vi) on the market and supervisor intervention under Basel II.
The theoretical model developed in Chapter 3 contributes to evaluate the poten-
tial procyclical effects of Basel II, and to what extent those effects might depend both
on banks’ customer portfolios and on how borrowers’ credit risk evolves over the busi-
ness cycle. We depart from the model developed in Chapter 2 by considering that firms
have different leverage ratios, that is, have different levels of credit risk and, conse-
quently, face different access to bank credit. Compared with the representative-firm, this
heterogeneous-firm framework allows for a more accurate inference of the potential pro-
cyclical effects of the changeover from Basel I to Basel II capital requirements: by in-
troducing risk-sensitive capital requirements into a model with heterogeneous firms that
differ on credit risk, we may properly analyze to what extent the riskiness of a bank’s loan
portfolio may accentuate the procyclical tendencies of banking under Basel II.
Since bank capital is more costly to raise than deposits, due to households’ prefer-
ences for liquidity, the general equilibrium model in steady state illustrates that the intro-
duction of regulatory capital requirements under both Basel I and Basel II has a negative
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effect on the economy’s aggregate output. Specifically, the introduction of regulatory
capital requirements, by forcing banks to finance a fraction of loans with bank capital, in-
creases the banks’ loan funding cost and, consequently, the banks’ lending rates, thereby
leading to a lower aggregate amount of loans granted to firms and, thus, lower physical
capital accumulation and output. Besides, in a stationary equilibrium characterized by a
significant fraction of high credit risk firms, the former effect is stronger under Basel II
than under Basel I. It is worthwhile to mention here that our model abstracts from the
positive effects of banking regulation, which may counteract the aforementioned result.
We ignore, for instance, the role of bank capital regulation in avoiding financial crises -
because this is not the focus of this thesis -, which certainly affects the macroeconomic
equilibrium.
To the extent that it is costly to hold bank capital in bad times and that the repre-
sentative bank’s loan portfolio is characterized by a significant fraction of highly lever-
aged firms, the introduction of an aggregate technology shock into a partial equilibrium
version of the former heterogeneous-agent model supports the Basel II procyclicality hy-
pothesis: the introduction of Basel II capital requirements exacerbates the (countercycli-
cal) response of the firms’ financing cost to an aggregate technology shock, leading to a
more amplified decrease in firms’ physical capital accumulation and output. This ampli-
fication effect rests, not only on the countercyclical required return on bank capital, but
also on the risk profile of the bank’s loan portfolio. The model predicts that the financing
cost of highly leveraged firms is very sensitive to changes in the required return on bank
capital, under the new regulatory framework. As the economy’s stationary equilibrium is
characterized by a significant fraction of this type of firms, the average firms’ financing
cost responds more strongly to the aggregate technology shock under Basel II, leading to
more amplified effects on capital accumulation and output than under Basel I.
This result supports Kashyap and Stein [56]’s argument that Basel II capital require-
ments have the potential to create an amount of additional cyclicality in capital charges
that may be quite large depending on a bank’s customer mix. According to our results, the
Basel II procyclical effect should be greater, the greater the fraction of firms who begin
with relatively high leverage ratios, that is, with relatively high credit risk. The distrib-
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ution of firms over the leverage ratio, which in our model proxies for the credit risk, is
therefore crucial to evaluate the potential procyclical effects of the new bank capital re-
quirements rules.
In sum, in addition to the present chapter, this dissertation comprises Chapter 2,
which builds a bank capital channel into a general equilibrium model, and Chapter 3,
which evaluates the potential procyclical effects of Basel II in the context of a heterogeneous-
agent model. The conclusion of Chapter 3 also summarizes the state of this research
project.
1.2 The Bank Capital Channel: Related Theoretical Literature
The theoretical literature distinguishes three channels of propagation of the effects
of monetary policy, through mechanisms related to financial imperfections: (i) the bank
lending channel, considering that banks finance loans in part with liabilities that carry
reserve requirements, (ii) the borrowers’ balance sheet channel, focusing on borrowers’
financial position and its effect on the external finance premium that borrowers face and,
more recently, (iii) the bank capital channel, arguing that monetary policy affects bank
lending, in part, through its impact on bank capital.2
The traditional bank lending channel and the borrowers’ balance sheet channel have
been more extensively studied - see Bernanke [14] and Bernanke and Gertler [16], for a
review. Instead, we focus on the bank capital channel theoretical models, discussing the
main implications of those models, summarized in Table 1.1 and classified according to:
 The motivation for bank capital holdings (market or regulatory capital requirements)
 The nature of bank capital (issued capital and/or retained earnings)
 The effects of exogenous shocks on lending and/or on the business cycle.
As both the bank lending channel and the bank capital channel build on the hypothesis that monetary
policy works, in part, by affecting banks’ supply of loans, they are sometimes treated as part of a broader
bank lending channel, notwithstanding being based on different transmission mechanisms. Note, for in-
stance, that in contrast with the traditional bank lending channel, the borrowers’ balance sheet and the bank
capital channels may operate in response to factors other than changes in monetary policy.
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Bank Capital Effect of exogenous shocks on lending and/or business cycle
Chen (2001) Market Amplified and more persistent*
Sunirand (2003) Market Retained Earnings Amplified with the introduction of a double CSV approach
Meh and Moran (2007) Market Retained Earnings More persistent*
Blum and Hellwig (1995) Regulatory Binding Fixed (no new equity issue) Amplified with the introduction of binding CR
↑ Risk-based CR  decrease in aggregate lending;
Expansionary MP when CR are binding may not increase lending
Repullo and Suarez (2000) Regulatory Binding Retained Earnings Contractionary MP  ↓ of bank lending relative to market lending
Kopecky and VanHoose (2004) Regulatory Binding Issued Equity ↑ Risk-based CR reduces the effects of MP
Van den Heuvel (2005) Regulatory Binding/Not Binding Issued Equity ↑ CR reduces welfare
Markovic (2006) Regulatory - Issued Equity Amplification of output response to a contractionary MP
*When compared to a situation where information frictions between banks and depositors are absent
MP = Monetary Policy; CR = Capital Requirements
Regulatory Bank faces penalty if it doesn't satisfy CR Fixed (no new equity issue)
↓ Bank Capital or ↑ CR  shift IS curve to the left and make it steeper  
↓ equilibrium output and subsequent MP will be less effective
Binding/Not Bindingvon Peter (2004) Resembles a Regulatory CR
Confirms Blum and Hellwig (1995)'s results + Optimal MP neutralizes the 
procyclical impact of binding CRCecchetti and Li (2005) Regulatory Binding/Not Binding
Moves with aggregate output 
(by assumption)
Capital Requirements (CR)
Van den Heuvel (2002a) Regulatory Binding/Buffer
Aikman and Paustian (2006) Market
Thakor (1996) Regulatory Binding
Bank capital channel  (BCC): with CR, lending overreacts to the MP 
shock; The BCC amplifies the standard interest rate channel of MP
Bolton and Freixas (2006) Regulatory Binding Issued Equity Potential amplifying effect of MP: tightening in MP ↓ incentives to raise 
bank capital  further decline of lending
Binding Issued Equity
Procyclicality: neg. shock  ↓asset prices  firms default  loan losses 
 ↓bank capital  ↓ credit (if CR are binding)  ↓ asset pricesRetained Earnings
Bank capital accelerator effect : amplifies the impact of MP on the 
economy; Asymmetric effects
Berka and Zimmermann (2005) Regulatory Negative aggregate shock  credit crunch; But negative ag. shock and procyclical CR (tighter during recession) soften the loan decrease
Chami and Cosimano (2001) Regulatory Binding/Not Binding Issued Equity (but predetermined)
Tanaka (2002)
Retained Earnings
Retained Earnings + 
Endowment
Amplified and more persistent with the introduction of an asym. inform. 
problem between depositors and banks and between banks and firms
↑ Risk-based CR  decrease in loan growth; Negative shock to bank 
capital  decrease in loan growth
Furfine (2001) Regulatory Not Binding Retained Earnings + Issued Equity
Table 1.1. The Bank Capital Channel - Related Theoretical Models
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The rationale for bank capital holdings builds on the premise that banks may hold
capital for market and/or regulatory reasons. Market capital requirements, as defined by
Berger et al. [11], are associated with the capital ratio, i.e., the ratio of bank equity to
assets, that maximizes the value of the bank in the absence of regulatory capital require-
ments, but in the presence of the remaining regulatory structure that protects the safety
and soundness of the banking system. According to these authors, market requirements
can be justified (i) by the costs of bank financial distress, which tend to increase if the
bank capital ratio decreases, (ii) by the existence of transaction costs when issuing eq-
uity, associated with substantial financial distress costs from low capital, and (iii) by the
existence of agency problems between shareholders and creditors.
As reported in Table 1.1, Chen [31], Meh and Moran [68], Aikman and Paustian
[1] and Sunirand [87] focus on this type of bank capital requirements. The first three
models are built upon Holmstrom and Tirole [50] formulation that features two sources
of moral hazard. The first source affects the relationship between banks and borrowers:
entrepreneurs (borrowers) can choose between different projects and have an incentive
to undertake the riskier projects in order to enjoy private benefits. To deter entrepreneurs
from going after those private benefits, banks require them to invest their own funds in the
project. The second source of moral hazard inuences the relationship between banks and
households (depositors) and justifies the existence of market capital requirements: since
banks may not dutifully monitor the entrepreneurs, households only lend to banks which
invest their own net worth (bank capital) in the financing of the entrepreneurs’ projects.
That is, since banks act as delegated monitors for depositors, they must be well capitalized
to convince depositors that they have enough stake in the entrepreneurs’ projects.
In this context, Chen’s model predicts that, since both bank capital and firms net
worth are used as collateral, a change in their level has a direct effect on bank lending
and, thus, on the economy’s investment: when banks suffer capital erosion, they find it
difficult to seek alternative sources of finance, due to the second source of moral hazard
mentioned above, and are forced to cut back lending. This initial effect tends to persist
over time: with less investment from the previous period, entrepreneurs and banks earn
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less revenue and end up with a lower level of net worth. This further weakens the lending
capability of banks and borrowing capacity of entrepreneurs.
Meh and Moran [68] go a step further and embed Holmstrom and Tirole [50]’s frame-
work within a dynamic general equilibrium model. In particular, according to Meh and
Moran’s model, a contractionary monetary policy raises the opportunity cost of the ex-
ternal funds that banks use to finance investment projects and leads the market to require
banks and firms to finance a larger share of investment projects with their own net worth.
Since banks and firms’ net worth are largely predetermined, bank lending must decrease
to satisfy those market requirements, thereby leading to a decrease in investment. This
mechanism implies a decrease in banks and firms’ earnings and, consequently, a decrease
in banks and firms’ net worth in the future. Therefore, there is a propagation of the shock
over time after the initial impulse to the interest rate has dissipated. Aikman and Paustian
[1]’s model also builds on the earlier work by Chen [31], predicting that financial frictions
lead to both more amplified and more persistent response of macroeconomic variables to
technology, monetary and bank capital shocks, relative to the benchmark case of no finan-
cial imperfections. The amplification effect rests on the introduction of external capital
adjustment costs in the model: a contractionary monetary policy, for instance, reduces the
net worth of both entrepreneurs and banks, and, as in Kiyotaki and Moore [59], a negative
feedback effect arises from net worth to asset prices, and then back from asset prices to
net worth, which greatly magnifies the impact of the initial shock.
Sunirand [87], using an alternative framework, also supports the amplification hy-
pothesis. In particular, by extending the financial accelerator model of Bernanke et al.
[17] to consider a two-sided costly state verification (CSV) framework, Sunirand was
able to dissociate the amplification effect caused by the moral hazard problem between
depositors and banks, from the amplification effect caused by the asymmetric information
problem between banks and firms. According to the CSV framework, first introduced by
Townsend [91], the lender must pay a cost in order to observe the borrower’s realized re-
turn. In Sunirand’s model, banks act as delegated monitors on firms’ investment projects,
as in Bernanke et al., and depositors perform the role of ‘monitoring the monitor’, as
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in Krasa and Villamil [62].3 The two-sided costly state verification framework leads to
a wedge between the internal and external cost of funds, thereby motivating an endoge-
nous role for firms’ and banks’ capital in the model. Sunirand then shows that embedding
the informational asymmetry between households and banks into the financial accelerator
model, amplifies and propagates the effects of a negative monetary shock on aggregate
output and investment.
Among the studies in the second group, i.e., assuming bank capital requirements
imposed by banking regulation, are Blum and Hellwig [19], Thakor [90], Repullo and
Suarez [80], Chami and Cosimano [30], Van den Heuvel [92, 94], Berka and Zimmermann
[13], Bolton and Freixas [21] and Markovic [66]. Blum and Hellwig [19], one of the
pioneer studies on this subject, predicts that a rigid link between bank capital and bank
lending may act as an automatic amplifier for macroeconomic uctuations, leading banks
to lend more when times are good and to lend less when times are bad, thus reinforcing
any underlying shocks. Assuming that banks cannot issue new capital and that firms do
not fully replace bank loans by other sources of finance, the amplification mechanism
works as follows: if many banks experience low return realizations at the same time,
they may all become undercapitalized at the same time. Thus, they may all have to cut
back lending (or to recapitalize) at the same time, in the presence of a capital adequacy
requirement. This is likely to reduce investment, which reduces aggregate demand and,
therefore, the cash ow that firms obtain from current production. The reduction in cash
ow, in turn, affects the ability of firms to pay their debts and hence the returns that banks
receive on their loans. A given initial shock to asset returns may thus be amplified by
a rigid application of a capital adequacy requirement (Blum and Hellwig [19], pp. 741-
742).
Also assuming regulatory capital requirements, Repullo and Suarez [80] provide an
explanation for the decline of bank loans relative to market lending during episodes of
tight money: since some long-term bank assets involve fixed interest rates whereas the
returns of many short term bank liabilities are closely linked to market interest rates, a
monetary tightening will generate losses to the banks, thereby reducing bank capital. A
See also Zeng [98] on this approach.
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decrease in bank capital or an increase in capital requirements will, in turn, produce a
credit crunch: bank lending and investment will fall, and the higher quality bank borrow-
ers tend to shift to market finance.
Van den Heuvel [92] also assumes that banks are exposed to interest rate risk (as in
Repullo and Suarez [80]) and are not able to issue new capital (as in Blum and Hellwig
[19]). According to Van den Heuvel’s model, an increase in funds rate (due to a con-
tractionary monetary policy) and, consequently, an increase in bank’s cost of funding,
induces a decrease in bank’s profits, given the maturity mismatch on the bank’s balance
sheet. This, in turn, weakens the bank’s future capital position - since banks may only in-
crease their capital through retained earnings -, increasing the likelihood that its lending
will be constrained by an inadequate level of capital. Therefore, new lending overreacts
to the monetary policy shock, when compared to a situation of unconstrained banks. Van
den Heuvel refers to this channel by which monetary policy inuences the supply of bank
loans through its impact on bank capital as the bank capital channel. The strength of
this channel depends on the capital adequacy of the banking sector and the distribution of
capital across banks. In particular, lending by banks with low capital is delayed and then
amplified in reaction to interest rate shocks, relative to well capitalized banks.
Finally, Chami and Cosimano [30], Berka and Zimmermann [13], Bolton and Freixas
[21] and Markovic [66] also consider regulatory capital requirements, but, in contrast with
Van den Heuvel, assume the possibility of issuing equity. However, equity issuance may
involve costs, as in Bolton and Freixas [21], who introduce a cost of outside capital for
banks by assuming information dilution costs in issuing bank equity: outside equity in-
vestors, having less information about the profitability of bank loans, will tend to misprice
the equity issues of the most profitable banks. In this context, the presence of binding reg-
ulatory capital requirements may magnify the effects of a contractionary monetary policy,
since this policy may cause a decrease (or prevent an increase) in bank capital: a contrac-
tionary monetary policy may render bank loans insufficiently lucrative when information
dilution costs in issuing bank equity are taken into account.
Markovic [66] also explores the asymmetric information relationship between banks
and their shareholders, by developing a theoretical model that extends Bernanke et al.
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[17]’s work to account for three distinct bank capital channels: (i) the adjustment cost
channel, which builds on the allocation cost necessary to reduce the aforementioned
asymmetric information problem (ii) the default risk channel, which arises from the pos-
sibility of banks defaulting on their capital and (iii) the capital loss channel, based on
the assumption that, during a recession, banks’ shareholders anticipate a future fall in the
value of bank capital. All channels trigger an increase in the required return on bank cap-
ital by shareholders, and thus an increase in the cost of bank capital, during a recession.
This higher cost is then transferred to firms, which borrow from banks, thereby leading
to lower firms’ investment and output. All the three channels thus work to amplify the
output response to a contractionary monetary policy.
In Berka and Zimmermann [13], when an initial negative shock hits the economy,
bank capital becomes riskier and households channel their savings away from capital and
into deposits. The banks are then squeezed by the binding regulatory capital requirements
and have to decrease their loan supply and invest more in government bonds. Without
capital requirements, banks could supply more loans, in principle, by charging even higher
loan rates, and entrepreneurs would still be ready to pay these rates.
In a slightly different perspective, Van den Heuvel [94] quantifies the welfare costs
of bank capital requirements by embedding the role of liquidity creation by banks in a
general equilibrium model, with no aggregate uncertainty. The households’ preferences
for liquidity play here a major role: equilibrium asset returns reveal the strength of these
preferences and allow the quantification of the ("neither trivial nor gigantic", according to
the author) welfare costs of bank capital requirements. Regulators, thus, face a trade-off
between keeping the effective capital requirement ratio as low as possible while keeping
the probability of bank failure acceptably low.
Diamond and Rajan [39] and Gorton and Winton [47] also suggest that bank capital
may be costly by reducing banks’ ability to create liquidity through deposits: an increase
in bank capital, may reduce the probability of financial distress, but also reduces liquidity
creation by banks by decreasing the aggregate amount of deposits (the "financial fragility-
crowding out effect", in the words of Berger and Bouwman [10]). However, Berger and
Bouwman [10] also point out that other contributions suggest the opposite outcome: an
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increase in bank capital leads to increased banks’ risk bearing capacity, thereby leading to
an increase in liquidity creation (the "risk absorption" hypothesis). Berger and Bouwman
construct liquidity creation measures and test these opposing theoretical predictions, using
data on U.S. banks from 1993-2003, and concluding that, for large banks, capital has a
statistically significant positive net effect on liquidity creation whereas, for small banks,
the effect is significantly negative. The net effect may depend on both bank size and the
level of bank capitalization. As mentioned by the authors,
"the financial fragility-crowding out effect may be relatively strong for small banks
because they tend to raise funding locally, whereas large banks more often access cap-
ital markets, so that it is less likely that capital crowds out deposits for large banks.
In contrast, the risk absorption effect may be relatively strong for large banks because
these institutions are subject to more regulatory and market discipline. Combining
these relatively strengths suggests that the financial fragility-crowding out effect may
more likely empirically dominate for small banks while the risk absorption effect may
more likely dominate for large banks. Similarly, the risk absorption effect may be rel-
atively strong for banks with low capital ratios of any size because these banks have thin
buffers to absorb risks and tend to face more regulatory, market, and/or owner pressures
to control risk taking." (Berger and Bouwman [10], p. 2)
In sum, the majority of the theoretical models reported in Table 1.1 predict that the
introduction of bank capital requirements, for market or regulatory reasons, tends to am-
plify the effects of monetary and other exogenous shocks. The amplification effect usu-
ally rests on the existence of imperfect markets for bank capital: in some models banks
are not able to raise capital on the open market, implying that bank capital becomes deter-
mined by banks’ retained earnings and changes in asset values, whereas in other models
banks may issue capital but face an issuance cost, which tend to increase during eco-
nomic downturns. In this context, if the value of bank capital decreases or its issuance
costs increase, the banks’ cost of funds tend to increase, particularly when the amount of
bank capital is not much higher than the level demanded by regulators or the market. This
higher cost is then transferred to firms, when borrowing from banks, thereby leading to
lower investment and output.
14
1.3 Capital Requirements within Banking Regulation
The preceding analysis reveals that the bank capital channel literature considers that
banks, for market or regulatory reasons, are required to hold capital in their balance sheet.
We now take a closer look to regulatory capital requirements, focusing on whether the
new Basel Capital Accord will strengthen or weaken the potential amplification effects
which underlie the bank capital channel.
1.3.1 Banking Prudential Regulation
Regulatory bank capital requirements are one of a broad set of instruments used in
banking prudential regulation. According to Freixas and Rochet [41], other instruments
are often used, such as, (i) deposit interest rate ceilings, (ii) entry, branching, network, and
merger restrictions, (iii) portfolio restrictions, (iv) deposit insurance, (v) and regulatory
monitoring (including closure policy).
The justification for any regulation is usually associated with market failures, such as
externalities, market power or asymmetric information. Lind [64] points out three factors
which justify, in particular, bank regulation: (i) certain banking activities are intrinsically
vulnerable4 (ii) even minor disturbances can threaten overall financial stability through
contagion (iii) banks are the dominant providers of some key services as the payment
system and the lending to small and medium-sized enterprises.
Santos [83], in turn, argues that one of the two most presented justifications for bank-
ing regulation is the inability of depositors to monitor banks.5 According to Dewatripont
and Tirole [38], small depositors protection is indeed one of the primary concerns of cur-
rent prudential regulation of banks. Asymmetric information leads to substantial moral
hazard and adverse selection in banking. Therefore, investors must perform several mon-
itoring activities, such as screening and auditing. However, these activities are complex,
expensive, and time-consuming and their exercise is a ‘natural monopoly’, in that their
duplication by several parties is technically wasteful. Since bank debt is primarily held
For instance, as loans usually have a longer duration than deposits, banks may lose a large proportion
of their deposits rather quickly while their loans remain outstanding.
The other being the risk of a systemic crisis.
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by a very large number small depositors, who are most often unable to understand the
specificities of balance and off-balance sheet banking activities, a free riding problem
emerges: bank customers have little individual incentive to perform the various monitor-
ing functions. This free riding gives rise to a need for private or public representatives of
depositors (Dewatripont and Tirole [38], pp. 31-32). To ensure that there is better pub-
lic information, regulators can also require banks to follow certain standard accounting
principles and to disclose a wide range of information that helps to assess the quality of a
bank’s portfolio (Mishkin [70], p. 268).6
As mentioned before, the prudential regulation of banks is also motivated by the
systemic risk prevention. In particular, Santos [83] points out that a bank run, that is
triggered by depositors’ panic or by the release of information when there is asymmetric
information among depositors about bank returns, leads to the premature liquidation of
bank assets and may trigger contagion runs, which may culminate in a banking system
failure. Among the proposals to insulate banks from runs are the development of narrow
banks - banks that invest the deposits of the public in traded securities -, the development
of banks that finance loans entirely with equity, the suspension of convertibility, the cen-
tral bank’s role as lender of last resort and the development of deposit insurance.7 In this
context, Allen and Herring [2] argue that reserve, capital and liquidity requirements de-
signed to ensure that banks will be able to honor their liabilities to their depositors, have a
consumer protection and microprudential rationale as well as a macroprudential rationale
to safeguard the system against systemic risk.
However, the creation of a government safety net for depositors may sometimes gen-
erate excessive risk taking on behalf of banks’ managers, calling for additional regulation.
As Mishkin [70] points out, with a safety net depositors know they will not suffer huge
losses if a bank fails and, therefore, tend not to withdraw deposits when they suspect that
the bank is taking on too much risk. For instance, to avoid bank panics and their so-
It is true that large corporations are also financed by the public: stocks and bonds issued by large
companies are in fact widely diffused. However, there are two differences, according to Freixas and Rochet
[41]: these securities are not used as a means of payment, and the ratio of debt to assets is substantially
higher for financial intermediaries than for nonfinancial firms. Therefore, the free rider problem involved
in the monitoring of widely held firms seems to be quantitatively much more serious in the case of banks
(Freixas and Rochet [41], p. 264).
See Santos [83] for details.
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cial costs, the authorities of many countries have established deposit insurance schemes.
Under such schemes each bank pays a premium to a deposit insurance company, and in
exchange its depositors have their deposits insured up to a fixed limit in the case the bank
fails. As mentioned by Gorton and Winton [48], once deposit insurance has been adopted,
there is a further need for government intervention via bank regulation because of the in-
centive of banks to take additional risks once they have (underpriced) government deposit
insurance.8 Regulatory capital requirements should thus be introduced as part of the pru-
dential regulation, to reduce the tendency towards excessive risk taking by banks, dimin-
ishing the bank insolvency risk. Beside providing a cushion against losses, bank capital
also works to discipline banks’ managers: when a bank is forced to hold a large amount
of capital, it has more to lose if it fails (Mishkin [70], p. 265). In this context, Kashyap
and Stein [56] perceive capital regulation as an instrument the regulator uses to get each
bank to internalize the systemic costs, such as losses absorbed by government deposit in-
surance and disruptions to other players in the financial system, which are not fully borne
by the bank in question.
Capital standards may also be an important instrument to implement the optimal gov-
ernance of banks as those standards can be used to define the threshold for the transfer of
control from banks’ shareholders to the regulator (Santos [83], p. 59). Additionally, Mor-
rison and White [71] argue that capital regulation should also have the effect of discourag-
ing unsound and unreliable institutions from setting up operations: capital requirements
can be used to solve adverse selection problems, that is, to select out bad banks from the
system.
In this context, and as mentioned by Santos [83], rules on bank capital are one of the
most prominent aspects of banking regulation. This prominence results mainly from the
role of bank capital in banks’ soundness, risk-taking incentives and corporate governance,
as the studies mentioned above indicate.
There is a large body of literature on the moral hazard issue of deposit insurance. See Santos [83] for
a review.
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1.3.2 Bank Capital Regulation: the Basel Accords
The bank capital regulation framework established by the Basel Accord of 1988
(Basel I, hereafter), and adopted, not only by the countries belonging to the Basel Com-
mittee,9 but by more than 100 countries around the world, established banks’ obligation
to continually meet a risk-based capital requirement. In short, each bank, under Basel I,
must maintain a total risk-weighted capital ratio, defined as the ratio of bank capital to the
bank’s risk-weighted assets, of at least 8%. The weights for assets on the balance sheet
depend, in turn, on the institutional nature of the borrower. For example, a zero weight is
assigned to a government security issued in the OECD, meaning that the bank can finance
such asset through deposits without adding any capital. Other three weights are permit-
ted, all meant to reect credit risk: 0.2 (e.g., for interbank loans in OECD countries), 0.5
(e.g., for loans fully secured by mortgages on residential property) and 1 (e.g., for indus-
trial and commercial loans).10
The same risk weight thus applies to all loans of a particular category (‘one-size-fits-
all’ approach). Consequently, this categorization does not reect the risk that a particular
borrower actually poses for the bank. The failure to distinguish among loans of very
different degrees of credit risk created the incentive for arbitrage activities. As mentioned
by Jones [53], p. 36,
"in recent years, securitization and other financial innovations have provided unprece-
dented opportunities for banks to reduce substantially their regulatory measures of risk,
with little or no corresponding reduction in their overall economic risks - a process
termed regulatory capital arbitrage (RCA)."
As explained by Jones, RCA, in general, exploits differences between a portfolio’s
true economic risks and the risk measurements defined by the bank regulation, usually in-
volving the unbundling and repackaging of a bank’s portfolio risks so that a disproportion-
ate amount of that portfolio’s true underlying credit risk is treated as lower risk-weighted
assets, or as having been sold to third-party investors. According to this author, from a
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (‘the Basel Committee’) consists of central bank and
supervisory authority representatives from Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg,
the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States.
	See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision [8], for a detailed description of the rules introduced
by Basel I, and Dewatripont and Tirole [38], for a short review.
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regulatory perspective, capital arbitrage has thus undermined the effectiveness of Basel I.
At least for large banks, capital ratios under this framework are no longer consistent mea-
sures of capital adequacy: available evidence suggests that the volume of RCA activities
is large and growing rapidly, especially among the largest banks.11 Furthermore, financial
innovation is making RCA more accessible to a wider set of banks than in the past.12
In this context, a new framework for capital requirements, also released by the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), emerged to address some of the major short-
comings of Basel I and foster stability in financial system: the new Basel Accord - Basel
II, hereafter. One of the central changes proposed by Basel II, whose implementation
has begun in January 2007, is the increased sensitivity of a bank’s capital requirement to
the risk of its assets: the amount of capital that a bank has to hold against a given expo-
sure becomes a function of the estimated credit risk of that exposure. Consequently, the
constant risk weight of 100% for commercial and industrial (C&I) loans, for instance, is
replaced by a variable weight, so that the C&I loans with a low credit rating and a high
probability of default are thus assigned a high risk weight. That is, under Basel II, the risk
weights used to compute bank capital requirements are determined both by the category
of borrower and by the riskiness of a particular borrower, thus aiming to reduce regulatory
capital arbitrage.
Basel II is built on three complementary pillars:13
Nevertheless, Jones also argues that RCA has been beneficial in minimizing allocative inefficiency
in lending markets: RCA permits banks to compete effectively with nonbanks in low-risk businesses they
would otherwise be forced to exit owing to high regulatory capital requirements.

Gorton and Winton [47] also suggest that national regulators have consistently weakened the 1988
Basel agreement both by applying capital guidelines selectively and by redefining what is meant by ‘capi-
tal’. Even as international bank regulators have been revising the 1988 Basel Accord to strengthen it (e.g.,
the statement issued by the Basel Committee on "Instruments Eligible for Inclusion in Tier 1 Capital"),
"the national regulators have successfully lobbied to weaken these standards by broadening the definition
of capital." (Gorton and Winton [47], p. 2). von Thadden [96], in turn, argues that according to its major
critics, Basel I, besides giving rise to regulatory arbitrage, ignored modern credit risk management tech-
niques, failed to take account of the dynamic distortions of capital regulation, and neglected complementary
regulatory instruments such as supervisory monitoring or prompt corrective regulatory action.
See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision [9] for details. On July 2006, the BCBS issued a
comprehensive version of the Basel II framework. This document is a compilation of Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision [9], the elements of the Basel I that were not revised during the Basel II process, the
1996 Amendment to the Capital Accord to Incorporate Market Risks, and the 2005 paper on the Application
of Basel II to Trading Activities and the Treatment of Double Default Effects. For a short chronology of the
Basel II process see Dierick et al. [40], p. 9, box 1.
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 Pillar 1 (minimum regulatory capital requirements) establishes the capital requirements
for credit risk, market risk and operational risk14
 Pillar 2 (supervisory action) comprises the ‘supervisory review process’, which out-
lines the requirements on banks’ management of risks and capital and defines the roles
and powers of the supervisors. Basel II should thus involve supervisors more directly in
the review of banks’ risk profiles, risk management practices and risk-bearing capacity
than Basel I
 Pillar 3 (market discipline) sets out requirements on banks for public disclosures. In
particular, banks will be required to publish information on their business profile, risk ex-
posure and risk management. Market participants will thus have better information on
banks, improving the functioning of market discipline.
As we intend to study the relationship between regulatory capital requirements and
the business cycle, our attention focuses on capital requirements for credit risk under
Pillar 1.
According to Basel II rules, banks may adopt one of the following approaches to
compute their minimum capital requirements for credit risk:
- The Standardized Approach. Under this approach, the risk weight associated with
each loan is based on an external rating institution’s evaluation of counterpart risk. This
may reect a considerable differentiation in the risk weights used compared to Basel I:
for instance, the less risky C&I loans can be assigned a risk weight of 20% whereas
the loans granted to the riskiest C&I firms are assigned a risk weight of 150%. Capital
charges for loans to unrated companies remain essentially unchanged when compared to
Basel I. Some authors (e.g., Hakenes and Schnabel [49]) thus argue that, in practice, the
standardized approach may become similar to the regulation imposed by Basel I, since in
many countries no external ratings exist for a large fraction of corporate loans15
Credit risk is the risk of losses in balance and off-balance sheet positions resulting from the failure of a
counterparty to perform according to a contractual arrangementMarket risk is the risk of losses in balance
and off-balance sheet positions arising from movements in market prices and volatilities Operational risk is
the risk of losses resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, people or systems, or from external
events.
An exception being the U.S., where many corporate borrowers are rated. However, the standardized
approach is not supposed to be implemented in this country.
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- The Internal Ratings Based (IRB) Approach. The estimated credit risk and, con-
sequently, the risk weights used to compute capital requirements, are assumed to be a
function of four parameters associated with each loan: the probability of default (PD), the
loss given default (LGD), the exposure at default (EAD) and loan’s maturity (M). Banks
adopting the "Advanced" variant of the IRB approach are responsible for providing all
four of these parameters themselves, using their own internal rating models. Banks adopt-
ing the "Foundation" variant of the IRB approach will be responsible only for providing
the PD parameter, with the other three parameters to be set externally by the regulatory
authorities.
Therefore, the IRB approach, considered one of the most innovative elements of
Basel II, permits the use of internal credit risk models by banks (as long as they are
validated by the regulatory authority) to assess the riskiness of their portfolios and to
determine their required capital. By aligning required capital more closely to banks’ own
risk estimates, Basel II should decrease the gap between regulatory and market capital
requirements, thus encouraging banks to improve their risk assessment methods.
Basel II contains a long list of minimum requirements that a bank has to fulfill to
be eligible for the IRB approach. Consequently, as mentioned by Hakenes and Schnabel
[49], the introduction of this approach requires high fixed costs which may deter smaller
and less sophisticated banks from adopting it. Nonetheless, Lind [64] points out that
banks still have an incentive to move to the IRB approach since the required capital will
then be more closely aligned with each bank’s actual risk.16 In addition, the adoption of
the IRB approach may imply a lower capital requirement. The Committee of European
Banking Supervisors [33], for instance, concludes, using a sample of European banks, that
the minimum required capital under Pillar 1 would decrease relative to Basel I and that
this decline would be amplified if banks move to more advanced approaches to compute
their minimum capital requirements. Note, however, that, as mentioned in the report,
these results might be inuenced by the fact that the study was carried out in a period of
favorable macroeconomic conditions in most countries.
See Repullo and Suarez [81] and Hakenes and Schnabel [49], for instance, on the banks’ optimal
choice between the IRB and the standardized approaches.
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Concerns have been raised that Basel II may raise the financing costs of small and
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) due to banks’ potential perception that these firms are
riskier and, hence, carry higher capital requirements than under Basel I (Altman and
Sabato [5]). Accordingly, the last version of the new framework recognizes a special
treatment for these firms:17 subject to certain conditions, aggregate exposures to a SME
can be treated as "retail exposures", which is advantageous compared to the treatment of
other corporate lending. Even SMEs considered as corporate can benefit, under certain
conditions, from a preferential treatment based on an adjustment relative to the firm’s size.
In fact, as Figure 1.1 illustrates, the risk weights, under the IRB approach, differ across
banks’ asset classes, and, for a given probability of default, the risk weights assigned to
retail or to SMEs exposures are smaller than the risk weight assigned to a corporate ex-
posure.
Figure 1.1. Risk weights under the IRB approach (Source: Dierick et al., 2005, "The
New Basel Capital Framework and its Implementation in the European Union", European
Central Bank Occasional Paper Series, No. 42)
Based on the fact that default probabilities for smaller firms are observed to be less correlated with
the overall state of the economy (Dierick et al. [40]).
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Basel II implementation has started in January 2007. In the U.S. only the large inter-
nationally active banks will be required to follow the Advanced IRB approach for credit
risk. However, other banks that meet the requirements for the use of this approach can
also adopt Basel II.18 In this context, and according to Dierick et al. [40], approximately
twenty banks fall into these two categories.19 All the other banks operating in the U.S.
will continue to follow Basel I rules or may adopt the U.S. Basel IA proposal, designed to
modernize the Basel I framework, improving its risk sensitivity without making it overly
complex for smaller banks. In the E.U., Basel II framework (transposed into E.U. leg-
islation by means of the Capital Requirements Directive) will apply to all banks and in-
vestment firms, independent of their size or the geographical scope of their activity. As
mentioned by The Economist (November 4, 2006, p. 86), since Basel II is being applied
in stages, full compliance in the E.U. is not due until 2008, and 2009 in the U.S.
Basel II Capital Requirements and Procyclicality
As argued by Lowe [65], Allen and Saunders [3] and Amato and Furfine [6], the
banking industry is inherently procyclical, regardless of the design of capital require-
ments, due mainly to the existence of asymmetric information and market imperfections:
on the one hand, banks tend to decrease lending during recessions, because of their con-
cern about loan quality and repayment probability, exacerbating the economic downturn
as credit constrained firms and individuals decrease their real investment activity. On the
other hand, banks tend to increase lending during expansions, thereby contributing to a
possible overheating of the economy. Procyclicality here thus refers to the tendency of
the financial system to reinforce the business cycle.
The introduction of the new bank capital requirements rules proposed by Basel II may
accentuate the procyclical tendencies of banking, with potential macroeconomic conse-
quences. Under both the standardized and the IRB approaches the higher the credit risk
of a given asset, the higher the capital that a bank will have to hold against it. If the
credit risk of the banks’ assets is countercyclical, the risk weights used to compute capi-
Only the most advanced approach of Basel II will be implemented in U.S.
Or twenty six, according to The Economist (November 4, 2006, p. 86).
23
tal requirements and, consequently, the minimum bank capital requirement, will increase
during recessions.20 The implementation of Basel II thus raises some concerns, from a
macroeconomic point of view: a co-movement in capital requirements and the business
cycle may induce banks to further reduce lending during recessions due to high capital
requirement. As mentioned by Daníelsson et al. [36], p.15,
"the riskiness of assets varies over the business cycle. Risk assessments, whether based
on credit rating agencies’ assessments or internal ratings, reect this procyclicality
- possibly more so in the case of internal ratings, which typically do not attempt to
assess risk ‘through the cycle’. This procyclicality in ratings will create a similar pro-
cyclicality in capital charges, with the implication that banks hold less capital or over-
lend at the cusp of a cycle - exactly when the danger of a systemic crises is largest
- while they will hold too much capital or underlend during the downturn when macro-
economic stabilisation requires an expansion of lending. As a result, regulation not
only renders bank crises more likely but could also destabilise the economy as a whole
by exaggerating uctuations."
To further clarify the Basel II procyclicality hypothesis, consider the potential effects
of an economic downturn under Basel I and Basel II. Under Basel I, minimum capital re-
quirements are fixed through time, and may become binding when banks’ capital declines
following the recognition of credit losses. Under Basel II, in turn, capital requirements can
become binding, not only because of the former effect (capital decline), but also because
existing non-defaulted loans are likely to become significantly riskier: as loans move to
higher risk classes, the minimum capital requirement increases. To the extent that it is
difficult or costly to raise external capital in bad times, as predicted by many of the theo-
retical models analyzed in Section 1.2, banks will be forced to cut back on their lending
activity, thereby contributing to a worsening of the initial downturn. Consequently, Basel
II may lead to a greater financial amplification of the business cycle than Basel I, coun-
teracting capital regulation’s goal to foster financial stability.
The Basel II procyclicality hypothesis has recently been subject to some empirical
research. Segoviano and Lowe [84], using data on internal ratings from banks operating
in Mexico over the second half of the 1990s, analyze how much regulatory capital require-
ments might move through time under Basel II. Their results indicate that, under the new

	See Lowe [65] and Allen and Saunders [3] for a review on the relationship between the measures of
credit risk exposure (namely, PD, LGD and EAD) and the macroeconomic conditions.
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Basel accord, measured risk is likely to increase in economic downturns and decrease in
economic booms. Consequently, the banks’ required amount of capital would have risen
steeply after the crisis in 1994 and then declined as the economy recovered. This same
pattern is likely to be translated into regulatory capital requirements, with the minimum
requirements increasing when times are bad and decreasing when times are good.21 Car-
ling et al. [24]’s empirical results, using data from a major Swedish bank for the period
of 1994 to 2000, also suggest that the application of the IRB approach would increase the
credit risk sensitivity in minimal capital charges and accentuate the procyclical tendencies
of banking.
Kashyap and Stein [56] simulate the degree of capital charge cyclicality that would
have taken place over the four year interval 1998-2002 - a time period characterized by
marked economic slowdowns in both the U.S. and Europe - had the Basel II foundation
IRB approach been in use. These simulations, which use data on the U.S., some European
countries and the ‘Rest of the World’, suggest that Basel II capital requirements have the
potential to create an amount of additional cyclicality in capital charges that may be -
depending on a bank’s customer mix and the credit-risk models that it uses - quite large.
Altman et al. [4] point out that the procyclical effects of Basel II may be even more
severe than expected if banks use their own estimates of LGD: low recovery rates when
defaults are high will amplify cyclical effects, which will tend to be especially strong
under the advanced IRB approach, where banks are free to estimate their own recovery
rates and may tend to revise them downward when defaults increase and ratings worsen.
The use of long term recovery rates by banks should attenuate this effect, but would also
force banks to maintain a less updated picture of their risks, thereby substituting stability
for precision, in Altman et al.’s words.
Concerning the standardized approach of Basel II, Carpenter et al. [27]’s estimates
on how risk-weighted C&I loans might have evolved over the last three decades if banks
had been using this approach, suggest very little cyclical impact compared to Basel I. That
is, the variation in ratings over the business cycle would not have been substantial enough

Note that this work is based on Basel II’s proposal released in 2001, and does not take into account
the latest version of 2004 which introduced some measures to attenuate the potential procyclical effects of
Pillar 1, as we will analyze later on in this section.
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to imply much additional cyclicality under the standardized approach of the new accord
when compared to Basel I. Recall that, under the standardized approach of Basel II, un-
rated firms are treated as in Basel I and the risk weights assigned to rated firms are based
on ratings of external agencies. Many of those rating agencies follow a through-the-cycle
approach to compute the default probability over the life of the loan, rating borrowers
according to their ability to withstand a recession. One advantage of this approach, ac-
cording to Segoviano and Lowe [84], is that it makes ratings less sensitive to the business
cycle. Amato and Furfine [6], using data on all U.S. firms rated by Standard & Poor’s,
support this idea showing that a firm’s rating, conditional on its underlying financial and
business characteristics, does not generally exhibit excess sensitivity to the business cycle.
However, as argued by Carpenter et al. [27], while the through-the-cycle approach
may create a presumption against changes in ratings over the business cycle, the additional
information available during actual downturns may nevertheless induce some cyclical ef-
fects. As noted by Pederzoli and Torricelli [72], if actual conditions are worse than the
scenario considered by the rating agencies, downgrades are likely to follow. Tanaka [89]
also points out that credit ratings derived from the existing through-the-cycle models tend
to lag rather than lead business cycles, so that the capital requirements based on external
credit ratings are likely to be lax during booms and stringent during recessions. Accord-
ing to Amato and Furfine [6], the difficulty in assessing whether ratings are excessively
procyclical is in determining what is an appropriate degree of co-movement between rat-
ings and the cycle. They argue that since most of the studies, which examine ratings
behavior over time, perform an analysis unconditional with respect to the specific charac-
teristics of firms, they cannot conclude that ratings are assigned in a procyclical manner,
but only that ratings move procyclically. Amato and Furfine’s results indicate that the
co-movement between through-the-cycle credit ratings and the business cycle is gener-
ally driven by cyclical changes to business and financial risks, and not to cycle related
changes to rating standards.
An alternative to the through-the-cycle approach, is the point-in-time approach, fol-
lowed by several banking institutions. The point-in-time rating systems assign ratings
according to the ability of the borrowers to fulfil obligations over the credit horizon, typi-
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cally one year, and are likely to be more sensitive to the business cycle than the through-
the-cycle approach.
The extent of additional procyclicality associated with the IRB approach of Basel II
should thus depend on the nature of the rating system used by banks, as Catarineu-Rabell
et al. [28]’s empirical study shows. According to this study, if banks use internal rat-
ings close to those of the main rating agencies, which are designed to be relatively stable
over the cycle (e.g., Moody’s rating system), the increase in capital requirements during
a recession is quite small (around 15%). However, if banks choose an approach based on
point-in-time rating systems, the increase in capital requirements during a recession will
be much more pronounced (around 40% to 50%). As mentioned by Pederzoli and Torri-
celli [72], the final version of Basel II, released in 2004, implicitly requires a through-the-
cycle rating system, by recognizing that banks adopting the IRB approach are required to
use a time horizon longer than one year in assigning ratings and to assess ratings accord-
ing to the "borrower’s ability and willingness to contractually perform despite adverse
economic conditions or the occurrence of unexpected events" (Basel Committee on Bank-
ing Supervision [9], par. 415). However, Repullo and Suarez [82] argue that, although
Basel II implicitly requires a through-the-cycle rating system, "industry practices based
on point-in-time rating systems, the dynamics of rating migrations, and composition ef-
fects make the effective capital charges on a representative loan portfolio very likely to be
higher in recessions than in expansions." (Repullo and Suarez [82], p. 1)
The procyclical effects of Basel II may also depend on the view adopted concerning
how credit risk evolves through time. According to Lowe [65] and Segoviano and Lowe
[84], for instance, one possible view is that the current performance of the economy can
be taken as the best guess of its future performance (the random walk view). This view
leads to risk being measured as low in an expansion and high in a recession, yielding
to higher regulatory capital requirements in a downturn than in a boom. An alternative
view, pointed out by the same authors, suggests that the forces that drive economic booms
often (although not always) sow the seeds of future economic downturns by generating
imbalances in both real and financial sectors. Segoviano and Lowe argue that these im-
balances increase risk by increasing uncertainty about the financial strength of individual
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borrowers, by making default probabilities more highly correlated, and by making future
collateral values more uncertain. In this context, the increase in defaults during a reces-
sion might be thought of as the materialization of risk built up during the boom. That is,
this view - the predictability view - is consistent with the proposition that risk builds up in
the boom but materializes in the downturn, and opens the possibility of measured credit
risk being relatively high when times are good.
As mentioned by Pederzoli and Torricelli [72], while the existence and the nature of
the relationship between real activity and default rates, as a measure of the materialized
risk, are not controversial, the debate is still ongoing regarding the relationship between
risk accumulation and the economic conditions. This debate is crucial to assess the po-
tential procyclical effects of Basel II, as the adoption of one of the two views described
above will inuence the path of the risk-based capital requirements during the business
cycle: depending on the view adopted, ratings may decline when economic conditions are
depressed or when financial imbalances emerge in good times.
Finally, some authors argue that procyclicality may not be a problem at all. In Dierick
et al. [40]’s opinion, for instance, although some empirical evidence indicates that capital
rules can exacerbate the economic cycle, during the development of the new rules of
Basel II various changes were made to accommodate this possibility. Besides, Jordan
et al. [54] point out that the improved risk-sensitivity under Basel II will encourage
banks to recognize and correct capital inadequacies earlier in the cycle, and therefore
may prevent the sudden declines in capital adequacy that cause credit crunches. Ayuso
et al. [7], drawing on a large panel of Spanish banks over the period 1986-2000, find
a robustly significant negative relationship between the business cycle and the capital
buffers, that is, the excess of current capital over the minimum capital requirements, that
Spanish banks held throughout the period. This results comes from the era of Basel I
but, according to von Thadden [96], if it carries over the era of Basel II, the current
concerns about the procyclicality of the new capital regulation may be exaggerated: if
banks build up capital buffers in downturns without being forced to do so by regulation,
then the new regulation, that makes part of this build-up mandatory under Pillar 2, may
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have little effect.22 Nevertheless, Ayuso et al. [7] argue that their result offers some
support to the view that some banks may behave in an excessively lax manner during
upturns because they do not take properly into account the cyclical nature of output and,
therefore, tend to underestimate risks under economic upturns. This should justify a closer
monitoring of banks’ own resources during good times by supervisors under Pillar 2 of
the new Basel Accord. It is also worthwhile to mention that, according to Repullo and
Suarez [82]’s theoretical model, the cyclical pattern of the buffers gets reversed in Basel
II, relative to Basel I, for precautionary reasons. According to these authors, the capital
buffers contribute to dampen, but do not eliminate, the procyclicality of Basel II and it
is inaccurate to accept that the cyclical behavior of capital buffers under Basel II can
be predicted from the empirical behavior of capital buffers under Basel I: "If buffers are
endogenously affected by the prevailing bank capital regulation (even if they appear not
to ‘bind’), reduced-form extrapolations from the Basel I world to the Basel II world do
not resist the Lucas’ critique." (Repullo and Suarez [82], p. 25).
In sum, this discussion shows that whether or not Basel II capital requirements will
add to the procyclical effects predicted by some of the theoretical models analyzed in
Section 1.2, is subject to much debate. Whereas some authors argue that the introduction
of the new bank capital requirements rules proposed by Basel II will accentuate the pro-
cyclical tendencies of banking, other authors argue that Basel II will contribute to a more
stable financial system, and, while it may not attenuate normal swings in the business
cycle, it will help avoiding the type of financial crises that occasionally have very large
macroeconomic effects.
Counteracting the Likelihood of Procyclical Effects under Basel II
Although the debate on the potential procyclical effects of Basel II is still ongoing,
the previous discussion made clear that the likelihood of those effects depends in large
part on what else changes with the implementation of risk-based capital requirements


See also Peura and Jokivuolle [76], who, using data on large banks in G10 countries, show that those
banks tend to hold considerable buffer capital, and Stolz and Wedow [86], who suggest that bank capital
buffers of German banks moved countercyclically during the 1993-2003 period.
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under the new Basel Accord. Lowe [65] suggests three factors, which may attenuate the
likelihood of the capital requirements procyclical effects under Basel II:
Improvements in credit risk management
The financial system should become less procyclical than in recent decades, if credit
risk management, within financial institutions, improves. For instance, as credit quality
problems should be recognized earlier in the business cycle, corrective actions can also
be taken sooner, and problems can be solved earlier, decreasing the likelihood of finan-
cial instability. Besides, and as mentioned before, under Pillar 2, banks are required to
follow the through-the-cycle approach analyzed above: in particular, banks are required
to evaluate their risk bearing capacity with respect to scenarios which would particularly
affect their credit exposures, and to draw on a longer time horizon in their assessment of
the borrowers’ credit risk under the IRB approach (Dierick et al. [40]).
Buffers over regulatory minimum
To avoid the procyclical effect of regulatory capital requirements, supervisors and
markets should require, under Basel II, financial institutions to carry large enough capital
buffers in good times to enable them to meet the higher requirements when times are not
so good. In fact, the supervisor review process, which underlies the second pillar of Basel
II, specifies that supervisors should expect banks to operate above the minimum regu-
latory capital ratios and should have the ability to require banks to hold capital buffers,
which should in turn attenuate the potential procyclical effects of the new regulation.
Changes in supervisory practices
Basel II rules recognize that supervisors must assess whether a bank is adequately
capitalized, even if it is meeting the Pillar 1 minimum capital requirements, taking into
account external factors such as business cycle effects. Pillar 2 also establishes that banks
must develop an internal capital adequacy assessment process (ICAAP), which should
ensure that banks adequately identify and measure their risks, set adequate internal capital
in relation to their risk profile and use sound risk management systems and develop them
further. Supervisors are responsible for evaluating banks’ ICAAP and for ensuring that
the processes for developing those assessments are robust and satisfactory. Additionally,
credit quality problems should become evident much earlier, not only because of better
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credit risk management practices, but also because of broader disclosure under Pillar 3. In
this context, supervisors cannot ignore deteriorations in the quality of banks’ portfolios,
and should help to overcome the problems that arise when banks in very poor condition
are allowed to continue operating.
Beyond these three factors, recognized by the last version of Basel II regulation,
Gordy and Howells [46] also point out that, if the procyclicality hypothesis is still con-
firmed, there is room for some corrective measures within the IRB approach, by directly
smoothing the output of the capital function. According to these authors, the new regula-
tion addresses the potential procyclical effects essentially by (i) smoothing the inputs of
the IRB capital function (e.g., adopting through-the-cycle rating methodologies) and (ii)
attening the capital function in order to reduce its sensitivity to risk components (see
Figure 1.1 above). However, these two solutions, by acting on the risk components or on
the measure of potential loss, trigger a loss of transparency, since the calculated required
capital does not properly represent actual risk (Pederzoli and Torricelli [72]). In this con-
text, Gordy and Howells [46] show that a third solution - smoothing the IRB output - is
less destructive to the information value of the capital ratio across banks and across time,
when compared to the first solution, and is more effective in dampening procyclicality,
when compared to the second solution. Gordy and Howells explain in the following way
how this third solution could be implemented:
"Let denote the unsmoothed output from the IRB capital formula for bank  at time
, expressed as a percentage of portfolio book value, and let  denote the correspond-
ing regulatory minimum applied to the bank. At present, the New Accord sets   .
One simple smoothing rule would specify  as an autoregressive process that ad-
justs towards , i.e.,       
The current Accord can be represented in stylized fashion as setting   , whereas
the New Accord sets   . An intermediate value of  would offer a compromise
between the current Accord and New Accord in sensitivity to the business cycle." (Gordy
and Howells [46], p. 397)
Table 1.2 summarizes other measures that have been proposed in the literature in
order to dampen the potential procyclical effects of Basel II.
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Kashyap and Stein [56] recognize that their corrective measure, by suggesting the
reduction of capital requirements in bad times, may be naïve since it will "give regulators
an excuse to engage in after-the-fact forbearance, with all the accompanying potential for
various forms of regulatory moral hazard." However, these authors also mention that "if it
really is the case that capital requirements need to come down, say, in a severe recessions,
it is probably better to acknowledge this fact of life up front and to explicitly codify the
magnitude of the adjustment. Such ex ante codification will, if anything, tend to reduce
regulators’ ex post discretion, thereby tempering moral hazard problems." (Kashyap and
Stein [56], p. 28)
Corrective Measure
Kashyap and Stein Define a family of point-in-time risk curves, with each
[55, 56] curve corresponding to different macroeconomic conditions.
Pederzoli and Use the predictability view of the business cycle and a
Torricelli [72] through-the-cycle logic in the rating assignment.
Pennacchi [75] Combine a risk-based capital requirement with a risk-based
deposit insurance: undercapitalized banks are required to
partially adjust their capital ratio toward a target standard
and pay a higher insurance premium appropriate with the
capital ratio they choose.
Cecchetti and Central banks should react to the state of the banking system’s
Li [29] balance sheet: the procyclical effect of prudential capital
regulation can be counteracted and completely neutralized.
Table 1.2. Some alternative corrective measures to dampen the potential procyclical ef-
fects of Basel II
According to Pederzoli and Torricelli [72], Basel II, by requiring banks that adopt
the IRB approach to follow a through-the-cycle rating system, may put the objective of
increased risk-sensitivity of capital requirements at risk. However, if the business cycle
effects are considered in a forward-looking perspective, both objectives - increased risk-
sensitivity of capital requirements and business cycle effects neutralization - can be rec-
onciled: the application of Pederzoli and Torricelli’s measures to quarterly U.S. data over
the forecasting period 1971-2002 show that the time varying capital requirements behave
quite well in anticipating the business cycle, increasing (decreasing) in anticipation of re-
cessions (expansions), and with a possible smoothing effect on the business cycle turning
points.
32
Cecchetti and Li [29] suggest that, with the introduction of Basel II, the optimal mon-
etary policy should move interest rates by more when the banking system is capital con-
strained, thus counteracting the procyclicality of capital regulation. Note, however, that
Kishan and Opiela [58]’s results indicate that if Basel II creates more constrained banks
during recessions and better capitalized banks during expansions, countercyclical policy
may become more difficult: high-capital banks tend not to decrease loans in response to a
contractionary monetary policy and, conversely, an expansionary monetary policy seems
to have no stimulating effects on the loan growth of the low-capital banks. Therefore,
Cecchetti and Li [29]’s proposal would be ineffective. Nonetheless, as Kishan and Opiela
[58] also point out, changes introduced by Basel II will result in banks reallocating their
capital and, consequently, adjusting the way they organize their balance sheets and the
way they react to monetary policy shocks. In this context, it is not clear that the Kishan
and Opiela’s results are valid under Basel II: once more, extrapolations from the Basel I
world to the Basel II world may not resist the Lucas’ critique.
1.4 Concluding Remarks
Focusing on the relationship between bank capital requirements and the business
cycle, we have brought together the theoretical literature related with the bank capital
channel, which is based on the premise that the introduction of bank capital requirements
limits banks’ ability to supply loans, with the literature on the regulatory framework of
capital requirements under the Basel Accords.
Most of the theoretical models analyzed predict that the introduction of bank capital
requirements, for market or regulatory reasons, amplifies the effects of monetary and other
exogenous shocks. This amplification effect usually rests on the argument that raising new
capital can be difficult and costly for many banks, especially during economic downturns,
thereby increasing the financing cost faced by firms that borrow from those banks. If
firms are restricted to banks as sources of credit, this increase in the financing cost tends
to affect negatively firms’ investment and output.
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In this context, the introduction of Basel II, whose implementation has started in
January 2007, raised some concerns, by establishing that the amount of capital that a bank
has to hold in its balance sheet depends on the riskiness of its portfolio. In particular,
under Basel II, if the credit risk of banks’ exposures increases during a recession, the
risk weights used to compute capital requirements and, consequently, the minimum bank
capital requirements will also increase. To the extent that it is difficult or costly to raise
external capital in bad times, banks will be forced to cut back on their lending activity,
thereby contributing to a worsening of the initial downturn. Consequently, Basel II may
lead to a greater financial amplification of the business cycle than Basel I, counteracting
capital regulation’s goal to foster financial stability.
Our analysis shows that the existence and the strength of this amplification effect
is still subject of much debate, and that additional measures, some of them already con-
templated in the last version of the Basel II Accord, can be implemented to counteract
this effect. In short, the procyclical effects of Basel II will depend on how the minimum
capital requirements will react over the business cycle, which, in turn, will depend (i) on
banks’ customer portfolios, (ii) on the approach adopted by banks to compute their mini-
mum capital requirements - the standardized or the IRB approach -, (iii) on the nature of
the rating system used by banks - through-the-cycle or point-in-time rating systems -, (iv)
on the view adopted concerning how credit risk evolves through time - the random walk
or the predictability view, (v) on the capital buffers over the regulatory minimum held by
the banking institutions, and (vi) on the market and supervisor intervention under Pillar 2
and 3.
In sum, this discussion shows that several theoretical studies predict that the intro-
duction of capital requirements, that limits banks’ ability to supply loans, accentuates the
procyclical tendencies of banking, leading to amplified macroeconomic effects of mon-
etary and other exogenous shocks (the bank capital channel). However, whether or not
Basel II capital requirements will add to this amplification effect is still subject to much
debate. Whereas some authors argue that the introduction the new bank capital require-
ments rules proposed by Basel II will accentuate this effect, by imposing countercycli-
cal minimum capital requirements, other authors argue that Basel II will contribute to a
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more stable financial system, and, while it may not attenuate normal swings in the busi-
ness cycle, it will help avoiding the type of financial crises that occasionally have very
large macroeconomic effects. In fact, our analysis has not focused on questions such as
whether bank regulation is itself optimal and what type of regulation is more appropriate
to avoid financial crises. By bringing together the theoretical literature on the bank capital
channel with the literature on the procyclical effects of Basel II, we tried instead to shed
some light on how the introduction of the new banking system regulatory framework may
potentially strengthen the propagation of exogenous shocks to the economy and, conse-
quently, amplify business cycle uctuations.
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Chapter 2
Business Cycle and Bank Capital: Monetary Policy
Transmission under the Basel Accords
2.1 Introduction
The precise mechanisms through which monetary policy affects real activity are not
completely clarified. Some recent literature explores the possible explanation of mone-
tary policy effects through financial imperfections. This essay fits in this line of research
by centering its attention on how microeconomic structures, such as the bank funding
structure and the relationship between the bank and the borrower, interact with macroeco-
nomic business conditions. In particular, we contribute to clarify the role of bank capital
and its regulatory environment in lending conditions and, consequently, in the transmis-
sion of monetary policy and in business cycle uctuations.
An additional motivation lies in current changes in the regulatory environment. In
fact, the study of bank capital - business cycle interactions is quite up to date, both at the
academic and institutional level, due to the implications of the changeover from Basel I
to Basel II bank capital requirements rules, whose implementation have begun in January
2007.23

The relevant regulatory framework is determined by Basel I and Basel II, the Basel Accords of 1988
and 2004, respectively, detailed in Basel Committee on Banking Supervision [8, 9].
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The existence of empirical evidence that the bank funding structure, or, more specifi-
cally, the bank capital, affects its supply of loans and, consequently, real activity, has mo-
tivated our modelization of the banking relationships in the context of a dynamic general
equilibrium model.
First, one strand of this empirical literature indicates that lending growth after a mon-
etary policy shock depends on the level of bank capital: using U.S. data from 1980 to
1995, Kishan and Opiela [57] predict that poorly capitalized banks experience more sig-
nificant declines in their lending, following monetary contractions. Their results are in
line with Van den Heuvel [93]’s, who, also using U.S. data, from 1969 until 1995, shows
that the real effects of monetary policy are stronger when banks have low capital relative
to the existing bank capital requirements: when a U.S. state’s banking sector starts out
with a low capital-asset ratio, subsequent output growth in that state is more sensitive to
changes in the Federal funds rate and other indicators of monetary policy. After the imple-
mentation of Basel I and FDICIA (the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improve-
ment Act of 1991) in the U.S., the loan response by banks to monetary policy appears to
be asymmetric, according to Kishan and Opiela [58]: a contractionary monetary policy
decreases the loans of the small low-capital banks relative to high-capital banks, and an
expansionary monetary policy is not able to increase the loan growth of the low-capital
banks relative to the high-capital banks. Also in this line of research, Hubbard et al. [51]
find that, even after controlling for information costs and borrower risk, the cost of bor-
rowing from low-capital banks is higher than the cost of borrowing from well-capitalized
banks that is, capital positions of individual banks affect the interest rate at which their
clients borrow.
Second, as mentioned by Van den Heuvel [92], the importance of bank capital on
lending has increased since the implementation of Basel I, which, by imposing risk-based
capital requirements, limits the ability of banks with a shortage of capital to supply loans.
There is a considerable number of papers that test the hypothesis of a "credit crunch" - a
significant leftward shift in the supply curve for bank loans - that may have occurred in
the U.S. during the early 90s, simultaneously with the implementation of the new banking
system regulation established by the Basel Accord. The idea behind those studies is that,
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given the common perception that bank capital is more costly than alternative funding
sources (such as deposits), regulatory capital requirements can have real effects: in order
to satisfy those requirements, banks may choose to reduce loans and, in such an event,
some otherwise worthy borrowers cannot obtain them. The allocation of credit away
from loans can, in turn, cause a significant reduction in macroeconomic activity, given
that many borrowers cannot easily obtain substitute sources of funding in public markets.
On this credit crunch literature, see, for instance, Bernanke and Lown [18], Peek and
Rosengren [73, 74], and Sharpe [85] for a review.
Some studies in this literature are, however, quite skeptical about the role of the credit
crunch in worsening the 1990 recession in the U.S. (e.g., Bernanke and Lown [18]): they
suggest that demand factors, including the weakened state of borrowers’ balance sheet,
were instead the major cause of the lending slowdown. In contrast, Peek and Rosen-
gren [74], for instance, focusing on the strong downward pressure on capital positions of
Japanese banks with branches in the U.S., identified an independent loan supply disrup-
tion and argued that this shock had substantial effects on real economic activity in the U.S.
This controversy illustrates one of the major difficulties of this type of analysis: it
is hard to distinguish between movements in loan demand and movements in loan sup-
ply, especially because, as mentioned by Van den Heuvel [93], there is no interest rate
summarizing the effective cost of financing, since this cost depends not only on the con-
tractual interest rate, but also on collateral requirements, the extent of rationing, and other
contractual features. Therefore, although there is some evidence that bank capital affects
bank lending and, consequently, real activity, these studies are not completely successful
in distinguishing shifts in loan demand from shifts in loan supply, leaving the question of
the relative importance of different effects unanswered.
Our model contributes to evaluate the relative importance of these loan supply and
demand effects, by bringing together, in a dynamic general equilibrium model, the bor-
rowers’ balance sheet channel developed by Bernanke et al. [17], with an additional
channel working through bank capital, which also amplifies the real effects of exogenous
nominal and real shocks. That is, taking the Bernanke et al.’s dynamic general equilib-
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rium model as a starting point, we add banks that, due to the imposition of regulatory
capital requirements, face financial frictions when raising funds.
This debate on the role of bank capital in business cycle uctuations is quite relevant
in the context of current implementation of Basel II. As detailed in Chapter 1, one of the
central changes proposed by the new Basel Accord is the increased sensitivity of a bank’s
capital requirement to the risk of its assets: the amount of capital that a bank must hold is
determined, not only by the institutional nature of its borrowers (as in Basel I), but also
by the riskiness of each particular borrower. Specifically, an increase in the credit risk of
a given asset should lead to an increase in the amount of capital that a bank must hold
against it. This has raised some concerns about the potential procyclical effects of Basel
II: during a recession, for instance, if non-defaulted loans are considered riskier, banks
will be required to hold more capital, or further reduce lending, thus exacerbating the
economic downturn.
Theoretically, our model has been decisively motivated by Bernanke et al. [17]’s
suggestion, in their concluding remarks, to introduce the specific role of banks in cyclical
uctuations. Although excluding some bank activities, for simplicity, our model explicitly
assumes the role of banks in financing two entities in financial deficit (the public sector
and nonfinancial firms) using the funds of households (the entity in financial surplus).
We assume that banks are constrained by a risk-based capital ratio requirement according
to which the ratio of bank capital to nonfinancial loans cannot fall below a regulatory
minimum exogenously set. Banks are, thus, limited in their lending to nonfinancial firms
by the amount of bank capital that households are willing to hold. Taking into account that
bank capital is more expensive to raise than deposits, due to households’ preferences for
liquidity, and that this difference tends to widen (narrow) during a recession (expansion),
we explore the additional channel through which the effects of exogenous shocks on real
activity are amplified - the bank capital channel. The model is then extended in order to
evaluate the impact of the bank capital channel under Basel I versus Basel II, thus aiming
to shed additional light on the debate about the potential procyclical effects of Basel II.
Our work relates to the theoretical literature analyzed in Chapter 1 (Section 1.2), by
accounting for the interactions between bank capital and macroeconomic conditions. We
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assume that banks issue capital to satisfy regulatory capital requirements (as Berka and
Zimmermann [13], and Bolton and Freixas [21]) and that households’ preferences for liq-
uidity matter for banks’ funding structure. By doing this, our model yields a liquidity pre-
mium effect on the external finance premium faced by firms, a mechanism through which
bank capital affects the transmission of monetary policy to the real economy.24 Accord-
ing to our results, this additional mechanism is responsible for a significant amplification
of the immediate effects of a monetary policy shock, the more significant the closer the
regulatory rules are to Basel II, rather than to Basel I.
This essay is organized as follows. After this introduction, Section 2.2 develops and
calibrates a dynamic general equilibrium model, with particular attention to the banking
relationships with entrepreneurs and households. Section 2.3 simulates a monetary policy
shock under several variants of the model, in order to analyze the role of bank capital in
the monetary policy transmission mechanism and the relative importance of demand and
supply-of-loans effects. Section 2.4 extends the baseline model to evaluate and compare
the magnitude of the demand and supply-of-loans effects under Basel I and Basel II.
Conclusions are outlined in Section 2.5.
2.2 A Model with Bank Capital
In order to analyze the role of bank capital in the transmission mechanism of mone-
tary policy, and, thus, in business cycle uctuations, we develop a dynamic general equi-
librium model, assuming five types of agents in the economy:
 Households, who work, consume and allocate their savings to bank deposits and bank cap-
ital
 Entrepreneurs, who need external (bank) finance to buy capital, which is used in combi-
nation with hired labor to produce wholesale output
 Banks, which, using the funds of households, finance and monitor (ex post) the entrepre-

Our meaning of the bank capital channel, thus, differs from Van den Heuvel [92]’s, in which house-
holds and liquidity preferences and, thus, the liquidity premium effect, are absent.
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neurs
 Retailers, added in order to incorporate inertia in price setting
 Government, which conducts both monetary and fiscal policy and regulates banks.
2.2.1 Entrepreneurs
The analysis of entrepreneurs’ behavior follows closely the model of Bernanke,
Gertler and Gilchrist [17], BGG hereafter.
In each period each entrepreneur buys the entire capital stock for his firm in order to,
in combination with labor, produce output in the next period. More specifically, at time ,
entrepreneur  purchases homogeneous capital for use at , . The return to capital
is sensitive to both aggregate and idiosyncratic risk. The ex post gross return on capital
for firm  is 	, where 

 is an idiosyncratic disturbance to firms ’s return and
	 is the ex post aggregate return to capital. The random variable  is independently
and identically distributed (i.i.d.) across time and across firms, with a continuous and
once-differentiable cumulative distribution function (c.d.f.), 
 , over a non-negative
support, and    .
At the end of period , entrepreneur  has available net worth   which he uses
to finance the acquisition of  To finance the difference between his capital expen-
ditures and his net worth, he must borrow an amount   

  

, where 
represents the price paid per unit of capital at time . Each entrepreneur then borrows
from a financial intermediary (bank) which imposes a required return on lending between
 and   , 	. This relationship embodies an asymmetric information problem be-
tween each entrepreneur and the bank: only the entrepreneur observes costlessly the re-
turn of his project. The financial contract established between these two agents is, then,
designed to minimize the expected agency costs. That is, as in BGG, we assume a costly
state verification (CSV) problem, in which the bank must pay a monitoring cost in order
to observe an individual borrower’s realized return. This monitoring cost is assumed to
equal a proportion  of the realized gross payoff of the firm’s capital:
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	



,
where     . The idiosyncratic disturbance  is unknown to both the entrepreneur
and the bank prior to the investment decision. That is, and 

 are chosen prior
to the realization of the idiosyncratic shock. After the investment decision is made, the
bank can only observe  by paying the monitoring cost.
Given , 

 and 	, the optimal contract is characterized by a gross non-
default loan rate, , and a cutoff value 

, such that, if 

  

, the borrower
pays the lender the amount 	

 and keeps the remaining:

  



	


That is,  is defined by
	



  



 (2.1)
If   

, the borrower receives nothing, while the bank monitors the borrower
and receives  	

.
In equilibrium, the contract guarantees the lender an expected gross return on the
loan equal to the required return 	 (taken as given in the contracting problem). That
is,

 
 



   
 

	



 
 	

 

 (2.2)
where  is the probability density function (p.d.f.) of .
Combining equation (2.1) with equation (2.2) yields the following expression:
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
 
 

   
 



	

 
 	

 

. (2.3)
As shown by BGG, the bank’s expected return reaches a maximum at an unique
interior value of , 

, and equilibrium is characterized by 

 always below 

.
Therefore, the hypothesis of an equilibrium with credit rationing is ruled out and the
bank’s expected return is always increasing in .
With aggregate uncertainty present,  depends on the ex post realization of 	:
conditional on the ex post realization of 	, the borrower offers a state-contingent non-
default payment that guarantees the lender a return equal in expected value to the required
return 	. Thus, condition (2.3) implies a set of restrictions, one for each realization of
	.
The optimal contracting problem determines the division, between the borrower 
and the bank, of the expected gross payoff to the firm’s capital, 

	



, where
 denotes the expectation operator conditional on the information available at time .
The optimal contract results from the maximization of borrower’s payoff, with respect to
 and 

, subject to the set of state-contingent constraints implied by (2.3).
Let  represent
	
	
, the expected discounted return to capital. Given  
, the first order conditions of the contracting problem yield the following relationship
between 






and the expected discounted return to capital (see BGG for details):



 
 
	


	

	



where    and   . Therefore, each borrower’s capital expenditures are pro-
portional to his net worth, with a proportionality factor that is increasing in the expected
discounted return to capital. As mentioned by BGG, everything else equal, a rise in the
expected discounted return to capital reduces the expected default probability. As a con-
sequence, the entrepreneur can borrow more and expand the size of his firm. Since the
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expected default costs also increase as the ratio of borrowing to net worth increases, the
entrepreneur cannot expand the size of his firm indefinitely.
Aggregating the preceding equation over firms we obtain25


 
	


	

	


, (2.4)
where  denotes the aggregate amount of capital purchased by all entrepreneurs at
time , and  the aggregate net worth of those agents.
Equivalently, equation (2.4) can be expressed as


	

	
 




, (2.5)
where  is increasing in 


for   . Thus, in equilibrium, the expected
discounted return to capital, 	


	
, depends negatively on the share of the firms’ capital
expenditures that is financed by the entrepreneurs’ net worth. As argued by Walentin
[97], 





	 should be interpreted as the return on capital required by banks, in
order to grant loans to the firms. Therefore, in an environment where entrepreneurs must
borrow, under imperfect information, to buy capital, the expected discounted return to
capital, 	


	
, may be interpreted as an opportunity cost of being an entrepreneur, or,
as in BGG’s acceptation, as the external finance premium faced by entrepreneurs.
Entrepreneurial Net Worth
The net worth of entrepreneurs combines profits accumulated from previous capital
investment with income from supplying labor. As a technical matter, it is necessary to
start entrepreneurs off with some net worth in order to allow them to begin operations: as
in BGG, we assume that, in addition to operating firms, entrepreneurs supplement their

As mentioned by BGG, the assumption of constant returns to scale generates a proportional relation-
ship between net worth and the capital demand at the firm level, with a factor of proportionality independent
of firm’s specific factors. This facilitates aggregation.
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income by working. It is also assumed that the fraction of agents who are entrepreneurs
remains constant.
Let  be the entrepreneurs’ total equity (i.e., wealth accumulated by entrepreneurs
from operating firms). Then, normalizing the total entrepreneurial labor to one,
    

  (2.6)
where   is the entrepreneurial wage and  is the probability that a entrepreneur survives
to the next period. To avoid the possibility that entrepreneurs accumulate enough net
worth to be fully self financed, it is assumed that those agents have finite horizons. The
fraction of agents who are entrepreneurs is held constant by the birth of a new entrepreneur
for each dying one.
Note that  can be expressed, in equilibrium, as
  	

  	

   	

  (2.7)
where 	  are the aggregate default monitoring costs with
 
 


Thus, combining equations (2.6) and (2.7), it is straightforward to conclude that 
reects the equity stake that entrepreneurs have in their firms, which in turn depends on
firms’ earnings net of interest payments to financial intermediaries.
Entrepreneurs who "die" in  are not allowed to buy capital and simply consume their
residual equity  . That is,
    (2.8)
where  represents the total consumption of entrepreneurs who leave the market.
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2.2.2 Banks
Financial intermediation, consisting of collecting funds from households and grant-
ing loans to entrepreneurs, is assured by banks. In this respect we depart from BGG by
properly defining the financial intermediaries as banks and, consequently, specifying their
behavior.
Banks are not subject to reserve requirements (for simplicity), but are legally subject
to a risk-based regulatory capital requirement. In particular, banks must hold an amount
of equity that covers at least a given percentage of loans, exogenously set by the regulator.
We assume that only banks issue equity (as in Bolton and Freixas [21], for instance), on
terms that depend on demand, i.e., on households’ willingness to hold capital in addition
to deposits. Banks’ assets comprise, not only loans to firms, but also government bonds,
which have zero weight in the risk-based capital requirement since they bear no risk.
Another specificity of banks is the technology needed to monitor entrepreneurs.
Since households do not have access to this technology, they delegate monitoring to banks,
which undertake the costly state verification defined above. In this framework, each bank
does not have any bargaining power in the relationship with the borrowing firm - the con-
tract specifies the maximization of borrower’s payoff subject to the constraint that the ex-
pected return to the bank covers only its opportunity cost of funds. In other words, we are
assuming a competitive banking system (as in Berka and Zimmermann [13], for instance)
with unrestricted entry, where each bank earns zero profits, in equilibrium.
In this context, we will now analyze the behavior of a representative bank which
maximizes its expected profits, acting as a price (interest rate) taker in a competitive
market. Its choice variables are loans, riskless government bonds, deposits and capital.
Beside the capital requirements, we will also assume that the bank must buy deposit
insurance. More specifically, the bank is subject to an insurance rate on deposits which
depends negatively on the level of bank capital.26

It should be noted, however, that we maintain BGG’s hypothesis (for comparative purposes), in which
lenders, by avoiding both idiosyncratic and aggregate risks, do not default. By holding a diversified portfolio
of loans, banks guarantee idiosyncratic risk diversification. The aggregate risk that could be associated to
deposits, is passed on to the entrepreneurs. As for bank capital, its risk is borne by the representative
household which owns stocks on the bank. Bolton and Freixas [21], in a similar context of regulatory
capital requirements, also consider perfectly diversified banks, which do not go bankrupt.
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Finally, in line with the contract established between the representative bank and each
entrepreneur, we assume that all bank’s assets and liabilities have the same, one period,
maturity.
Following Berka and Zimmermann [13]’s specification of deposit insurance cost, the
bank’s objective is then given by:
	



	  	 	

  

	

  




s.t.
       (balance sheet constraint) (2.9)


  (capital requirements) (2.10)
with      and     , and where
  are the real loans granted to all firms from  to   
  are the real government bonds held by the bank from  to   
  are the real households’ deposits
  is the real bank’s capital
 	 is the required gross real return on loans between  and   
 	 is the gross real return on government bonds ()
 	 is the gross real return on deposits ()
 

	

is the expected real return on bank capital ()
 


is the deposit insurance rate
  is the imposed level of capital requirements.
Note that 	 differs from the non-default lending rate (): as has been derived
above (see equation 2.2), the difference between the two is due to the possibility of en-
trepreneur’s default and to the existence of monitoring cost, which are taken into account
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in 	. The rate of return on bank capital, 	, is conditional on the realization of date
  state of nature whereas all the other rates of return are not (	, 	 and 	 are
known in ).
The first order conditions of the interior solution (that is, the solution characterized
by positive values of , ,  and ) of this problem yield
	  	

  




 (2.11)
	   	  

	

 




 (2.12)
which satisfy the bank’s zero profit condition. These two equations were obtained con-
sidering binding capital requirements, that is,


 ,
which, as we show below, proves indeed to be the case for reasonable values of the para-
meters.
Due to the introduction of binding capital requirements, the required return on lend-
ing, 	, becomes dependent on a weighted average of the deposit return and the equity’s
expected return, whereas in BGG, 	 is equal to the riskless rate, 	.
2.2.3 Households
The economy is composed of a continuum of infinitely lived identical risk averse
households of length unity. Each household works, consumes, and invests its savings in
assets which include deposits, that pay a real riskless rate of return between  and   of
	, and (risky) shares of ownership of banks in the economy, that pay 	.
For simplicity, we assume a representative household’s instantaneous utility function
separable in consumption, liquidity (in the form of deposits) and leisure:
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 


  
 


 !
 
" 

 !

where  denotes household real consumption,  the deposits (in real terms) held by
the household from  to    and " the household hours worked (as a fraction of total
time endowment).
The real level of deposits is included in the instantaneous utility function to indicate
the existence of liquidity services from wealth held in the form of that asset. That is,
despite yielding a gross return of 	, deposits also serve transaction needs since currency
is absent from our model: we assume that deposits can be used in an almost money
like fashion to simplify a variety of transactions. In short, we are assuming that, when
compared to bank capital, deposits have an advantage in terms of liquidity, similarly to
Poterba and Rotemberg [77] and, more recently, Van den Heuvel [94].
The representative household chooses consumption, leisure and portfolio to max-
imize the expected lifetime utility (appropriately discounted) subject to an intertempo-
ral budget constraint that reects intertemporal allocation possibilities. The household’s
problem is then given by
	

 



!



  
 


 !
 
"

 !

s.t.     "

  #    	

    	

    (2.13)
where   !   is the subjective discount factor,   is the real wage, # represents
lump sum taxes,  dividends received from ownership of imperfect competitive retail
firms, and  the real bank capital held by the household from   to .
The first order conditions of (2.13) are the following three:

  !	




 
  (2.14)
which takes into account that the gross real rate of return on deposits, 	, is certain at
time  (is known ahead of time)
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and the labor supply
"

 
  
   (2.16)
In this representation, the expected excess return on the risky asset (bank capital) is
linked both to the risk and liquidity premium, since it depends, on the one hand, on the
covariance between the aggregate consumption and bank capital’s return and, on the other
hand, on deposits liquidity.
2.2.4 Return on Bank Capital
Before proceeding we can now specify the return on bank capital. The bank capital
requirement constraint establishes that the representative bank must issue an amount of
capital which covers  times the value of loans. Loans are thus financed by bank capital
and deposits, and households, in turn, allocate their savings to those two financial assets.
A spread between the expected real return on bank capital and the real return on deposits
is, then, justified by the liquidity services provided by deposits and by the riskless return
on this asset, i.e., 		  
In addition, we assume that the expected real returns of bank capital and physical
capital are equal:
	

  	

 (2.17)
Although physical capital is totally held by the entrepreneurs, if households could
hold it, they would demand the same expected return on both physical and bank capital:
since both returns are subject to the same aggregate risk and neither bank capital nor phys-
ical capital provide liquidity services to the household, equation (2.17) would correspond
to the no-arbitrage condition.
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2.2.5 General Equilibrium
Now, following the modeling strategy of BGG, we embed the solution of the partial
equilibrium contracting problem within a dynamic new Keynesian general equilibrium
model, also taking into account the results obtained in the household and the bank opti-
mization problems.
As mentioned above, in each period  each entrepreneur  acquires physical capital,
, which is used in combination with hired labor to produce output in period   .
Following BGG, we specify each entrepreneur’s investment decisions, under adjustment
costs, assuming that each entrepreneur  purchases the capital goods from some other
competitive firms, producers of capital. More specifically, each entrepreneur sells his
entire stock of capital at the end of each period  to the capital producing firms at price
. These firms also purchase raw output as an input, ' (total investment expenditures),
and combine it with the aggregate capital stock in the economy  to produce new
capital goods via the production function 




, where   is an increasing and
concave function, with    . The function   is concave in investment to capture
the difficulty of quickly changing the level of capital installed in the firms (and is thus
called the adjustment cost function). The new capital goods, jointly with the capital used
to produce them, are then sold to each entrepreneur  at the price .27
In this context, the aggregate capital stock follows an intertemporal accumulation
equation with external adjustment costs,
  

'


    (2.18)
where  denotes the depreciation rate. The introduction of adjustment costs permits vari-
ation in the price of a unit of capital in terms of the numeraire good, , which, derived
from the first order condition for investment for one of the capital producer firms men-
tioned above, is given by

We ignore the "rental rate"

 

, since in steady state      and around the steady state
the difference between  and  is second order.
51
 





  (2.19)
The price of capital is, thus, an increasing function of the quantity invested.
Aggregate Production Function
The physical capital acquired at period  by each entrepreneur is then combined with
labor to produce output in period , by means of a constant returns to scale technology.
This allows us to write the production function as an aggregate relationship:
(  )

 "

 (2.20)
with      and where ( represents the aggregate output of wholesale goods, " the
labor input and ) an exogenous technology term.
The final output may then be either transformed into a single type of consumption
good, invested, consumed by the government (*) or used in monitoring costs:
(    

  '  *  	

  (2.21)
Entrepreneurs sell the output to retailers at a relative price of 

, where + is the
gross markup of retail goods over wholesale goods. Therefore, the expected gross return
to holding a unit of capital from  to    can be written as:


	

 



 

  


 (2.22)
where 

 

represents the rent paid to a unit of capital in   .
In turn, as already mentioned, the supply of investment capital is described by the
return on physical capital the (representative) bank requires in order to grant loans to the
firms (see equation 2.5 on page 44).
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Concerning the labor input, it is assumed that " 

"

" 

, with  
  , and where " represents the households labor, and " the entrepreneurial labor.
Therefore, we can rewrite (2.20) as
(  )



"

" 


 (2.23)
Equating marginal product with the wage, for each case, we obtain:
    

+
(
"
(2.24)
     

+
(
"
(2.25)
where   represents the real wage for households labor and   the real wage for
entrepreneurial labor. As mentioned, and following BGG, we assume that entrepreneurs
supply one unit of labor inelastically to the general labor market: "   .
Now, taking into account equations (2.7), (2.20) and (2.25), we can rewrite (2.6) as
  

	  	

   	

 


  

+
)

 "

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 (2.26)
The Retail Sector and Price Setting
To increase the empirical relevance of the model concerning price inertia, we intro-
duce sticky prices in it using standard devices used in new-Keynesian research. Namely,
we incorporate monopolistic competition and costs of adjusting nominal prices by dis-
tinguishing between entrepreneurs and retailers (since assuming that entrepreneurs are
imperfect competitors would complicate aggregation): entrepreneurs produce wholesale
goods in competitive markets, and then sell their output to retailers who are monopolistic
competitors. Retailers do nothing other than buy goods from entrepreneurs, differentiate
them (costlessly), and then resell them to households. They are included only in order
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to introduce price inertia in a tractable manner: following Calvo [23], it is assumed that
the retailer is free to change its price in a given period only with probability   , (with
  ,  ). The profits from retail activity are rebated lump-sum to households ( in
the household’s intertemporal budget constraint).28
Government
Government comprises the monetary, fiscal and regulatory authorities. We assume
that conicts between policies are internalized within the agent government, since we do
not aim at exploring those differences.
Public expenditures, *, are financed by lump-sum taxes, #, and by issuing securi-
ties (government bonds, ):
*   	  #  -
where - represents other costs and revenues and includes the deposit insurance premium
paid by the banks to the regulatory authority. In particular, the government adjusts the
mix of financing between bonds issuance and lump-sum taxes to support an interest rate
monetary policy rule, to be defined below. To implement its choice of the nominal interest
rate, the government adjusts the supply of government bonds to satisfy the bank’s demand
for this asset.
2.2.6 The Linearized Model and Calibration
According to the model just described, and in the absence of exogenous shocks, the
economy converges to a steady state growth path, along which all variables are constant
over time (including prices, which implies a zero ination rate in steady state).
To linearize the preceding equations, we use a first order Taylor series expansion
around the steady state. Let the lower case letters denote the percentage deviation of each

Detailed derivation, not presented here since it is standard in new Keynesian framework, is available
upon request.
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variable from its steady state level: .  




, where +, without the time subscript, is
the value of + in nonstochastic steady state.
The complete log-linearized model is provided in the appendix. Here we focus on the
main equations necessary to clarify the results and discussion in the following sections.
Aggregate Demand
The aggregate demand is defined by equations (2.5), (2.8), (2.14), (2.15), (2.19),
(2.21) and (2.22). The household’s Euler equations (2.14) and (2.15) can be written in
log-linear form as (assuming that   !):29
 $   !	
 $  !	
/   




 (2.27)
 $   !	
 $  !	


/

 (2.28)
Recall that we assume that 	  	, as argued above.
In what concerns the relationship between the external finance premium and the ratio
of capital expenditures to net worth, equation (2.5) - p. 44 - becomes, in the log-linearized
version of the model,
/

 /

  &0  1  2, (2.29)
where & is the steady state elasticity of 	


	
with respect to 


.

We take a first-order Taylor approximation around the steady state ignoring the second order terms (or
assuming that they are constant over time:   ,). Thus, the difference between 



and  rests solely on liquidity.
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Representative Bank
Equations (2.11), p. 48, and (2.12), p. 48, derived from the first order conditions of
the bank’s profit maximization problem, can be written in log-linear form as:
/ 
	
	
/ 
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
	
  3 (2.30)
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The capital requirement constraint    , turns into:
3 


0  1


2 (2.32)
Aggregate Supply and State Variables
The aggregate supply is defined by the aggregate production function (2.23), the
labor market clearing condition - taking into account both equations (2.16) and (2.24) -
and the Phillips curve (or the price adjustment equation) derived from the optimal price
setting by the retail sector.
The transition for the two state variables, capital and net worth, is described by equa-
tions (2.18) and (2.26), respectively.
The log-linearized version of these equations is provided in the appendix.
Monetary Policy Rule
The interest rate rule is given by
/  4/

  56  7

 (2.33)
where /  /  6 is the nominal interest rate from  to    (with 6 
8  8) and 7 an i.i.d. disturbance at time . As in BGG, we standardly assume
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that the current nominal interest rate responds to the lagged ination rate and the lagged
interest rate.
Calibration
We calibrate the model assuming that a period is a quarter. To evaluate the parameters
and steady state (SS) variables common to the BGG’s model, we followed these authors,
focusing on U.S. data. See Table 2.2 in the appendix for details.
Other parameters and SS variables are specific to our model, namely, the ratio of
loans to deposits in SS, the bank capital requirement and the deposit insurance costs pa-
rameters ( and , respectively) and the preference parameter, !.
To compute the SS ratio of loans to deposits, 

, we use data on commercial and
industrial (C&I) loans made by all U.S. commercial banks - provided by the Survey of
Terms of Business Lending that is published by the Federal Reserve30 - and data on the
total loans and deposits at all U.S. commercial banks - available at the Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis.31
To calibrate the deposit insurance parameter  we followed Berka and Zimmer-
mann [13]’s procedure, using U.S. data as of December 2006, from the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC).
Concerning the bank capital requirement, we set  equal to  based on the rules
established by the Basel Accords - see Basel Committee on Banking Supervision [8, 9].
Finally, in calibrating the preference parameters, we assume, for simplicity, that  
!. By that, we only need to compute the deposit to consumption ratio in steady state



to solve the model, instead of defining both variables,  and , separately. And, as
in many business cycle models, including BGG,  is set equal to  (log preferences).
For further details on the model’s calibration see the appendix.
After log-linearizing the model, we applied the computational procedure used for
solving linear rational expectations models developed by McCallum [67].
	Available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/e2/.
See http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/.
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2.3 The Bank Capital Channel at Work
In order to analyze the role of bank capital in the transmission of monetary policy
and, thus, in business cycle uctuations, we present now some quantitative experiments
focusing on the economy response to an unanticipated temporary negative monetary pol-
icy shock.
Concerning the channels through which monetary policy affects real activity, our
model, derived above, brings together (i) the standard interest rate channel of monetary
policy transmission - according to which an unanticipated increase in the nominal interest
rate depresses the demand for physical capital, which, in turn, reduces investment and
the price of capital (ii) the borrowers’ balance sheet channel and (iii) the bank capital
channel.
The borrowers’ balance sheet channel predicts that the decline in asset prices (phys-
ical capital price in our model), due to a contractionary monetary policy, decreases bor-
rowers’ net worth, raising the external finance premium and, consequently, forcing down
investment. This, in turn, will reduce asset prices and borrowers’ net worth, further push-
ing down investment, and thus giving rise to the financial accelerator effect, which ampli-
fies the impact of the monetary shock on borrowers’ spending decisions. Finally, the bank
capital channel, in contrast with the borrowers’ balance sheet channel, works through the
supply of funds side and is related to the introduction of the specific role of banks in cycli-
cal uctuations, as implied by our model.
2.3.1 Simulating the Amplification Effects of a Monetary Policy Shock
To analyze the bank capital channel, we begin by comparing the effects of a negative
innovation in the nominal interest rate (which corresponds to an annual increase of 25
basis points) under three distinct hypotheses:
 Variant 1: Baseline model derived previously, assuming a risk-based capital ratio re-
quirement of 
 Variant 2: Model without capital requirements, i.e., excluding the capital requirement con-
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straint from the baseline model (equation 2.10)
 Variant 3: Model with no capital requirements nor financial accelerator, which is gener-
ated by fixing the external finance premium, in variant 2, at its steady state level. That is,
under variant 3, the capital requirement constraint is absent from the model, and both the
bank and each entrepreneur observe costlessly the return of the firm’s project. This amounts
to setting the parameter &, in the financial accelerator equation (2.29), to zero, since
in the absence of capital market frictions the external finance premium should not respond
to changes in the ratio of capital expenditures to net worth.
Figures 2.1 and 2.2 illustrate the impulse response functions of the relevant variables
under these three variants (variant 1: solid line variant 2: dashed line and variant 3:
dashed-dotted line), using the calibrated model economy with each period equivalent to a
quarter and the variables expressed as percentage deviations from steady state values.
The increase in the nominal interest rate triggers an immediate decline in output,
investment and consumption below their steady state values, after which the economy
returns gradually to its steady state. As predicted by the Phillips curve in a sticky prices
context, ination also decreases in response to the output decline, and then gradually
reverts to its stationary value. Ination behavior, in turn, inuences the nominal interest
rate through the monetary policy rule - the monetary authority sets the nominal interest
rate in response to lagged ination and lagged nominal interest rate.
Figure 2.2 depicts the financial sector variables response. As in BGG, the external
finance premium evolves countercyclically, increasing in response to the deterioration
of entrepreneurs’ financial position following the decline in assets prices. In fact, the
financial accelerator effect of monetary policy (the borrowers’ balance sheet channel),
arising from the loan demand side and embedded within equation (2.29), is present in
both variants 1 and 2. In line with the analysis in 2.2.1, above, this demand effect is
based on the prediction that the external finance premium facing a borrower depends on
the borrower’s financial position - the greater the borrower’s self-financing ratio is, the
lower the external finance premium should be. Intuitively, a stronger financial position
diminishes the expected monitoring costs that arise from the informational asymmetry
between each entrepreneur and the bank.
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However, it is notable that the impact of the monetary policy shock is stronger in the
presence of capital requirements (that is, stronger in variant 1 than in variant 2). This am-
plification effect can be explained through the analysis of bank and household behavior,
as follows.
Combining the log-linearized equations (2.30) and (2.31) which have been derived
from the representative bank’s profit maximization problem, it is straightforward to derive
the following condition:
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Taking into account the steady state conditions and the calibration of the model,
we conclude that
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 More specifically, the difference be-
tween these two coefficients relies on the magnitude of the deposit insurance costs: when
   and    these coefficients take the values  and ,
respectively. Therefore, equation (2.34) may be rewritten as
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According to this expression, the external finance premium, //, depends
positively on /  /, which we will refer to as the liquidity premium.32 The
external finance premium also depends on the deposit-bank capital ratio,   3,
through the deposit insurance costs, but this effect is relatively small and vanishes when

Note that, since we use a first-order Taylor approximation around the steady state (ignoring the sec-
ond order terms) to linearize the model,    is not the equity premium, defined as the extra
return required by risk averse households to compensate for the covariance between equity returns and the
stochastic discount factor. Instead, it reects the liquidity advantage of deposits over bank capital, properly
called liquidity premium.
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we set  equal to zero.33 Therefore, we focus our attention now on the relationship
between the liquidity premium and the external finance premium.
As illustrated in Figure 2.2, a contractionary monetary policy shock leads to an in-
crease in the level of capital issued by the bank 3 in variant 1. This happens for two
reasons: (i) the level of commercial and industrial (both uncollateralized) loans also in-
creases - although entrepreneurs invest less  , the sharp decrease in their net
worth ( ) leads to an increase of    above its steady state
level34 and (ii) as bank capital requirements are binding in variant 1, the bank may only
grant more credit if it issues more capital. To hold more bank capital during the reces-
sion, households in turn require an increase in the liquidity premium, /  /,
since they must reduce the amount of deposits to attenuate the decline in consumption (in
line with Gorton and Winton [47]’s model, for instance).
To clarify this last effect recall the log-linearized Euler equations (2.27) and (2.28)
derived in Section 2.2. Combining these two equations, with the calibrated   , yields
!	
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/
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 !	/ 
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	 	
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! $ 


 (2.36)
where    , which confirms that the liquidity premium required by the households
depends negatively on deposits .
In sum, after the contractionary monetary policy shock in variant 1, the level of loans
can only increase above its steady state level if the bank issues more capital (due to the
binding capital requirements). Households in turn require an increase in the liquidity pre-
mium to hold more bank capital and less deposits - note that, as illustrated in Figure 2.2,
the liquidity premium under variant 1 increases with a simultaneous decrease in deposits’
level and in the deposit-bank capital ratio. The larger the increase in the liquidity premium
the larger will be the increase in the external finance premium (see equation 2.35):
For example, in variant 1, the immediate change in deposit-bank capital ratio [second term on the right
hand side of (2.35)] accounts for less than  of the change in the external finance premium. The absence
of a significant impact is confirmed in an exercise, in the context of sensitivity analysis not reported here,
where we compare different levels of capital requirements: choosing 	   (variant 1) or 	  
leaves almost unchanged the impact of a decrease in 
 from 	 to .
See Gertler and Gilchrist [44] and Den Haan et al. [37] for some evidence on the increase of
commercial and industrial loans after a contractionary monetary policy.
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The bank’s balance sheet equilibrium is guaranteed by a reduction in bonds held by the
bank.
We call the relationship between deposits and the external finance premium (through
the liquidity premium), the liquidity premium effect. This effect is strictly related to the
financial accelerator effect. That is, in variant 1 of the model, the external finance pre-
mium increases not only because the net worth of firms decreases (due to the decline in
asset prices), but also because the liquidity premium required by the households increases
(a cost that is passed on to firms):
(A) Liquidity Premium Effect:   	
	

(B) Financial Accelerator Effect:    




	


	

Comparing variants 1 and 2 further clarifies the liquidity premium effect. Although
the variant 2 of the model assumes no regulatory capital requirements, the bank still is-
sues some capital due to the deposit insurance rate, which depends negatively on the level
of bank capital: in steady state, for instance, the bank sets an equity-loan ratio of ,
approximately. However, and in contrast with variant 1, the negative monetary shock in
variant 2 leads to a decrease in bank capital, since banks are no longer forced to issue
equity to finance a given percentage of loans. As illustrated in Figure 2.2, after the neg-
ative shock both deposits and bank capital decrease in variant 2 (the increase in loans is
compensated again by a decrease in bonds held by the bank), and the deposit-bank capital
ratio increases (in contrast with variant 1).
Even though   3 increases, in variant 2, the liquidity premium required by
the households still rises after the shock, although less than in variant 1. This can again be
explained through the analysis of equation (2.36) above, according to which the liquidity
premium required by the households depends negatively on . In variant 2, households
reduce the amount of bank capital held after the shock, and, consequently, reduce the level
of deposits to a smaller extent than in variant 1. Therefore, the increase in the liquidity
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premium is smaller than in variant 1, as predicted by equation (2.36). This, in turn, implies
a smaller increase in the external finance premium through effect (A) above, reducing the
effects of the exogenous shock on investment and output (see Figure 2.1).
We may then conclude that the introduction of regulatory capital requirements - in
a model with bank capital, but where banks were not constrained by those requirements
- amplifies the effects of monetary policy on real activity through the liquidity premium
effect. Other experiments conducted by us, but not reported here, assuming different
levels of risk-based capital requirements (), show that the same conclusion applies to
an exogenous increase in capital requirements imposed by the authorities (increase in ).
Finally, variant 3 excludes both the liquidity premium and the financial accelerator
effects. As Figures 2.1 and 2.2 show, there are considerable differences between variants
1 and 2, on the one hand, and variant 3, on the other. The effects of a monetary policy
shock are much weaker in variant 3. Concerning, for instance, the immediate effect on
real output and ination, output decreases  in variant 1 and only  in variant
3, while ination decreases  and  in variants 1 and 3, respectively.35
BGG predict that the financial accelerator amplifies monetary shocks by about 
(in terms of real output response). According to Quadrini [78], in his comment to Carl-
strom and Fuerst [26],  is still relatively small: "Based on this result, it is hard to
claim that financial frictions are the main mechanism through which monetary shocks
get propagated in the economy. If we eliminate financial market frictions, the impact of
monetary shocks will be reduced only by one third." (p. 31) Our model responds to this
insufficiency. If we eliminate financial market frictions, that is, if we compare variant 3
with variants 1 and 2, the impact of the monetary shock is reduced by much more than
one third:  and  from variants 1 and 2, respectively, to variant 3.
2.3.2 Decomposing the Amplification Effects
To confirm and then explain this discrepancy in the magnitude of results, we com-
pare, in Figure 2.3, the effects of the negative innovation in the nominal interest rate under
This difference in ination response justifies the contrast in nominal interest rate behavior following
the initial shock, shown in Figure 2.1.
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variants 1, 3 and a BGG variant, that is, a variant derived as our baseline model but treat-
ing the bank as the financial intermediary in BGG’s model, thus excluding bank capital
and eliminating deposits from households’ utility function.36
Variant 1 includes both the financial accelerator and the liquidity premium effects,
variant BGG only comprises the financial accelerator effect and variant 3 excludes both
effects (the external finance premium does not depart from its steady state value). Or, in
other words, variant 1 comprises the effects arising from the loan demand side (due to
the informational asymmetry between each entrepreneur and the bank, which gives rise
to the financial accelerator effect) and the effects arising from the loan supply side (due
to the presence of bank capital in the model, which gives rise to the liquidity premium
effect) variant BGG, in turn, only comprises loan demand effects and variant 3 excludes
both effects.
As illustrated in Figure 2.3, the real effects of monetary policy are in fact much
stronger in variant 1 than in variant BGG: concerning real output, once more, whereas it
initially decreases  in variant 1, it only decreases  in variant BGG. In other
words, whereas the introduction of an informational asymmetry between each entrepre-
neur and the bank amplifies monetary shocks by about  in our model (variant BGG vs
variant 3), the introduction of that same information asymmetry jointly with the imposi-
tion of bank capital minimum levels (through a deposit insurance rate and capital require-
ments) amplifies monetary shocks by significantly more than  (variant 1 vs variant
3).37
In variant 1 the external finance premium set by the bank must not only compensate
the bank for the costs of mitigating incentive problems due to informational asymmetries
(as in variant BGG), but also the return required by the households to hold bank capital.
That is, the external finance premium, in variant 1, is not only inuenced by the self
financing ratio, 


, but also by the liquidity premium required by the households,
Although in BGG’s original model, real money balances are included in the utility function, the results
are similar to those obtained under the BGG variant: under interest rate targeting, money in the utility
function yields a money demand equation, which "simply determines the path of the nominal money stock.
To implement its choice of the nominal interest rate, the central bank adjusts the money stock to satisfy this
equation." (Bernanke et al. [17], p. 1364).
The behavior of the nominal interest rate after the initial period is, once more, justified by the response
of ination, which is much stronger in variant 1 than in variants 3 and BGG.
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	


	
. Since the liquidity premium required by the households is countercyclical in
variant 1 (see Figure 2.2), due to deposits response, the countercyclical movement in the
external finance premium is exacerbated (see Figure 2.3: the external finance premium
initially increases  in variant 1 vs  in variant BGG). This explains why real
effects are much stronger in variant 1 than in variant BGG.
In sum, the amplification effects are much stronger in variant 1 (as well as in variant
2) than in variant BGG. The reason is summarized in Table 2.1: in addition to the bor-
rowers’ balance sheet channel of monetary policy transmission (also included in variant
BGG), variants 1 and 2 comprise the bank capital channel, which, through the liquidity
premium effect, further amplifies the monetary policy shock effects. In turn, the ampli-
fying effects are somewhat stronger in variant 1 than in 2, since in variant 1 banks must
issue more capital to comply with the binding capital requirements.
Standard interest Borrowers’ balance Bank capital
rate channel sheet channel channel
(amplifiers of monetary policy effects)
Variant 1   
Variant 2   
Variant 3 
Variant BGG  
Table 2.1. Monetary policy transmission channels
Our result of a much more powerful propagation than in BGG’s model, is in line
with Kocherlakota [60]’s argument - credit constraints can help to explain the properties
of output uctuations in the U.S., including the large movements in aggregate output. Ac-
cording to this author, these large movements cannot be explained by large shocks (those
"are hard to find in the data," p. 3), but by mechanisms which transform "small, barely
detectable, shocks to some or all parts of the economy into large, persistent, asymmetric
movements in aggregate output."
As for persistence over time of the effects of the monetary policy shock, using the
half-life (from the initial impact) criterion, as in Carlstrom and Fuerst [26], none of the
amplification channels generate higher persistence: the output response, for instance,
reaches half life between the second and the third quarters in variants 1, 2, 3 and BGG.
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2.3.3 Confirming that Capital Requirements are Binding
As the results of our model rely on the assumption of binding capital requirements,
we show now that, for reasonable values of the parameters, capital requirements are in
fact binding in our model. In the absence of deposit insurance, this is straightforward to
show: with no regulatory capital requirements nor deposit insurance, banks clearly prefer
to finance loans with deposits, since, due to the liquidity premium, 	  

	

, that
is, deposits are less expensive than bank capital. Therefore, there is no reason for banks
to hold bank capital and, consequently,   . If the capital requirement constraint is
introduced, then banks should optimally set  at its minimum regulatory level.
When deposit insurance costs are introduced, the outcome depends on the value as-
sumed for the deposit insurance costs parameter, , which enters the bank’s profit func-
tion. In the absence of capital requirements and considering the calibrated value of 
(, associated with an adequately capitalized bank belonging to the subgroup A,
as defined by FDIC for the soundest financial institutions, as of December 2006), bank
issues bank capital, in steady state, such that   . That is, bank capital is set
below the regulatory level. We also verify that bank capital remains always well below its
minimum regulatory level, in the absence of regulatory capital requirements, when one of
the following exogenous shocks is simulated: a contractionary or an expansionary mon-
etary policy shock,38 an expansionary or contractionary government expenditure shock,
and an expansionary or contractionary technology shock. Therefore, when the regulatory
capital constraint is introduced it will be binding:   .
Other experiments conducted by us, but not reported here, show that by considering
binding capital requirements our model rules out the analysis of unsound financial insti-
tutions, as banks belonging to the subgroup C as defined by the FDIC, which consists of
institutions that pose a substantial probability of loss to the deposit insurance fund, and,
thus, face a higher . Excluding this hypothesis seems reasonable, in the context of our
model, since a bank of type C will most probably face additional restrictions when issuing
new capital, restrictions which we do not take into account.
Corresponding, respectively, to an annual increase or decrease in the nominal interest rate of 25 basis
points.
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In addition, we have also performed the following sensitivity and robustness checks:
 Introducing a permanent technology shock and a temporary shock to government expen-
ditures, as defined in the appendix
 Removing the adjustment costs in the production of capital (which leads to a constant price
of capital)
 Considering internal habit formation in consumption and modifying investment adjust-
ment costs, making them directly dependent on changes in investment, as in Christiano
et al. [32].
The results obtained indicate that the bank capital channel remains at work in all of
the above experiments: the liquidity premium effect amplifies the effects of the exogenous
shock considered. Besides, combining habit formation in consumption with Christiano
et al.’s investment adjustment costs, generates more empirically consistent hump-shaped
responses of investment, consumption and, consequently, output, to a negative innovation
in the nominal interest rate.
2.4 The Liquidity Premium Amplification Effect: Basel I vs Basel II
The bank capital regulation framework of Basel I, established banks’ obligation to
continually meet a risk-based capital requirement. In short, under Basel I, each bank
must maintain a total risk weighted capital ratio, defined as the ratio of bank capital to the
bank’s risk-weighted assets, of at least 8%. The weights for assets on the balance sheet
depend, in turn, on the institutional nature of the borrower. For example, a zero weight is
assigned to a government security issued in the OECD, meaning that the bank can finance
such asset through deposits without adding any capital. Other three weights are permitted,
all meant to reect credit risk: 0.2 (e.g., for interbank loans in OECD countries), 0.5 (e.g.,
for loans fully secured by mortgages on residential property) and 1 (e.g., for industrial
and commercial loans).39
See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision [8], for a detailed description of the rules introduced
by Basel I, and Dewatripont and Tirole [38], for a short review.
67
As the same risk weight applies to all loans of each category (‘one size fits all’ ap-
proach), Basel I rules do not reect the risk that each particular borrower poses to the
bank. This has created the incentive for arbitrage activities: by moving low-risk instru-
ments off balance sheet and retain only relatively high-risk instruments, banks were able
to increase the risk to which they were exposed without increasing the amount of regula-
tory capital.
According to Jones [53], from a regulatory perspective, capital arbitrage has un-
dermined the effectiveness of Basel I. At least for large banks, capital ratios under this
framework are no longer reliable measures of capital adequacy: although for most bank-
ing organizations, neither public financial reports nor regulatory reports disclose sufficient
information to measure the full extent of a bank’s capital arbitrage activities, available ev-
idence suggests that the volume of this type of activities is large and growing rapidly,
especially among the largest banks. Furthermore, recent innovation in financial markets
is making capital arbitrage more accessible to a much broader range of banks than in the
past.
Basel II, aiming to further foster stability in the international banking system, ad-
dresses these shortcomings. One of the core changes proposed by Basel II is the increased
sensitivity of a bank’s capital requirement to the risk of its assets: the amount of capital
that a bank has to hold against a given exposure becomes a function of the estimated
credit risk of that exposure. Consequently, the constant risk weight of 100% for commer-
cial and industrial (C&I) loans, for instance, is replaced by a variable weight, so that the
C&I loans with a low credit rating and a high probability of default are thus assigned a
high risk weight. That is, under Basel II, the risk weights used to compute banks’ capital
requirements are determined both by the category of borrower and by the riskiness of a
particular borrower, thereby aiming to reduce regulatory capital arbitrage.40
The introduction of the new bank capital requirements rules may however accentuate
the procyclical tendencies of banking, with potential macroeconomic consequences, as
the countercyclical risk weights used to compute capital requirements may exacerbate
the procyclical uctuations in bank lending. Under Basel II, the co-movement of capital
	See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision [9] for details.
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requirements and the business cycle could induce banks to further reduce lending during
recessions due to high capital requirements.
The baseline model developed in Section 2.2 can be extended to compare the role of
bank capital in the business cycle under Basel I versus Basel II. In fact, on the one hand,
the capital requirements on that baseline version can be interpreted as a simplified Basel
I rule: banks must hold an amount of equity of at least 8% of the amount of C&I loans,
so that the same risk weight (100%) always applies to these loans, while government
bonds, bearing no risk, have zero weight. On the other hand, by introducing, in the capital
requirements constraint, risk weights that vary over the business cycle, the model can be
extended in order to shed light on the potential procyclicality of Basel II. We proceed now
in this direction.
Under Basel II rules, the risk weights in the capital requirements constraint depend
on the estimated credit risk of each exposure. In our model, firms default on the loan if the
idiosyncratic disturbance, , turns out to be smaller than the cutoff value 

. This
cutoff value, in turn, depends positively on the ratio of capital expenditures to net worth,








, which, for simplicity, we refer to as the leverage ratio.41 Therefore, the risk
weights in the capital requirements constraint become a positive function of the leverage
ratio.
Note that the optimal financial contract established between the bank and each entre-
preneur yields a common cutoff value, , for all entrepreneurs. Combining equations
(2.3) and (2.4) yields

 
 

   
 
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	
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	


 	
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
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
	

 


The right hand side of the former equation is the same for all firms (it does not depend on
). Concerning the left hand side, it is straightforward to show that, for an interior solution
Intuitively, everything else equal, higher leverage means higher exposure, implying a higher probabil-
ity of default, which the bank translates into a higher cutoff value. The formal proof, similar to the one in
BBG’s Appendix A, is available upon request.
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of , it is increasing in (formal proof available upon request). Therefore, there
exists only one  that satisfies the former equation: 

  . The intuition
is that, facing a common discounted return, 	


	
, producers choose the same leverage
ratio, leading to a common cutoff value larger firms, rather than benefiting from lower
interest rates, have, instead, access to larger amounts of credit.
Yet, the common cutoff value and, consequently, the credit risk, vary with the busi-
ness cycle. This allows straightaway the analysis of the business cycle properties of Basel
II, insulated from the effects of credit risk heterogeneity across firms.
According to the Internal Ratings Based (IRB) approach of Basel II, the estimated
credit risk and, consequently, the risk weights used to compute capital requirements, are
assumed to be a function of four parameters associated with each loan: the probability of
default (9), the loss given default (*), the exposure at default ()) and the loan’s
maturity (: ). Banks adopting the advanced variant of the IRB approach are responsible
for calculating all four of these parameters themselves, using their own internal rating
models. Banks adopting the foundation variant of the IRB approach are only responsible
for calculating the 9 parameter, while the other three parameters are to be set by the
regulatory authorities. As in Basel I, the ratio of bank capital to the risk-weighted assets
must be at least 8%. The risk-weighted assets are, in turn, computed as follows.
1 The capital requirement for corporate exposures, under the assumption of one-year ma-
turity, is given by42
	  *


 ;	 
 9 

;
 ;
	


9
*
where  denotes the cumulative distribution function for a standard normal random
variable and ; represents the asset-value correlation which parameterizes dependence across
borrowers and is assumed to be a decreasing function of the 9:
; 

  

 9
 

 


 

 9
 



2 According to the foundation variant of the IRB approach, the* is set to  to all cor-
porate exposures. Basel II also establishes that the expected losses 9
* should

See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision [9], paragraph 272, for details.
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be covered with loss general provision. From the perspective of our work, provisions are
treated as bank capital. Therefore, the capital requirement becomes
	  
 

 ;	 
 9 

;
 ;
	



3 The risk-weighted assets are then given by 	
 
).
Since all firms in our model have the same leverage ratio and, thus, the same proba-
bility of default (the same cutoff value ), they are all assigned the same 	 . The bank
capital requirement constraint can thus be defined as

	 
 
 
  

	 
 
 
where  are the loans granted by the bank to all firms from  to ,  is the bank’s
capital and 	  	 
 
By keeping track of how 	 evolves over the business cycle, our model is able to
give some insight into procyclicality of Basel II.
Note that under the foundation variant of the IRB approach of Basel II, 	 only
varies with 9. As mentioned, the probability of default on each loan in our model,
8/%<  , depends positively on the cutoff value , which, in turn, depends
positively on firm’s leverage ratio, 


. In sum, the higher the leverage ratio, the higher
the probability of default, that is, the higher the credit risk. The optimal financial contract
established between the bank and each entrepreneur can thus be used to derive a positive
relationship between 	 and



as reported in Figure 2.6.
According to our simulations, this relationship can be approximated by the linear
function
	  =  <



with =   and <  . Consequently, the capital requirements constraint in
the bank’s objective, under Basel II, becomes:
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

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=  <



 (2.37)
The calibrated model delivers, in steady state, a smaller minimum ratio of bank capital
to loans than in Basel I ( vs  under Basel I), which is in line with the results of
Committee of European Banking Supervisors [33], for instance. Besides, the ratio of bank
capital to bank loans, as defined by equation (2.37), uctuates over the business cycle, in
contrast with Basel I. Specifically, the higher the leverage ratio, the higher the fraction of
loans which must be financed by bank capital.
The bank’s objective is now given by:
	


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  	 	

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s.t.
       (balance sheet constraint) (2.38)


 

=  <



(capital requirements)
Taking into account that the leverage ratio depends, in turn, on the loans granted to
firms, since     , the capital requirement constraint in this problem
can be rewritten as:


 

=  <



 


The first order conditions of the interior solution of problem (2.38) yield43
	  	

  




 (2.39)
The two equations were derived considering binding capital requirements, since the analysis in 2.3.3
also applies here. In contrast with the bank’s problem under Basel I, the bank’s zero profit condition is not
guaranteed here. Technically, we assume that profits are distributed to the households.
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As in Basel I, the required return on lending, 	, depends on a weighted average of
the deposits’ return and the bank capital’s expected return. However, the weights depend
now on firms’ leverage. In particular, and taking into account the log-linearized version
of equation (2.40) - see equation (2.42) in the appendix -, the higher the firms’ leverage,
that is, the higher the credit risk, the higher the required return on lending by banks.
To analyze the consequences on the business cycle of introducing Basel II rules, we
compare the effects of a negative innovation in the nominal interest rate, corresponding
to an annual increase of 25 basis points, under Basel I, that is, considering the model de-
veloped in Section 2.2, and Basel II. Figures 2.4 and 2.5 illustrate the impulse response
functions of the relevant variables under the two hypotheses. The response of both eco-
nomic and financial variables under Basel II is much more pronounced than in Basel I,
thus supporting the procyclicality hypothesis of Basel II.
Recall that under Basel II, bank capital depends positively, not only on the level
of loans, but also on the firms’ leverage (see equation 2.37, above). Since both loans
and firms’ leverage tend to increase after the contractionary shock, for the same reasons
described in Section 2.3, the response of bank capital is amplified under Basel II, as
illustrated in Figure 2.5. As described in 2.3.1, to hold more bank capital during the
recession, households require an increase in the liquidity premium, since they must reduce
the amount of deposits held in order to attenuate the decline in consumption. In fact,
Figure 2.5 shows that the amplified increase in bank capital after the shock, under Basel
II, leads to an amplified decrease in deposits and, consequently, to a marked increase in
the liquidity premium required by households.
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As in the baseline model, the increase in the liquidity premium leads, in turn, to an
increase in the external finance premium faced by firms: combining the log-linearized
versions of equations (2.39) and (2.40) - see the appendix - yields
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where   = < <


 and >&  1  02. According to this equation, the
external finance premium, 

/

/, depends on the liquidity premium, /
/, on the deposit-bank capital ratio,  3, and on firms’ leverage, >&. Again,
these two latter effects are relatively small when compared to the former one.44
In sum, our model predicts that after the contractionary shock banks must issue more
capital under Basel II than under Basel I, since (i) the level of uncollateralized loans
increases, (ii) firms’ credit risk increases, and (iii) bank capital requirements are binding.
In order to hold more bank capital, households require a higher increase in the liquidity
premium, which, in turn, leads to a higher increase in the external finance premium faced
by firms. Consequently, the liquidity premium effect which underlies the bank capital
channel, detailed in 2.3.1, is stronger under Basel II, leading to more amplified responses
of both economic and financial variables after the monetary shock.
This outcome supports the hypothesis, mentioned above in the introduction of this
essay, that the application of the new bank capital requirements rules proposed by Basel II
will accentuate the procyclical tendencies of banking, which may work against the main
objective of Basel II of promoting the stability of the international banking system. In
For instance, immediately after the negative shock, the equation above can be rewritten as:
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fact, the countercyclically risk weights used to compute capital requirements may lead
banks to hold too much capital during downturns and less capital during upturns, when
the danger of a systemic crises is larger, as argued by Daníelsson et al. [36].
2.5 Concluding Remarks
Focusing on how microeconomic structures - namely the bank funding structure and
the relationship between the banks, entrepreneurs and households - interact with macro-
economic business conditions, we have built a bank capital channel into a general equi-
librium model, and found that it amplifies the real effects of monetary policy shocks and
business cycle uctuations, through a liquidity premium effect. This effect is strictly re-
lated to the financial accelerator effect associated with the borrowers’ balance sheet chan-
nel: when the liquidity premium and the financial accelerator effects are both present,
the external finance premium responds not only to borrowers’ financial position (as in
Bernanke et al. [17]), but also to the liquidity premium required by households to hold
bank capital. This exacerbates the (countercyclical) response of the external finance pre-
mium to a monetary policy shock, since the liquidity premium also moves countercycli-
cally and inuences positively the external finance premium.
The liquidity premium effect rests on the fact that bank capital (mandatory due to
risk-based capital requirements) is more expensive to raise than deposits, due to house-
holds’ preferences for liquidity, and that this difference tends to widen (narrow) during a
recession (expansion): after a contractionary monetary policy shock, for instance, house-
holds tend to decrease the amount of deposits held to attenuate the decline in consump-
tion since we assume that deposits provide liquidity services, households, thus, require
an increase in liquidity premium, that is, an increase in the difference between the ex-
pected return on bank capital (which is also owned by households, but which does not
render any liquidity services) and the return on deposits. This cost is then passed on to
firms by the bank through an increase of the external finance premium.
Concerning the magnitude of the amplification effects, our results indicate that if
we bring together the bank capital with the borrowers’ balance sheet channel, financial
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frictions do seem to be a very important mechanism through which monetary shocks get
propagated in the economy and business cycle uctuations are amplified. Actually, if,
in addition to the informational asymmetry between each entrepreneur and his bank, we
introduce in the model other financial frictions related to the imposition of regulatory bank
capital minimum levels, the role of financial frictions in the mechanism through which
monetary shocks are propagated in the economy becomes much more powerful than in
Bernanke et al.’s model, in line with some arguments in related literature.
As the definition of bank capital minimum levels has been the focus of Basel I and
Basel II, we have extended the model in order to compare a simplified version of these two
regulatory frameworks, thereby contributing to the debate on the procyclicality of Basel
II. We found that the liquidity premium effect amplifies business cycle uctuations the
more significantly the closer the regulatory rules are to Basel II, rather than to Basel I. For
instance, in face of a contractionary shock, banks must issue more capital under Basel II
than under Basel I. To absorb this additional capital, households require a higher increase
in the liquidity premium, which, in turn, leads to a higher increase in the external finance
premium faced by firms. This result implies that the application of the new bank capital
requirements rules will accentuate the procyclical tendencies of banking, which conicts
with the main objective of Basel II of promoting the stability of the international banking
system.
Economic policy conclusions should be drawn carefully, however, since the model
simplifies and abstracts from many important features of the economy. Importantly, as the
model is not designed to capture the effectiveness of Basel I and Basel II in preventing
bank failure, conclusions regarding the ranking of the two frameworks are clearly out of
its scope. As a matter of fact, our analysis has not been concerned with questions such as
whether bank regulation is itself optimal and what type of regulation is more appropriate.
We ignore risk and incentives that support capital adequacy regulation (as the social cost
of bank failure) and, therefore, our analysis does not support any normative conclusions
regarding bank-capital regulation.
So far, the value added by our work to the discussion of the role of financial imper-
fections in the monetary policy transmission mechanism and in business cycle uctua-
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tions, and to the issue of procyclicality of Basel II, encourages to proceed this research.
A promising direction is to build risk-sensitive capital requirements into a heterogeneous-
agent general equilibrium model. This will allow a fuller account of Basel II rules, by
considering that credit risk varies not only along the business cycle, but also across firms.
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2.6 Appendix
The Linearized Model and Calibration
A. The Baseline Model
To linearize the model’s equations, we use a first order Taylor series expansion
around the steady state. Let the lower case letters denote the percentage deviation of each
variable from its steady state level: .  




, where + is the value of + in nonsto-
chastic steady state.
Aggregate Demand
Starting by log-linearizing the Euler equations, equation (2.14) becomes (assuming that
  !):
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Concerning equation (2.15), we take a first-order Taylor approximation around the
steady state ignoring the second order terms (or assuming that they are constant over time:
$%&  $%&,) and obtain:
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Concerning the entrepreneurs’ consumption (equation 2.8), we follow BGG and as-
sume in simulations that
$  2
In turn, the aggregate resource constraint (2.21) becomes
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This term (A ) is ignored in the simulations. Note that 
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, the share of expected
monitoring costs in output, is quite small (even smaller than 

).
In what concerns the relationship between the external finance premium and the ratio
of capital expenditures to net worth, equation (2.5) can be written in log-linear form as
/
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
  &0  1  2,
where & is the steady state elasticity of 	


	
with respect to 


, i.e., the steady
state elasticity of the external finance premium with respect to the ratio of entrepreneurs’
capital expenditures to net worth:
& 

0
0


We follow Gertler et al. [45] to compute &.
Log-linearization of (2.19) implies that
1     0 
where  is the elasticity of the price of capital with respect to 

:   
 	 
 	 



Log-linearization of (2.22), in turn, renders
/   7?  0  .  71  1
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Aggregate Supply
In the log-linearized version of the model, equation (2.23) becomes
?  =  0   B

 ,
and the labor market clearing condition, taking into account both equations (2.16) and
(2.24), is given by

 

C

B  ?  .   $
where C  !
!"
"

 



.
Finally the Phillips curve (or the price adjustment equation) is given by
6  !6  D.,
where D  ##
#
, 6  8 8 is the rate of ination from   to , 8  

$
$

,
and 9 is the price index. This equation is derived from the optimal (staggered) price
setting by the retail sector.
State Variables
Log-linearization of (2.26) implies that the entrepreneurs’ net worth evolves according to
(ignoring the monitoring costs):
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


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(


+
?  .
Concerning the capital stock, the log-linearized version of (2.18) is
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Representative Bank
Equations (2.11) and (2.12) can be written in log-linear form as :
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The capital requirement constraint,    , turns into:
3 


0  1


2
Monetary Policy Rule and Shock Processes
The interest rate rule is given by
/  4/

  56  7


where /  /  6 is the nominal interest rate from  to    (with 6 
8  8) and 7 an i.i.d. disturbance at time .
Concerning the exogenous disturbances to government spending and technology,
they follow, as in BGG, stationary autoregressive processes:
@  4%@  7
%

=  4&=  7
&

where 7% and 7& are i.i.d. disturbances.
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B. The Log-linearized Equations of the Basel II Extension
By log-linearizing equations (2.39) and (2.40), derived from the bank’s objective first
order conditions, we get:
/ 
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  3 (2.41)
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where >&  1  0  2.
Additionally, the log-linearized version of the binding capital constraint is
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C. Calibration
To evaluate some of the model’s parameters and variables in steady state (SS), we
follow BGG, who, focusing on U.S. data, consider (recall that, according to our notation,
a variable without the time subscript indicates its steady state value):
Entrepreneurial Consumption/Output in SS 



Government Expenditure/Output in SS 



Gross Markup of Retail Goods over the Wholesale Goods in SS  
Price of Capital in SS  
Entrepreneurial Labor  
Elasticity of the price of capital with respect to I/K  

Capital Share 
 
Household Labor Share  
 
Labor Supply Elasticity  
Depreciation Rate 	 

Interest Rate Smoothing  
Coefficient on ination in the interest rate rule  
Prob. that an entrepreneur survives to the next quarter  
	
Probability of a firm does not change its price within a given period  
Serial correlation parameter for technology shock 	 
Serial correlation parameter for gov. expend. shock 
 
Standard Deviation of   
	
Monitoring Costs Parameter  

Preference Parameter  
Preference Parameter  
Table 2.2. Calibration I
Concerning the parameters related to the financial contract, we choose the same val-
ues as BGG for the probability that an entrepreneur survives to the next quarter ( 
) and for the monitoring cost parameter (  ). For the standard deviation of
, we assume that    . According to Carlstrom and Fuerst [25], a standard
deviation of  of around  is comparable to the corresponding empirical standard de-
viation reported by Boyd and Smith [22]. These assumptions allowed us to approximate,
with good accuracy, the three steady state outcomes pointed out by BGG: a financing pre-
mium of  per year 

  (which implies a ratio of loans to capital expenditures, 

,
of ) and an annualized business failure rate, 
   .45
Data for the U.S. on the financing premium is available at http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/, whereas
data on the leverage ratio is available in Rajan and Zingales [79].
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There are other parameters and variables in steady state which are specific to our
model, namely:
Loans/Deposits in SS 


Bank Capital Requirement 
 	
Deposit Insurance Costs Parameter (risk-sensitive dep. ins. rate) 	 
Preference Parameter 	 
Table 2.3. Calibration II


 In steady state, and according to the model,      , where  represents
loans without collateral that are granted to entrepreneurs who buy capital to produce the
final good. Therefore, real estate and consumer loans should not be included in , as
well as loans secured by collateral. In other words,  should only comprise commercial
and industrial (C&I) loans which are not secured by collateral. The Survey of Terms of
Business Lending, published by the Federal Reserve, provides data which allowed us to
compute the amount of C&I loans not secured by collateral in percentage of all C&I loans
(made by all U.S. commercial banks), in each quarter from 1997:2 to 2004:4:
"'(')


Then, using the (U.S., quarterly) banking data, from 1997:2 to 2004:4, available at
the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (see http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/), on (a)
the total loans at all commercial banks and (b) the deposits at all commercial banks, we
computed the ratio (a)/(b), from which we could proceed, assuming
*'&)
*'&)

(a)
(b) 
and



*'&)
*'&)


(a)
(b)


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where  denotes the deposits that are used in financing "'('), i.e., the deposits
relevant to our model.
Finally, we assumed that 

corresponds to the average value of
"'(')


"'(')



 
To calibrate the deposit insurance parameter  we followed Berka and Zimmer-
mann [13]’s procedure, using data from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)46
as of December 2006 and assume that, in steady state, the representative bank of our
model is an adequately capitalized bank belonging to the subgroup A, as defined by FDIC
for the soundest financial institutions.47 Therefore, the deposit insurance rate corresponds
to 3 cents per $100 of deposits in annual terms.48 In quarterly terms, this means that



 .
Since we are assuming that, in steady state, 

 , and that 

is always equal to
 (in the benchmark case),


     
The other parameters and variables in steady state are set in the following way:
 &, 	

	
 , 


, and follow from the computation of , which, according to the opti-
mal financial contract established between the bank and each entrepreneur in steady
state, must satisfy the following condition
  

	


  


	

 
  !

,
where   


and !  
 

  



. Details on  and &
computation are available upon request. See also Gertler et al. [45].
Available at http://www.fdic.gov/deposit/insurance/risk/assesrte.html.
See http://www.fdic.gov/deposit/insurance/risk/rrps_ovr.html.
Be aware that the rates established by the FDIC changed in 2007.
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
 D  ##
#

 The variables and parameters must satisfy the steady state equations derived from the model’s
FOC and optimization constraints.
 	 represents the quarterly steady state real gross return on government bonds. Taking into
account the first Euler equation (2.14) evaluated in steady state,
  !	  




and the relationship between 	 and 	 (see equation 2.11),
	  	  



we set the parameter  to guarantee	   in steady state (a value which is assumed
by many other business cycle models, including BGG, for the riskless real rate of return,
since it guarantees an average riskless interest rate of 4% per year), with 

 .
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Figure 2.1. Response of economic activity to a negative monetary policy shock: variant
1 (solid line) - with capital requirements variant 2 (dashed line) - without capital require-
ments variant 3 (dashed-dotted line) - with no capital requirements nor financial acceler-
ator.
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Figure 2.2. Response of financial variables to a negative monetary policy shock: variant
1 (solid line) - with capital requirements variant 2 (dashed line) - without capital require-
ments variant 3 (dashed-dotted line) - with no capital requirements nor financial acceler-
ator.
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Figure 2.3. Response of economic activity to a negative monetary policy shock: variant
1 (solid line) - with capital requirements variant BGG (dashed line) - based on BGG’s
model variant 3 (dashed-dotted line) - with no capital requirements nor financial acceler-
ator.
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Figure 2.4. Response of economic activity to a negative monetary policy shock: Basel I
- dashed line Basel II - solid line.
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91
1 1 .2 1 .4 1 .6 1 . 8 2 2 .2 2 .4 2 .6 2 .8 3
0
0 .5
1
1 .5
2
2 .5
le ve ra g e  ra t io
CR
*
Figure 2.6. Relationship between the leverage ratio and the capital requirements weights,
under Basel II, derived from the steady state optimal financial contract
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Chapter 3
Basel II Capital Requirements, Firms’ Heterogeneity and
Macroeconomic Dynamics
3.1 Introduction
One of the most important changes underlying the new Basel Capital Accord (Basel
II hereafter) - the increased sensitivity of a bank’s capital requirement to the risk of its
portfolio - has raised some concerns, at both academic and policy-making levels. In con-
trast with the bank capital regulation framework established by the Basel Accord of 1988
(Basel I hereafter), the risk weights used to compute bank capital requirements under
Basel II are determined by both the institutional category and the riskiness of each particu-
lar borrower: the higher the credit risk of a given bank exposure, the higher the risk weight
assigned to that exposure.49 Consequently, if, during a recession, the non-defaulted bank
borrowers are downgraded by the credit risk models in use, the minimum bank capital re-
quirements will increase. The general concern is that, to the extent that it is difficult or
costly for the bank to raise external capital in bad times, this co-movement in bank capital
requirements and the business cycle may induce banks to further reduce lending during
recessions, thereby amplifying the initial downturn. This potential procyclicality of Basel
II may render more difficult for policy makers to maintain macroeconomic stability.
Under Basel I only the borrower’s institutional category is taken into account.
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The present essay addresses this question in the context of a dynamic heterogeneous-
agent model, in which firms differ in their access to bank credit depending on their finan-
cial position, that is, depending on their estimated credit risk. In particular, we aim to
examine to what extent the changeover from Basel I to Basel II capital requirements rules
may accentuate the procyclical tendencies of banking and, consequently, may amplify
business cycle uctuations, taking into account that under the new Basel Accord the min-
imum capital requirements depend on the credit risk of each particular bank exposure.
Some empirical papers, aiming to infer the potential procyclicality of Basel II, have
also motivated our modelization of the bank-borrower relationship under the new regula-
tory framework in the context of a heterogeneous-agent model. Kashyap and Stein [56]
simulate the degree of capital charge cyclicality that would have taken place over the four
year interval 1998-2002 had the Basel II foundation Internal Ratings Based (IRB) ap-
proach been in use. The simulations, using data on the U.S., some European countries
and the ‘Rest of the World’, suggest that Basel II capital requirements have the potential
to create an amount of additional cyclicality in capital charges that may be - depending
on a bank’s customer mix and the credit-risk models that it uses - quite large. Altman
et al. [4] point out that the procyclical effects of Basel II may be even more severe than
expected if banks use their own estimates of loss given default to compute the capital re-
quirements risk weights: low recovery rates when defaults are high will amplify cyclical
effects, which will tend to be especially strong under the advanced IRB approach, where
banks are free to estimate their own recovery rates and may tend to revise them downward
when defaults increase and ratings worsen.
Concerning the standardized approach of Basel II, Carpenter et al. [27]’s estimates
of how risk-weighted commercial and industrial loans might have evolved over the last
three decades if banks had been using this approach, suggest very little cyclical impact
compared to Basel I. That is, the variation in ratings over the business cycle would not
have been substantial enough to imply much additional cyclicality under the standardized
approach of the new accord when compared to Basel I. It is worth noting that under the
standardized approach of Basel II, unrated firms are treated as in Basel I and the risk
weights assigned to rated firms are based on ratings of external agencies, which usually
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follow a through-the-cycle approach to compute the default probability over the life of
the loan, rating borrowers according to their ability to withstand a recession. In fact,
and as the Catarineu-Rabell et al. [28]’s empirical study shows, the extent of additional
procyclicality associated with Basel II will depend on the nature of the rating system used.
According to this study, if banks use internal ratings close to those of the main rating
agencies, the increase in capital requirements during a recession is quite small (around
15%). However, if banks choose an approach based on point-in-time rating systems,
which assign ratings according to the ability of the borrowers to fulfil obligations over the
credit horizon (typically one year), the increase in capital requirements during a recession
will be much more pronounced (around 40% to 50%).
The procyclical effects of Basel II will also depend on the view adopted concerning
how credit risk evolves over time. According to Segoviano and Lowe [84], for instance,
one possible view is that the current performance of the economy can be taken as the best
guess of its future performance (the random walk view). This view leads to risk being
measured as low in an expansion and high in a recession, yielding to higher regulatory
capital requirements in a downturn than in a boom. An alternative view suggests that the
forces that drive economic booms often (although not always) sow the seeds of future eco-
nomic downturns by generating imbalances in both real and financial sectors. Segoviano
and Lowe argue that these imbalances increase risk by increasing uncertainty about the
financial strength of individual borrowers, by making default probabilities more highly
correlated and future collateral values more uncertain. The increase in defaults during a
recession might thus be thought of as the materialization of risk built up during the boom.
That is, this view - the predictability view - is consistent with the proposition that risk
builds up in the boom but materializes in the downturn, and opens the possibility of mea-
sured credit risk being relatively high when times are good. In this context, Pederzoli and
Torricelli [72]’s model, by considering the predictability view of the business cycle and a
through-the-cycle logic in the rating assignment, is able to preserve the risk sensitivity of
capital requirements and at the same time dampen Basel II procyclicality.
In sum, these and other empirical studies show that the procyclical effects of Basel II
will depend on how the minimum capital requirements will react over the business cycle,
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which, in turn, depend (i) on banks’ customer portfolios, (ii) on the approach adopted
by banks to compute their minimum capital requirements - the standardized or the IRB
approach -, (iii) on the nature of the rating system used - through-the-cycle or point-
in-time rating systems -, (iv) on the view adopted concerning how credit risk evolves
over time - the random walk or the predictability view, (v) on the capital buffers over
the regulatory minimum held by the banking institutions, and (vi) on the market and
supervisor intervention under Pillar 2 and 3 of Basel II.50
Our theoretical model contributes to evaluate the potential procyclical effects of
Basel II and to what extent those effects might depend on banks’ customer portfolios and
on how borrowers’ credit risk evolves over the business cycle. As in the model developed
in Chapter 2, we take the Bernanke et al. [17]’s dynamic general equilibrium model as a
starting point and we add banks that, due to the imposition of regulatory capital require-
ments, face financial frictions when raising funds. We depart, however, from these two
models by properly considering that firms have different access to bank credit. Specif-
ically, in the model of Bernanke et al. all firms are alike ex ante, except for the initial
net worth. Aggregation is quite easy since all firms have the same ratio of capital expen-
ditures to net worth and, thus, face the same external finance premium when borrowing
from banks. Yet, and as mentioned by Bernanke et al., there is in practice considerable
heterogeneity among firms along many dimensions, in particular in access to credit. Our
model attempts to fill this gap by considering firms with different levels of credit risk and,
consequently, facing different conditions when borrowing from banks. Compared with
the representative-firm, this heterogeneous-firm framework allows a more accurate infer-
ence of the potential procyclical effects of the changeover from Basel I to Basel II capital
requirements: by introducing risk-sensitive capital requirements into a model with het-
erogeneous firms that differ on credit risk, we may properly analyze to what extent the
riskiness of a bank’s loan portfolio may accentuate the procyclical tendencies of banking
under Basel II.
In this context, we first develop a heterogeneous-agent general equilibrium model in
steady state, with uncertainty only at the firm level, assuming that banks finance nonfi-
	On this subject see also Carling et al. [24], Amato and Furfine [6] and Ayuso et al. [7], for instance.
96
nancial heterogeneous firms using the funds of a representative household. Firms have
different access to credit depending on their estimated credit risk, which depends, in turn,
on their leverage. We also assume that banks are constrained by a risk-based capital re-
quirement according to which the ratio of bank capital to the risk-weighted nonfinancial
loans cannot fall below . Whereas under Basel I the capital requirements risk weights
are constant and equal to one across all firms, under Basel II the risk weights depend
positively on firms’ credit risk. Note that in the stationary equilibrium the aggregate vari-
ables are constant over time, but firms are undergoing change both in size and in leverage.
Therefore, the capital requirements risk weight assigned to each firm, under the new ac-
cord, also changes over time.
As in Chapter 2, banks are limited in their lending to nonfinancial firms by the amount
of bank capital that households are willing to hold, which, due to households’ preferences
for liquidity, is more expensive to raise than deposits.
Our model evaluates the impact of the changeover from Basel I to Basel II capital
requirements on the economy’s aggregate variables in steady state and on the stationary
distribution of firms over the state space. The firms’ dynamics generated by the steady
state model seem to be in line with the related literature. Besides, the effects of a perma-
nent increase in the aggregate technology level on the stationary equilibrium indicate the
existence of potential procyclical effects of Basel II.
We then simulate an aggregate technology shock, in order to properly assess those
potential procyclical effects. Due to the large number of state variables considered, we
adopt a partial equilibrium version of the steady state model, focusing on the bank-
borrower relationship and in the absence of households. Assuming a countercyclical re-
quired return on bank capital, based on the robust results of Chapter 2, the model allows us
to infer the importance of the banks’ customer portfolios to the potential procyclicality of
Basel II, which may be significant even when the perceived average credit risk decreases
in bad times (as the predictability view suggests).
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Related Theoretical Literature
Since the introduction of the first Basel Accord, some theoretical studies on the rela-
tionship between regulatory bank capital requirements and the business cycle have been
developed, as analyzed in Chapter 1. However, only a few focused on the potential macro-
economic effects of Basel II.
Tanaka [88] extended a static IS-LM model, in the spirit of Bernanke and Blinder
[15]’s work, to introduce the new capital requirements rules: the risk weights used to
compute capital requirements become a function of the mean probability of borrower de-
fault over the business cycle. According to the model, an increase in the credit risk raises
the probability that the bank faces a regulatory penalty, thus restricting bank’s ability to
lend. Therefore, if the credit risk varies with the business cycle, the new regulation may
exacerbate macroeconomic uctuations. The model also predicts that an expansionary
monetary policy, under Basel II, may be less (more) effective during recessions (booms),
when credit risk tends to be higher (lower). The intuition is that during a recession the
bank’s capital-to-asset ratio would be lower, for given levels of capital and loans, if the
bank faces a relatively high level of credit risk. Hence, the bank’s loans become more in-
sensitive to an expansionary monetary policy, since a lower capital-to-asset ratio restricts
banks’ ability to increase its risky asset holdings.
Zicchino [100], aiming to capture the link between loan risk weights and borrow-
ers’ creditworthiness established in Basel II, introduces capital requirements risk weights
that vary with macroeconomic conditions, in the theoretical partial equilibrium model of
Chami and Cosimano [30]. In her model the capital requirements risk weights become
a function of the macroeconomic activity, which, in turn, follows a first-order autore-
gressive stochastic process. Consequently, if banks face binding capital constraints, they
will be able to increase their loan supply when times are good but they might be forced
to reduce supply during a recession. Zicchino thus concludes that Basel II may lead to
a greater reduction of credit following a negative macroeconomic shock: not only will
loan demand fall during an economic downturn, but banks may be forced to reduce loan
supply to satisfy tighter capital requirements. In order to avoid such an eventuality, su-
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pervisors should, according to Zicchino, encourage banks to build a capital buffer during
expansions above the one banks would choose voluntarily.
In this context, the still preliminary work of Repullo and Suarez [82] considers the
possibility that banks optimally choose to keep capital buffers, thus, counteracting the po-
tential procyclicality of the new Basel Accord. The partial equilibrium model developed
by these authors predicts that when the value of the on-going lending relationships is large
enough and the cost of bank capital is not very large, banks optimally choose to keep cap-
ital buffers. However, the model also predicts that these capital buffers are insufficient to
neutralize Basel II procyclicality: during a recession banks will significantly decrease the
supply of credit to some of their dependent borrowers causing a credit crunch that would
not occur under Basel I.
Our work differs from (and adds to) the existing literature by evaluating the potential
procyclical effects of Basel II in the context of a heterogeneous-agent model: as one of
the central changes of the new regulation is to introduce capital requirements risk weights
that depend on the riskiness of each borrower, considering heterogeneous borrowers with
different levels of credit risk and analyzing a bank’s customer portfolio and how it varies
with the business cycle is essential to capture some of the potential effects of the new
Basel Accord.
This essay is organized as follows. After this introduction, Section 3.2 develops and
calibrates a heterogeneous-agent general equilibrium model in steady state, with uncer-
tainty only at the firm level. Three variants of the model are considered: the model assum-
ing Basel II capital requirements rules, the model assuming Basel I capital requirements
rules and the model without capital requirements. Section 3.3 simulates an aggregate
technology shock under a partial equilibrium version of the model developed in the pre-
vious section, in which household are absent. In order to analyze the potential procyclical
effects of Basel II, we compare the effects of the technology shock under the three vari-
ants of the model described above. Section 3.4 offers current conclusions and summarizes
the state of this research project.
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3.2 The Model in Steady State
In order to analyze the effects of the introduction of Basel II minimum capital re-
quirements on cyclical uctuations, we develop a dynamic general equilibrium model
assuming three types of agents in the economy:
 Households, who consume and allocate their savings to bank deposits (which provide liq-
uidity services) and bank capital
 Entrepreneurs, who own firms that need external (bank) finance to buy capital and pro-
duce output
 Banks, which, using the funds of households, finance and monitor (ex post) the entrepre-
neurs.
We first explore the model in steady state, that is, the model assuming no uncertainty
over the aggregate state of the economy, even though there is uncertainty at the firm level.
In steady state equilibrium, although firms are undergoing change, with some of them
growing in size and others contracting, the aggregate variables are constant over time.
3.2.1 Entrepreneurs
At each point in time there is a continuum of heterogeneous firms, of total measure
one, which have different access to credit depending on their financial position. In par-
ticular, each firm is characterized by (i) the amount of physical capital held to produce
output, (ii) the price paid per unit of capital, (iii) its net worth and (iv) its idiosyncratic
productivity.
In each period each entrepreneur buys the entire capital stock for his firm in order to
produce output in the next period, according to the following production function:
(   

)



 (3.1)
where  represents the homogeneous capital bought by each entrepreneur of type  at
time    and used in production at time , ) ( ) represents a common and constant
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productivity factor and  is an idiosyncratic disturbance to the production function, in-
dependently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) across time and across firms, with a contin-
uous and once-differentiable cumulative distribution function (c.d.f.), 
 , over a non-
negative support. It is assumed that  follows a log-normal distribution with    .
In the steady state model, the only source of uncertainty for firms is the idiosyncratic
shock.
The assumption of constant returns to scale, in the model of Bernanke, Gertler and
Gilchrist [17] (BGG hereafter), is convenient for computational reasons since agency
costs become independent of firm’s size and a representative firm can be used. How-
ever, the implication that firm size does not matter is not appealing to our study. Besides,
the convergence of the model to a steady state is not guaranteed if we assume a constant
return to scale production function with no labor. In this context we consider, instead,
decreasing returns to scale:   .
The entrepreneur’s gross project output, at the end of each period, consists of the sum
of his production revenues and the market value of his capital stock. Following Gertler
et al. [45], we assume that the idiosyncratic shock affects both the production of new
goods and the market value of capital. The shock  may thus be considered a measure of
the quality of entrepreneur’s overall capital investment. Each entrepreneur’s gross project
output, at the end of time , is then given by
)



  



 
where  is the depreciation rate and  is the price, at the end of time , of a unit of capital
held by entrepreneurs of type .51
Firms’ Demand for Capital and the Cost of Funds
At the end of period , each entrepreneur has available net worth  , which he
then uses to finance his expenditures on capital goods: 

. To finance the difference
between capital expenditures and the net worth, each entrepreneur borrows an amount
 is in units of household consumption.
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  



  

 from the bank which, in turn, imposes a required return on
lending, between  and    of 	.
Each entrepreneur’s decision on how much capital to buy, , depends both on the
expected marginal return to capital and on the marginal financing cost.
The expected marginal return to capital at the end of time , 	, comprises both the
expected marginal productivity of capital and the expected capital gains/losses:
	 
)



 



 

 (3.2)
where   refers to expectations taken over the distribution of the idiosyncratic shock.
We are excluding the possibility of arbitrage. Therefore, the expected return to capital
may differ across firms.
The marginal cost of funds faced by a particular entrepreneur depends on the financial
position of his firm, that is, depends on the ratio of firm’s capital expenditures to net worth.
As in Chapter 2 and in BGG, the relationship between the bank and each entrepreneur
embodies an asymmetric information problem: only the entrepreneur observes costlessly
the return of his project. That is, we assume a costly state verification framework, in which
the bank must pay a monitoring cost in order to observe an individual borrower’s realized
return. This monitoring cost is assumed to equal a proportion  of the entrepreneur’s
gross project output (net of unexpected capital gains/losses):


)



 



 



,
where     .
At the end of time , each entrepreneur (borrower) and the bank agree on a debt
amount, , and a borrowing rate, 

. At   , the entrepreneur defaults if his
resources are not enough to pay back the amount due. That is, the entrepreneur defaults
if  is smaller than the default threshold, 

, defined by


)



 



 

 

 (3.3)
102
We assume that the unexpected capital gains/losses, when  differs from 



,
are borne by the entrepreneur. This assumption simplifies the contracting problem.
If   

, the borrower defaults while the bank monitors the borrower and
receives,
 

)



 



 




If   

, the borrower pays the lender the amount 



 and keeps the
remaining.
The contract guarantees the bank an expected gross return on the loan equal to the
required return 	 (taken as given in the contracting problem). That is, the loan contract
established between each borrower and the bank must satisfy

 








 




 
 


)



 



 



 
 	



 


where  is the probability density function (p.d.f.) of . Combining the former equa-
tion with equation (3.3) yields

!



 


 
)



 



 


 	



 

 (3.4)
where !



is the expected gross share of profit going to the lender,
!




 

  








and  the expected monitoring costs,
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  
 


Therefore, !



 



represents the net share of profits going to the lender
and

 !



the share going to the entrepreneur (where, by definition, ! 
satisfies   !



 ).
The optimal contracting problem determines the division of the expected gross project
output, )



 



  between the borrower and the lender. The
optimal contract results from the maximization of borrower’s expected payoff, with re-
spect to  and 

, subject to (3.4):
	







 !


 
)



 



 

s.t. (3.5)
! 


 
)



 



 

 	



 


The first order conditions of this contracting problem yield, in turn, the following
equations (see Appendix A for details):
!



! 


! 



)



  

	






 !



 
!



! 


0
 (3.6)


 !



 )


 
	


 
and

! 



 

! 



 )


 
	



 

0
  (3.7)
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where  
	


	


(external finance premium faced by firms of type ) and 0  








(ratio of capital expenditures to net worth of type  firms). As we assume decreasing re-
turns to scale, and in contrast with BGG and Chapter 2, the cutoff value  varies with
firms’ type: borrowers have different ratios of capital expenditures to net worth and, con-
sequently, different cutoff values for  and different access to credit. Besides, the first
order conditions (FOCs) are more complex: whereas in BGG and Chapter 2 the only un-
known variables were the threshold value, , the external finance premium and the
ratio of capital expenditures to net worth, now the FOCs also depend on the capital stock,
, on the price of capital, 

 , on the required return on lending by the bank, 	

,
and on the common productivity factor, ) (which is constant in the steady state model,
but will vary when we introduce an aggregate productivity shock in the next section).
Nevertheless, and in line with BGG, our simulations predict that, for a given price of
capital and level of net worth, the external finance premium faced by leveraged firms in-
creases with the capital stock. Figure 3.1 illustrates this relationship using the contract
calibrated as described below, in 3.2.5. Besides, as in BGG, this figure also shows that an
increase in firm’s net worth improves firm’s financial position causing a rightward shift in
the external-finance-premium curve: an increase in net worth relative to the capital stock
reduces the firm’s expected default probability and, consequently, the external finance
premium.
See Appendix A for the assumptions made in order to solve numerically equations
(3.6) and (3.7).
Entrepreneurial Net Worth
As a technical matter, it is necessary to start entrepreneurs off with some net worth
in order to allow them to begin operations. We assume that, in each period, each entre-
preneur is endowed with a small endowment,  . The net worth of entrepreneurs thus
combines profits accumulated from previous capital investment and the endowment  .
To avoid the possibility that the entrepreneurial sector accumulates enough net worth
to be fully self-financed, we assume that each entrepreneur consumes, in every period, a
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constant fraction () of his resources.52 Therefore, the net worth ( ) and consump-
tion ( ) of each entrepreneur of type , at the end of time , are defined as follows.53
a) If    , the borrower pays the lender the amount


  



)



 



 

and keeps the remaining:
   

)



  



  



)



 



 

(3.8)
   

)


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  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
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
  



)



 



 

 (3.9)
b) If    , the borrower pays the lender the amount)







 

 :
   

)



  



  


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)



 



 



(3.10)
   

)



  



  



)



 



 



 (3.11)
Capital Producers
Following the models developed in Chapter 2 and in BGG, we specify each entrepre-
neur’s investment decisions under external capital adjustment costs. We depart, however,

Alternatively, we could assume that agents had finite horizons. We did not pursue this hypothesis for
simplicity, avoiding the exit and entry of firms. However, we intend to further research on this issue and
introduce in the model exiting firms and the creation of new ones.
As a technical matter, under both hypotheses a) and b) we consider that    . Therefore,
if, for instance,   





under b), we assume that the entrepreneur pays the bank 








 	



 and keeps the remaining  .
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from those models by introducing a specific capital producer for each entrepreneur. In
particular, an entrepreneur of type  sells his entire stock of capital,  , at the end of each
period  to the capital producing firm associated with his firm. This capital producer also
purchases raw output as an input and combines it with  to produce new capital goods
via the production function 








 , where   is an increasing and concave func-
tion, with    , and ' represents the investment at time  of the entrepreneur of type
. The new capital goods, jointly with the capital used to produce them, are then sold to
the entrepreneur at the price  . The capital stock of each firm of type  thus evolves
according to:
  
	
'



   

  (3.12)
and the FOC for investment for the capital producers yields
 









  (3.13)
We assume that the capital adjustment cost function   takes the following form
(similar to the function used by Jermann [52] and Boldrin et al. [20]):
  

=
  

	
'


 

(3.14)
where  ( ) is the elasticity of the ratio of investment (measured in units of capital)
to the capital stock with respect to the price of capital and = is a constant. Therefore,
equation (3.13) can be rewritten as
 

=
	
   




 

 (3.15)
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Note that  is set after the realization of the idiosyncratic shock at the beginning of time
 (see Figure 3.2).
3.2.2 Banks
Financial intermediation, consisting of collecting funds from households (deposits
and bank capital) and granting loans to the entrepreneurs, is assured by banks, which are
legally subject to a risk-based regulatory capital requirement. The asset side of a bank’s
balance sheet includes loans granted to firms, whereas the liability side comprises deposits
and bank capital. In line with the contract established between the representative bank and
each entrepreneur, banks’ assets and liabilities have the same, one period, maturity.
Following a simplified version of Basel II capital requirements rules, banks are re-
quired to hold at least a minimum amount of bank capital, determined by amount of loans
granted to firms and by the credit risk of banks’ loan portfolios. That is, we assume that
the minimum amount of bank capital that each bank has to hold depends on the estimated
credit risk of its loan portfolio, as specified by the following equation
  



"
where
  is the bank capital issued by the bank and held by households between  and 
  is the loan granted, at the end of time , to firms of type 
  is the credit risk weight associated with type  firms, at the end of time 
 " is the distribution of firms over the state space  , at the end of time
.
Under Basel I,  is constant and equal to one across all commercial and industrial
loans (   , ). Under Basel II, the risk weights in the capital requirements
constraint depend positively on the estimated credit risk of each exposure. According to
our model, firms default on the loan if the idiosyncratic disturbance, , turns out to be
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smaller than the cutoff value . Therefore, the higher the cutoff value, the higher the
probability of default, 8/%<  

. The risk weights, under Basel II, should thus
depend positively on the cutoff value, .
Figure 3.3, derived from our simulations of the model, shows that the financial con-
tract delivers a positive relationship between  and the ratio of capital expenditures
to net worth, 0. Therefore, firms’ credit risk and, consequently, Basel II risk weights


depend positively on firms’ ratio of capital expenditures to net worth (0). In
this context, we assume that the risk weights depend positively and linearly on 0, as spec-
ified by the following equations:
  =  <0

, if 0

  
=
<
 (3.16)
   if 0

  
=
<

where = and < are constants and <  .
For simplicity, we assume that banks are allowed to issue bank capital at any time,
on terms that also depend on households’ willingness to hold bank capital in addition to
deposits. Since bank capital is more expensive to raise than deposits, due to households’
preference for liquidity (as shown below in 3.2.3), the capital requirement constraint is
always binding:
  



"
We will now analyze the behavior of a representative bank which maximizes its ex-
pected profits, acting as a price (interest rate) taker in a competitive market. Its choice
variables are loans, deposits and bank capital. The bank’s objective is then given by:
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


	

"

	 	


s.t. (3.17)
"     (balance sheet constraint)



"
  (binding capital requirements),
where:
  are the households’ deposits from  to   
 	 is the required return on loans granted by the bank to firms of type , between
 and   
 	 is the gross return on deposits
 	 is the gross return on bank capital.
This specification facilitates the comparison between Basel I and Basel II regulatory
frameworks:
a) Under Basel II,
  =  <0

  


 =  <



 
   =  <
	

 
 



Therefore, taking into account that 0 depends on the loan granted to the firm,
since   



  

 and 0

 









, the capital requirements constraint in
the bank’s objective can be rewritten as
  
 
=  <
	

 
 


"
and the FOCs of the interior solution of problem (3.17) yield
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
 

= <  <0

	  

= <  <0

	 (3.18)
The required return on loans granted by the bank to firms of type , 	, is, thus, a
weighted average of the gross return on deposits and the gross return on bank capital. The
weights depend on firms’ type: the higher the ratio of capital expenditures to net worth
(that is, the higher the credit risk of the firm), the higher the weight associated with 	,
since a larger fraction of loans must be financed with bank capital.
b) Under Basel I,    , and the FOCs of the interior solution of problem
(3.17) yield
	   	

  	

  (3.19)
The required return on loans granted by the bank to firms of type , is again a weighted
average of the gross return on deposits and the gross return on bank capital. However, the
weights are now constant and do not depend on firms’ type, that is, all firms face the same
required return on lending.
In contrast with the bank’s problem under Basel I, the bank’s zero profit condition is
not guaranteed in a). Technically, we assume that profits are distributed to the households.
We also build a third variant of the model assuming no regulatory capital require-
ments at all. In this case, and since bank capital is more expensive to raise than deposits,
the bank finances all loans with deposits:    and 	  	 for any .
3.2.3 Households
The economy is composed of a continuum of infinitely lived identical risk averse
households of length unity. Each household consumes and allocates its savings to assets
which include deposits, that pay a riskless rate of return between  and    of 	,
and shares of ownership of banks in the economy, that pay 	. For simplicity, labor is
absent from our model. The representative household’s instantaneous utility function is
separable in consumption and liquidity (in the form of deposits) and given by:
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
  
 


 !
 (3.20)
where  denotes household consumption at time  and  the deposits held by the
household from  to   .
As in Chapter 2, the level of deposits is included in the instantaneous utility function
to indicate the existence of liquidity services from wealth held in the form of that asset.
In short, we are assuming that deposits have an advantage in terms of liquidity when
compared to bank capital. See Chapter 2 for details.
The representative household chooses consumption and its portfolio to maximize
the expected lifetime utility (appropriately discounted) subject to an intertemporal budget
constraint that reects intertemporal allocation possibilities. The household’s optimiza-
tion problem is then given by
	





!



  
 


 !

s.t. (3.21)
  	

    	

     

 
where !    is the subjective discount factor and  are dividends paid by the bank,
under Basel II.54
The FOCs with respect to  and  are the following:

  !	




 
 

  !



	



In steady state there is no aggregate uncertainty and     . Therefore,
assuming   !, the FOCs become,
Under Basel I,   .
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  !	  




 (3.22)
  !	 (3.23)
Since 



 is strictly positive, 	 exceeds 	, that is, the representative house-
hold, due to its preferences for liquidity, requires a liquidity premium, 	 	, in order
to hold bank capital in its portfolio.
As mentioned, we also considered a variant of the model in which banks do not face
regulatory capital requirements and, thus, optimally choose to finance all the loans with
deposits. In this case, households allocate all their savings to deposits and there is no bank
capital in the model. Therefore, we set  equal to zero and the Euler equation becomes
  !	
3.2.4 Equilibrium
A stationary equilibrium for this economy consists of:55
 Decision rules   ",   ",    " for the representa-
tive household
 A decision rule      for firms
 A law of motion for firms’ net worth,     
 A decision rule    for the representative capital producer associated
with each firm, producer of manufactured goods
 Equilibrium prices 	 	  for each type of firm, and 	 	
 A stationary distribution " 
Such that
A variable with the superscript  refers to its end-of-period value. To simplify the notation we now
drop the  superscript.
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 The consumer decision rules solve problem (3.21)
      satisfies equation (3.2) and solves the contract problem (3.5)
      satisfies equations (3.8) and (3.10)
     satisfies equations (3.12) and (3.13)
 The required return on lending by the bank,	 , satisfies equation (3.18), under Basel II
(or equation 3.19, under Basel I)
 The bank’s balance sheet and the capital requirements constraint are satisfied:
"    

 "
 
 The markets clear:
" 

    "
(    

  " 
    

  "

 Monitoring Costs (3.24)
where ( denotes the aggregate output and the aggregate entrepreneurial consump-
tion.56
 The stationary distribution "  is consistent with  ,
 ,   and the distribution of the idiosyncratic shock.
3.2.5 Calibration
We calibrate the model assuming that a period is a quarter. Some of the parameters
were calibrated as in Chapter 2: see Table 3.1.
Equation (3.24) is derived in Appendix B.
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Depreciation rate 	 

Monitoring costs parameter  

Preference parameter  
Preference parameter 	 
Discount factor  		
Table 3.1. Parameters values I
The parameter  in equation (3.15) is set to , in line with Jermann [52]. The
coefficient associated with deposits in the utility function (3.20), , is set such that, in
steady state and under Basel I, 	  , as assumed by many other business cycle
models, including BGG, for the riskless real rate of return, since it guarantees an average
riskless interest rate of  per year.
We consider a higher standard deviation of  - which enters the financial contract
- than in Chapter 2, because with the former value and under decreasing returns to scale
we did not guarantee that all leveraged firms (those with 0  ) face an external finance
premium, 	
	
, higher than 1 (see Table 3.2).
Entrepreneurs’ endowment   
Capital adjustment costs parameter ! 
 
Fraction of wealth consumed by each entrepreneur   
Aggregate productivity factor  
Production function parameter 
 
Standard Deviation of   
Utility function parameter 
	 	
Parameter of capital requirements’ risk weights under Basel II ! 
Parameter of capital requirements’ risk weights under Basel II " 
Table 3.2. Parameters values II
The remaining parameters, also reported in Table 3.2, satisfy the following require-
ments:
(i) The fraction of wealth consumed by each entrepreneur at the end each period,
 , the common productivity factor ) and the parameter  in the production function
(3.1) are set such that, in steady state:
 The fraction of self-financed firms is small (around  in steady state), as our model fo-
cuses on the behavior of leveraged firms
 The firms’ stationary distribution over net worth (size) is skewed to the right, that is,
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is skewed toward small firms, which, according to Cooley and Quadrini [34, 35], is an em-
pirical regularity of the data
 The average leverage ratio, measured by the average ratio of loans to capital expen-
ditures, is close to , as the data reproduced in Rajan and Zingales [79] points out.
(ii) The entrepreneurs’ endowment,  , is set to + ,
-
, where  >$ represents
the first grid point in the state space of firms’ net worth.57 This variable’s law of motion,
defined in 3.2.1, guarantees that each firm’s net worth does not take values below    
   

.
(iii) The capital adjustment costs parameter = in equation (3.15) is set such that
when this equation in considered in aggregate terms with    and   , 
equals one in steady state.
(iv) The parameters underlying the relationship between the capital requirements risk
weight  and the ratio of firm’s capital expenditures to net worth 0 under Basel II - see
equation (3.16), above - were calibrated such that a zero risk weight is assigned to firms
with 0   and a maximum risk weight of  is assigned to firms with 0  . Specifically,
we assume, in our simulations, that all firms with 0   are assigned the maximum level
of   . This is in line with the assumptions made concerning the financial contract
established between the bank and each entrepreneur (see the computational procedure
described in Appendix C, step 8), and avoids unrealistic values of  (based on Figure 1.1
in Chapter 1).
We then solve numerically the model, for the steady state, using the computational
procedure described in Appendix C.
3.2.6 Results
Before introducing an aggregate shock in the model to test the potential procyclical
effects of Basel II, we now describe the firms’ dynamics generated by the model in steady
state. Three variants of the model are considered:
 Variant 1: the model assuming Basel II capital requirements rules
As detailed in Appendix C, to solve the model we discretize the state space of firms’ net worth.
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 Variant 2: the model assuming Basel I capital requirements rules
 Variant 3: the model without capital requirements, i.e., excluding the capital requirements
constraint from the model.
The steady state values of some key variables of the model are reported in Table 3.3.
Comparing variant 3 with variants 1 and 2 allow us to conclude that the introduction of
regulatory capital requirements has a negative effect on capital accumulation and, con-
sequently, on firms’ production - the steady state output in variant 1 (2) is  ()
smaller than in variant 3. In both variants 1 and 2, banks are required to finance a frac-
tion of loans with bank capital, which is more expensive to raise than deposits, due to
households’ preferences for liquidity (	  	. This additional cost is passed on to
firms through an increase in the required return on lending, 	 . The total amount of
loans granted to firms, and, consequently, firms’ capital accumulation and output are thus
smaller in variants 1 and 2.
Variant 1 Variant 2 Variant 3
(Basel II) (Basel I) (No Capital Req.)
Aggregate Output 

		 

 

Aggregate Capital Stock 

 
	 


Aggregate Net Worth 
		 

 
Average Leverage Ratio (borrowers)  	 
Average Ratio of Cap. Expend. to Net Worth 
	 
 
Aggregate Loans 
  
% of Borrowers  
 	
# 
  
# 	 	 
Average # (borrowers)  	 
Average Capital Requirements Risk Weight 
  
Aggregate Bank Capital/Aggregate Loans  	 
Table 3.3. Key variables of the model in steady state
Table 3.3 also indicates that firms’ size, proxied by firms’ net worth, is smaller in
variants 1 and 2. However, the differences across the three variants of the model are less
significant with respect to this variable, when compared, for instance, with differences in
output or in the capital stock: net worth in variant 1 (2) is  () smaller than in
variant 3. Figures 3.4 and 3.5, which plot the distribution of firms over net worth and
capital stock, support this result. Figure 3.4, in particular, shows that the distribution
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of firms over net worth is, in fact, quite similar across the three variants of the model.
Differences are, however, evident concerning the distribution over capital stock: Figure
3.5 confirms that the introduction of regulatory capital requirements has a negative effect
on capital accumulation and shows that this negative effect is stronger under Basel II.
Figure 3.6, which plots the joint distribution of firms over net worth and capital stock
under Basel II regulatory capital requirements, jointly with Figures 3.4 and 3.5, also allow
us to conclude that the stationary distribution, under the three variants of the model, is
characterized by small and leveraged firms: having access to bank credit, firms are able
to accumulate a significant amount of capital when compared to their size.58
As analyzed in 3.2.2, for a given amount of loans, the minimum amount of capital that
banks must hold, in variant 1, is increasing in the capital requirements risk weights, which
depend positively on the borrowers’ credit risk (proxied by the ratio of firms’ capital
expenditures to net worth). In variant 2, in turn, the risk weights are constant and equal
to one across all firms. The last two rows of Table 3.3 show that the average capital
requirements risk weight in variant 1 is higher than in variant 2, leading, in turn, to a
higher ratio of bank capital to loans, despite the decrease in borrowers’ average leverage
ratio with the changeover from Basel I to Basel II capital requirements rules. That is, the
stationary distribution of firms in this economy seems to be characterized by somehow
highly leveraged firms, thereby leading to a relatively high level of average credit risk in
steady state. Consequently, under Basel II, the representative bank must finance a higher
proportion of loans with bank capital. As bank capital is more expensive to raise than
deposits, the financing cost faced by firms is higher under Basel II, leading to smaller
steady state values of aggregate loans, capital accumulation, and, consequently, aggregate
output.59
Recall that the model was calibrated in order to generate a firms’ stationary distribution over net worth
skewed toward small firms, which, according to Cooley and Quadrini [34, 35], is an empirical regularity
of the data.
The aggregate amount of loans and the aggregate capital stock in variant 1 are (respectively) 
	
and 
 smaller than in variant 2.
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Firms’ Dynamics in Steady State
Figures 3.7 to 3.9 describe firms’ dynamics generated by the calibrated steady state
model. It is straightforward to conclude that, except for the required return on lending
(	 ) and the capital requirements risk weights, and despite the differences across the three
variants of the model reported in Table 3.3, firms’ dynamics, in steady state, do not vary
significantly across variants 1, 2 and 3 (Basel II, Basel I and No Capital Requirements,
respectively).
Figure 3.7 reports typical decision rules for net worth ( ) and physical capital ().
We conclude that, for a given value of capital expenditures,  (firms’ net worth at the
end of time ) is increasing in both  and the idiosyncratic shock, . Concerning the
capital stock, and due to the introduction of capital adjustment costs in the model, this
variable changes gradually and, consequently, its decision rule is very close to the 45'
line. The capital stock at the end of time ,  also increases with the idiosyncratic
shock, but this effect is imperceptible in the figure. As expected (see equation 3.15), for
a given value of  and , the price of capital at time  () is decreasing in  and
increasing in the idiosyncratic shock.60
Figures 3.7 (d), 3.8 and 3.9 report some unconditional moments, computed by aver-
aging some key variables of the model according to the firms’ stationary distribution ".
The key properties of firms’ behavior, which are in line with Cooley and Quadrini [34]’s
results, can be summarized as follows:
1. Small firms take on more debt: small firms borrow more and are more leveraged
2. Small firms face higher probability of default (proxied by the default threshold,
)
3. Small firms face a higher external finance premium (and a higher required return
on lending, under Basel II)
4. Small firms grow faster (see Figure 3.9, d).
Figures 3.7 (d) and 3.8 (a and b) show that, although capital expenditures increase
with firms’ size (as measured by firms’ net worth), small firms take on more debt: small
	For simplicity, and since the decision rule for  does not vary significantly across the three variants
of the model, we only plot this decision rule under Basel I.
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firms borrow more and, consequently, have higher ratios of capital expenditures to net
worth. As depicted by Figure 3.7 (d), firms’ capital expenditures increase with firms’ size
but at a slower pace than the net worth. Consequently, the amount of uncollateralized
loans is smaller for large firms.
A higher ratio of capital expenditures to net worth translates into a higher expected
probability of default, as predicted by the contract established between each firm and the
bank. Actually, Figure 3.8 (c) shows that small firms face, on average, higher probability
of default (proxied by the default threshold, ). Consequently, the capital requirements
risk weights in variant 1 are, on average, higher for those firms, as they have higher credit
risk - see Figure 3.8 (d). Finally, small firms, having higher probability of default, face
higher external finance premia, as illustrated by Figure 3.9 (a). As mentioned, the mag-
nitude of these effects (except for the capital requirements risk weights) is very similar
across the three variants of the model.
Figure 3.9 also reports the relationship between the required return on lending by
the bank, 	 , and the ratio of capital expenditures to net worth, 0. In variant 1, and in
contrast with the other two variants of the model, 	 increases with 0. Recall that under
Basel II the required return on a loan granted to a particular firm is a weighted average
of the return on deposits, 	, and the return on bank capital, 	 (with 	  	, due to
households’ preferences for liquidity). The weights depend, in turn, on the firm’s credit
risk (proxied by the firm’s ratio of capital expenditures to net worth, 0). Everything else
equal, the higher the firm’s leverage, the higher the fraction of bank loans that must be
financed with bank capital and, thus, the higher the weight associated with 	 and the
higher the financing cost, 	 . Since small firms, in our model, are more leveraged, they
face a higher 	 . That is, 	 increases with 0 and, consequently, decreases, on average,
with firms’ size.
Indeed, and as Figure 3.8 (d) illustrates, small firms face higher capital requirements
risk weights in variant 1 and, consequently, face a higher required return on lending,
	 . In variant 2, in turn, the required return on lending by the bank does not depend on
firms’ type (see equation 3.19), thus being independent of firms’ leverage and firms’ size.
Figure 3.9 (b) also allow us to conclude that only the less leveraged firms (those with a
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ratio of capital expenditures to net worth smaller than 2, approximately) benefit with the
changeover from Basel I to Basel II rules: the required return on lending is smaller for
those firms under the latter regulatory framework. The distribution of firms across their
leverage is thus essential to evaluate the effects of the introduction of Basel II rules, as
will become clearer in Section 3.3.61
Changing the Common Productivity Factor in the Steady State Model
Following the same computational procedure described in Appendix C, we solved
the model for the steady state, assuming now a higher value for the common productivity
factor: )   (which corresponds to an increase of ). Table 3.4 shows the new
steady state values of the same variables reported in Table 3.3.
Variant 1 Variant 2 Variant 3
(Basel II) (Basel I) (No Capital Req.)
Aggregate Output 
		 
 

Aggregate Capital Stock 

 
 

Aggregate Net Worth 	  	
Average Leverage Ratio (borrowers)  
 
Average Ratio of Cap. Expend. to Net Worth 
  	
Aggregate Loans 	  
% of Borrowers 	  

# 		  
# 	 	 
Average # (borrowers)   
Average Capital Requirements Risk Weight 	  
Aggregate Bank Capital/Aggregate Loans 
 	 
Table 3.4. Key variables of the model in steady state with A = 0.101
By comparing the two tables we find that, as expected, a higher common productivity
factor leads to a higher level of aggregate steady state output (which increased by ,
 and , in variant 1, 2 and 3, respectively). The increase in output is due, not
only to the higher common productivity factor, which enters the production function of
every firm, but also to the positive effect of ) on capital accumulation (as also reported
Note that the required return on lending faced by even less leveraged firms (firms with $  ,
approximately) is smaller in variant 1 (Basel II) than in variant 3 (model with no capital requirements),
since, according to our simulations, the steady state return on deposits, #, is also smaller in variant 1 (see
Table 3.3). This is in line with the results obtained in Chapter 2.
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in Table 3.4). Figure 3.10 confirms this result, showing that a higher level of ) implies a
clear rightward shift of the stationary distribution of firms across the capital stock.62
The steady state firms’ aggregate net worth also increases with ), but at a smaller
extent than the aggregate capital expenditures. Therefore, firms become more leveraged,
on average, in the new steady state: the average leverage ratio increases by , 
and  in variants 1, 2, and 3, respectively. Figure 3.11 supports this result (in variant
1):63 given firms’ size ( ), an increase in ) triggers higher capital expenditures by firms
(see panel a). Since net worth is less sensitive to the common productivity factor, the
average ratio of capital expenditures to net worth is higher in the new steady state for
each level of  (see panel c).
The preceding results can be explained through the analysis of household and bank
behavior, as follows. As reported in Table 3.4, the return on deposits, in both variants 1
and 2, is smaller in the new steady state:64 the increase in ) leads to an increase in the
steady state ratio of household’s consumption to deposits and, consequently, to a decrease
in 	 (see equation 3.22 in 3.2.3). Therefore, the required return on lending by the
bank, 	 , is also smaller in both variants (see Figure 3.11 e and Table 3.4).65 A smaller
cost of financing leads, in turn, to a higher amount of loans granted to firms, stimulating
capital accumulation. The decrease in 	 and the consequent increase in aggregate loans,
capital accumulation and output, are stronger in variant 1 than in variant 2, indicating
the existence of potentially stronger procyclical effects associated with Basel II capital
requirements.
We may summarize the following conclusions from the steady state model:
 The introduction of regulatory capital requirements has a negative effect on steady
state aggregate output: the financing cost is higher, on average, in the presence of capital
requirements, leading to a smaller aggregate amount of loans granted to firms which, in
turn, has a negative effect on firms’ capital accumulation and output

The distribution of firms in variant 3 is not shown for simplicity.
For simplicity, we omit the firms’ dynamics in the other two variants of the model.
Since the discount factor, , doesn’t change with , # (in variants 1 and 2) and # (in variant 3)
are the same as in the previous steady state.
Under Basel II, the effect of the decrease in # exceeds the effect of the increase in the average risk
weight associated with # (caused by the increase in the average leverage ratio).
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 In a steady state equilibrium characterized by a significant fraction of high credit
risk firms, the former effect is stronger under Basel II capital requirements
 The financing cost faced by small firms is higher, under Basel II, due to banks’
perception that these firms are riskier and, hence, carry higher capital requirements than
under Basel I
 A higher common productivity factor has positive effects on steady state aggregate
output, especially under the new regulatory framework, indicating the existence of poten-
tially stronger procyclical effects.
3.3 Introducing an Aggregate Technology Shock
We now introduce an aggregate technology shock in the model in order to analyze
the effects on cyclical uctuations of the changeover from Basel I to Basel II capital re-
quirements rules. In particular, we aim to compare the impact of an aggregate technology
shock across the three variants of the model developed in the previous section.
Recall the common productivity factor ) that enters each firm’s production function
- see equation (3.1). In contrast with the previous section, where ) was assumed to be
constant, we now introduce a temporary negative aggregate productivity shock, which
leads to a  decrease in ), at the beginning of period 1. The common productivity factor
then gradually converges to its steady state value following the autoregressive process:
)   4&)  4&) (3.25)
with 4&   and     # .
It is well known that introducing an aggregate shock into a dynamic heterogeneous-
agent model is not an easy computational task, since, by assuming a continuum of agents,
the state of the economy, at any point in time, is an infinite-dimensional object. Specifi-
cally, in order to be able to forecast prices (interest rates) accurately, agents need to keep
track of the evolution of the distribution ", which is an infinite dimensional object.
One approach that renders these models computable was developed by Krusell and Smith
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[63], who consider that agents only use a finite number of statistical moments, derived
from the distribution, to predict future prices.66
The large number of individual state variables considered in our model (the capital
stock, the price of capital and firms net worth) renders this methodology quite difficult to
use. Besides, in order to analyze the consequences of the introduction of Basel II capital
requirements, we are interested in keeping track of the evolution of firms’ distribution
over their ratio of capital expenditures to net worth (which proxies for firms’ probability
of default and, thus, determines the capital requirements risk weights used under the new
Basel Accord).
In this context, we followed an alternative procedure, based on Mendoza et al. [69],
to analyze the effects of the aggregate technology shock.67 In contrast with Section 3.2,
and due to the large number of state variables in the model, we consider a partial equi-
librium framework, in which households are absent. In particular, we assume that both
the return on deposits (	) and the return on bank capital (	) are exogenously set at
their steady state values and do not change over the business cycle. Alternatively, we can
interpret this economy as a small open economy, which takes interest rates as given.
Following Mendoza et al., after solving the model for the steady state, we choose a
number of transition periods, # , taking into account the path of the common productivity
factor ), given by equation (3.25). Assuming an initial shock of , the common
productivity factor takes approximately 110 quarters to return to its steady state value. We
thus consider #  . Using the FOCs and the law of motion for the net worth, derived
in Section 3.2 and properly modified in order to account for the aggregate productivity
shock, we solve for the optimal choices backward, starting from # and taking into account
that both ) and the decision rules at #   are equivalent to those derived in the steady
state model. This procedure allow us to compute the optimal decision rules at   # # 
   , which can then be used to find the sequence of firms’ distributions over the
state space   at each point in time and to compute the aggregate variables of
the model.
In particular, Krusell and Smith used the mean and the standard deviation of the distribution.
The model developed by these authors does not consider an aggregate shock, but analyzes the transi-
tional dynamics between two different steady states. We adjust their procedure in order to account for an
aggregate shock.
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3.3.1 Results
We begin by comparing the effects of the negative technology shock, described
above, under the three distinct hypotheses: variant 1 - the model assuming Basel II capi-
tal requirements rules variant 2 - the model assuming Basel I capital requirements rules
variant 3 - the model without capital requirements.
Figures 3.12 and 3.13 illustrate the impulse response functions of the relevant aggre-
gate variables of the model under these three variants, using the calibrated model econ-
omy, with each period equivalent to a quarter and the variables expressed as percentage
deviations from their steady state values.
The decrease in the common productivity factor ) triggers an immediate decline in
output below its steady state value, after which it returns gradually to its steady state. Due
to the introduction of capital adjustment costs, the capital stock response is moderate,
first decreasing and then gradually reverting to its steady state value. Therefore, and since
labor is absent from our model, the response of output is essentially determined by the
common productivity factor in the first periods after the shock.68
As in Chapter 2, the average price of physical capital, the aggregate capital expendi-
tures and the aggregate firms’ net worth are all procyclical. However, as the decrease in
capital expenditures () is more amplified than the decrease in net worth (), firms’
demand for uncollateralized loans (  ) also decreases after the shock, as Figure
3.12 (f) shows. That is, in contrast with Chapter 2, the decline in asset prices () after the
shock has a stronger effect on capital expenditures than on net worth.
As described in Section 3.2, under Basel I capital requirements, the amount of bank
capital held by the bank depends positively on the amount of loans granted to the firms:
  

"    
A very simple growth accounting exercise shows that, in the second quarter after the shock, the capital
stock explains around  of output (both variables expressed as percentage deviations from their steady
state values), in all variants of the model. The role of capital then gradually increases, reaching  after 20
quarters (approximately). These values are not very different from those derived from the model developed
in Chapter 2.
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Therefore, the decrease in aggregate loans after the shock leads, necessarily, to a decrease
in bank capital (see Figure 3.13, a). Under Basel II, in turn, the minimum amount of bank
capital that a bank must hold depends both on the total amount of loans granted by the
bank and on the credit risk of its loan portfolio:
  



" with   =  <0


As detailed in Section 3.2, firms’ credit risk is proxied by the ratio of capital expen-
ditures to net worth. Figure 3.13 (b) shows that the average value of this ratio decreases
with the negative technology shock, since the amount of loans granted to firms also de-
creases.69 This effect is supported by the results obtained in 3.2.6, according to which a
permanent decrease in the common productivity factor, leads to a decrease in the steady
state leverage ratio. Therefore, bank capital should not only be procyclical in variant 1,
since both loans and the average ratio of capital expenditures to net worth decrease, but
should also decrease by a larger extent than aggregate loans, after the shock.
However, as depicted by Figure 3.13, despite the decrease in bank capital under
Basel II, the average ratio of bank capital to loans




increases, immediately after the
shock, then decreasing below its steady state level, in the second quarter, and gradually
reverting towards its equilibrium level from below after the fourth quarter. The average
capital requirements risk weight () and the average required return on lending by the
bank (	 ) follow the same path, in variant 1. The analysis of the technology shock effects
on the distribution of firms over their ratio of capital expenditures to net worth (0) can be
useful to understand this result.
Figure 3.14 illustrates the impulse response functions, to the negative technology
shock, of the fraction of firms in each of the following categories:
This result seems to be in line with the ‘predictability view’, analyzed in the introduction of this
chapter, which opens the possibility of measured credit risk being relatively low (high) during recessions
(expansions).
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 Self-financed firms:   0  
 Firms with   0  
 Firms with   0  
 Firms with   0  
 Firms with 0  
According to our computational procedure (see Appendix C), all firms with 0  
face the same  and 	 - see Figure 3.13 (h) and Figure 3.9 (b), respectively. That
is, we assume that highly leveraged firms are treated equally by the bank (have the same
perceived credit risk, face the same required return on lending, the same default threshold
and the same external finance premium).70 Figure 3.14 indicates that the decrease in the
average ratio of capital expenditures to net worth, in variants 1 and 2, is mainly driven by
a decrease in the fraction of highly leveraged firms in the economy (firms with 0  ).
Figure 3.14 also suggests that, immediately after the shock, some of those firms move to
the preceding category (  0  ). This relocation affects negatively the average value
of 0, helping to explain the decrease in this variable after the shock, but does not affect the
average capital requirements risk weight ( and the average cost of financing (	 ).71 In
addition, firms with 0 between  and , in steady state, and which migrated to the two
subsequent categories after the shock, as Figure 3.14 suggests, justify the initial increase
in  and 	 . The increase in  explains, in turn, the increase in the average ratio of
bank capital to loans in variant 1, as implied by the capital requirements constraint.
In sum, although the average ratio of capital expenditures to net worth decreases, our
computational procedure yields an increase in the average credit risk immediately after
the shock, due to the shift in the distribution of firms over 0. This explains why the ratio
of bank capital to loans increased in the first quarter. Figure 3.14 illustrates that, in the
second quarter after the shock, the fraction of firms with   0   and   0  
increased and the fraction of firms with   0   and 0   decreased, leading,
simultaneously, to a decrease in 0 and in the perceived average credit risk. Consequently
,


and 	 also decreased (see Figure 3.13, c to e).
	Thus avoiding unrealistically high firm’s probability of default and external finance premium.
Since both the return on deposits (#) and the return on bank capital (#) are fixed, the required
return on lending by the bank (# ) is fixed in variant 2 and only responds to changes in the ratio of capital
expenditures to net worth in variant 1. See equations (3.18) and (3.19) in Section 3.2.
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Concerning the variables that enter the financial contract established between the
bank and each firm, Figure 3.13 allows us to conclude that the impulse response functions
of the average default threshold () and the average external finance premium (EFP)
resemble that of the average capital requirements risk weight in variant 1, due, once more,
to the response of firms’ distribution over 0 to the technology shock. There is, however,
an additional effect inuencing the relationship between 0,  and the EFP outside the
steady state: in contrast with BGG, the common productivity factor, ), enters the FOCs
derived from the contracting problem under decreasing returns to scale (see equations 3.6
and 3.7, in 3.2.1). According to our simulations, a decrease in ) triggers, everything
else constant (including 0), an increase in the default threshold (that is, a higher firm’s
expected probability of default), and an increase in the EFP faced by each firm. Therefore,
the technology shock has two distinct effects which render the results derived from the
contract outside the steady state more difficult to interpret:
)

0    
9
  
9
Concerning the potential procyclical effects of Basel II, we conclude that the impulse
response functions are very similar across the three variants of the model, contradicting
the procyclicality hypothesis. In fact, only ,  and, consequently, 	
 have a noticeably
different behavior in variant 1. However, as we are assuming that both the return on de-
posits and the return on bank capital are constant, 	 deviation from its steady state value
is not sufficient to generate significantly different responses of the remaining variables of
the model under Basel II.
Actually, the procyclical effects of bank capital requirements, both in the model de-
veloped in Chapter 2 and in some studies discussed in Chapter 1, are associated with some
specific cost in raising bank capital (e.g., the liquidity premium required by the households
in order to hold bank capital, and which increases during recessions, or the information
dilution costs introduced by Bolton and Freixas [21]).72 In the present work we assume,

See also Markovic [66], who developed a theoretical model that accounts for three distinct bank
capital channels that trigger an increase in the required return on bank capital by shareholders, and thus an
increase in the cost of bank capital, during an economic downturn.
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thus far, that the return on bank capital required by the representative household, in order
to hold this asset in its portfolio, is constant throughout the business cycle, that is, is the
same during upturns and downturns, and does not vary with the changeover from Basel
I to Basel II bank capital requirements rules. Thus, since the exogenous shock we intro-
duced in the model is not sufficient to cause a major change in firms’ distribution over
their leverage, it is not surprising that an aggregate shock does not render significantly
different effects across the three variants of the model.
Therefore, based on the results obtained in Chapter 2, we consider now that, imme-
diately after the negative technology shock, the cost of bank capital increases: during a
downturn, the representative household demands a higher return on bank capital, 	, in
order to hold this asset and attenuate the decrease in consumption. Also based on the
model developed in Chapter 2, we assume that after the decrease in the common produc-
tivity shock, 	 increases by , gradually converging to its steady state value accord-
ing to the following autoregressive process:
	   4&	
  4&	

 
with 4&   and     # . In contrast with the previous chapter, we assume that
the response of 	 is the same under Basel II and Basel I (that is, the increase in the
liquidity premium is the same in both variants 1 and 2). Since bank capital is absent in
variant 3, the results presented here, concerning this variant of the model, are the same as
those reported in Figures 3.12 and 3.13.
The Effects of a Technology Shock Assuming a Countercyclical Required Return on
Bank Capital
Figures 3.15 and 3.16 show the impulse response functions of the model’s relevant
aggregate variables under the three variants of the model, assuming that, immediately after
the technology shock, the required return on bank capital increases and then gradually
converges to its steady state. As explained before, the response of output, in our model,
is mainly driven by the common productivity factor in the first quarters after the shock.
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Therefore, the impulse response functions of aggregate output are initially very similar
across the three variants of the model. However, Figures 3.15 and 3.16 also show that
the impact of the technology shock on the remaining economic and financial variables is
visibly stronger in the presence of regulatory capital requirements: as in the preceding
experiment, in which 	 was assumed to be constant, the aggregate capital stock and its
average price, the firms’ net worth, the aggregate amount of loans and the average ratio
of capital expenditures to net worth are all procyclical, but the effects of the technology
shock on these variables are clearly amplified when capital requirements are introduced
in the model. Concerning, for instance, the immediate effect on aggregate loans and
capital expenditures, the first variable decreases  in variant 1,  in variant 2,
and only  in variant 3, while capital expenditures decrease   and 
in variants 1, 2 and 3, respectively. Put differently, if we eliminate capital requirements
from the model, that is, if we compare variant 3 with variants 1 and 2, the immediate
impact of the technology shock on aggregate loans is reduced by  and  from
variants 1 and 2, respectively, to variant 3. The same exercise focusing on the aggregate
capital expenditures leads to a reduction of  and  from variants 1 and 2,
respectively, to variant 3.73 It is straightforward to conclude that this amplification effect is
stronger in variant 1, supporting the procyclicality hypothesis underlying the changeover
from Basel I to Basel II capital requirements rules: if we compare variant 2 with variant
1, the immediate impact of the technology shock on aggregate loans and aggregate capital
expenditures is reduced by  and , respectively, from variant 1 to variant 2.
Due to the adjustment in the distribution of firms over 0, the average capital require-
ments risk weight in variant 1, the average default threshold and the average external fi-
nance premium increase, immediately after the shock, despite the decline in the average
ratio of capital expenditures to net worth: as before, the decrease in this ratio is mainly
driven by a shift of highly leveraged firms (with 0  ) towards the preceding category
(  0  ) - see Figure 3.17. This figure also shows that the adjustments in firms’ dis-
When the role of capital in explaining the output response to the technology shock becomes more
significant, the differences in the output impulse response functions across the three variants of the model
emerge. For instance, in the  quarter after the shock, if we eliminate capital requirements from the
model, that is, if we compare variant 3 with variants 1 and 2, the impact of the technology shock in output
is reduced by 
 and  from variants 1 and 2, respectively, to variant 3.
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tribution over the ratio of capital expenditures to net worth are more amplified in variant
1 than in variant 2.
Given the imposed increase in the return on bank capital required by the households
after the negative technology shock, this amplification effect can be explained through the
analysis of bank behavior, as follows. In contrast with the previous experiment, and as
depicted by Figure 3.16 (f), the average required return on lending by the bank, 	 , in
variant 1 does not follow the same path as the average capital requirements risk weight
(see panel e). Recall that, in both variant 1 and variant 2, 	 is a weighted average of the
return on deposits and the return on bank capital. As derived in 3.2.2, under Basel I the
weights are constant,
	   	

  	

 
whereas under Basel II the weights depend on firm’s leverage,
	 

 

= <  <0

	  

= <  <0

	
Figure 3.16 (a and f) shows that, as predicted by the first equation, 	 , in variant 2,
follows very closely the return on bank capital. In contrast with the previous experiment,
we assume that households require an increase in the return of bank capital in order to
hold this asset in their portfolios after the negative technology shock. This cost is then
passed on to firms by the bank through an increase in the required return on lending, 	 .
The consequent decline in the aggregate amount of loans granted to firms and in firms’
capital expenditures, under Basel I, is thus more amplified than in the case when 	 was
assumed to be constant.
In variant 1, in turn, 	 depends both on firms’ credit risk and 	 . Figure 3.16 (f)
shows that the response of 	 is much stronger under this variant of the model than under
variant 2. Two effects contribute to this more amplified response.
First, and as in the previous experiment, the adjustment in firms’ distribution over
0, immediately after the shock, affects positively 	 (taking into account the assumption
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that all firms with 0   are treated equally by the bank). However, by comparing
Figure 3.13 (e) with Figure 3.16 (f), it is straightforward to conclude that, immediately
after the shock, the increase in 	 , under Basel II, is much more amplified in the second
experiment. Besides, and in contrast with the previous case, 	 remains above its steady
state value during the subsequent periods. This can be explained through a second effect
associated with the economy’s initial distribution of firms over 0, as follows.
As we mentioned in 3.2.6, the stationary equilibrium of this economy is characterized
by a large fraction of highly leveraged firms. Consequently, the steady state average level
of credit risk is relatively high, leading to a higher steady state ratio of bank capital to loans
under Basel II than under Basel I. As also analyzed in 3.2.6, only the less leveraged firms
benefit with the changeover from Basel I to Basel II. Besides, as predicted by the second
equation above, the higher the leverage of the firm, the more sensitive is 	 to a change
in 	 . In particular, assuming a  increase in 	, and for given values of 0 and 	,
only the firms with 0   benefit with the introduction of Basel II regulation:74 the
increase in the financing cost after the shock is smaller for those firms, under the new
regulatory framework. For the remaining firms, Basel I would be preferable.
Therefore, since this economy is characterized by a large fraction of highly leveraged
firms in steady state, and since those are the firms which lose with the introduction of
Basel II, the increase in the average financing cost is more amplified in variant 1 than in
variant 2: for those highly leveraged firms, the increase of the required return on lending
after the exogenous shock is stronger under Basel II than under Basel I.75
Actually, this second effect is much stronger than the previous one, which was also
present in the preceding experiment: even in the second quarter after the shock, when the
average capital requirements risk weight decreases below its steady state value - indicating
a decrease in the average level of credit risk in the economy, due to the adjustment in
firms’ distribution over 0 -, the average required return on lending remains well above its
equilibrium level, in contrast with the previous experiment (see Figure 3.16, e and f).
This result takes into account that the steady state level of # is smaller under Basel II than under
Basel I.
And the decrease in the average leverage ratio is not sufficient to offset this effect.
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Finally, since the required return on lending by the bank increases more in variant
1 than in variant 2, the decrease in the aggregate amount of loans granted to firms, and,
consequently, in firms’ capital expenditures is more amplified in the former variant.76
In sum, the introduction of a countercyclical required return on bank capital leads to
a stronger response of the economy to a technology shock when capital requirements are
considered in the model, especially under the Basel II regulatory framework.
We may then conclude that, to the extent that it is costly to raise or hold bank capi-
tal in bad times and the representative bank’s loan portfolio is characterized by a signifi-
cant fraction of highly leveraged firms, the introduction of the new bank capital require-
ments rules proposed by Basel II may accentuate the procyclical tendencies of banking,
with macroeconomic consequences. The Basel II procyclical effect should be greater, the
greater the fraction of firms who begin with relatively high leverage ratios, that is, with
relatively high credit risk. The distribution of firms over their leverage ratio, which in our
model proxies for the credit risk, is therefore crucial to understand the potential procycli-
cal effects of the new bank capital requirements rules.
3.3.2 Some Additional Experiments
Mimicking a Monetary Policy Shock
Although the model developed in this chapter does not contemplate a central bank
and a monetary policy rule, in contrast with the model developed in Chapter 2, we may
still capture some potential effects of a negative monetary policy shock, assuming that
this shock translates into an exogenous increase in the return on deposits, 	 (in line
with Meh and Moran [68], for instance). Specifically, we now introduce an exogenous
shock that leads to a  increase in 	 which then gradually converges to its steady
state value following the autoregressive process:
In contrast with Chapter 2, this amplification effect does not depend on the amplitude of the liquidity
premium’s response: recall that we are assuming here that the increase in # is the same under both Basel
I and Basel II.
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
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with 4&   and     # .
For the same motive pointed out in 3.3.1, we also assume that, after the negative
monetary policy shock, households require an increase in the return on bank capital, 	 ,
in order to hold this asset in their portfolios. In particular we consider that, simultaneously
with the increase in 	, 	 increases by , gradually converging to its steady state
value according to the same autoregressive process followed by 	. Consequently, the
liquidity premium, 	 	, increases after the shock, as in Chapter 2.
Figure 3.18 reports the impulse response functions of some key variables of the
model under variants 1 and 2.77 The response of both economic and financial variables in
variant 1 is more pronounced than in variant 2, thus supporting again the procyclicality
hypothesis of Basel II. In this case, aggregate output follows very closely the response of
physical capital, as the common productivity factor is assumed to stay constant (see panel
b). Since we are assuming an increase in the liquidity premium required by the house-
holds after the shock and since the economy is characterized by a large fraction of highly
leveraged firms, the rise in the financing cost is more amplified under Basel II, leading
to a stronger decrease in the amount of loans granted to firms and, consequently, to a
stronger decrease in firms’ capital expenditures and output, after the shock. Once more,
the decrease in the average leverage ratio, after the negative monetary policy shock, is
not sufficient to offset the effect associated with the high sensitivity of the high leverage
firms’ financing cost to changes in the required return on bank capital, 	 .
In sum, as long as the increase in 	 is sufficiently higher than the increase in 	,
that is, as long as the liquidity premium increases significantly after the negative monetary
policy shock (see panel h), the procyclical tendencies of banking are accentuated under
the new Basel Accord.78
We omit variant 3, for simplicity.
Even considering that the increase in the liquidity premium is the same under Basel I and Basel II, in
contrast with Chapter 2.
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We also tested the effects of the negative technology shock analyzed in 3.3.1 assum-
ing that, after the shock, households require, not only an increase in the return on bank
capital, but also an increase in the return on deposits, 	.79 In particular we assume that
after the decrease in the common productivity shock, 	 increases by  in the three
variants of the model, gradually converging to its steady state value according to the same
autoregressive process followed by 	 . The results, not reported here, do not change sig-
nificantly: the responses of the model’s key variables to the technology shock are stronger
in all the variants of the model when compared to the results reported in 3.3.1, but the
amplification effect, associated with the introduction of Basel II capital requirements, re-
mains valid, as long as the increase in 	 is significantly higher than the increase in 	,
as we assume in our experiments.
Increasing the Upper Limit of 0
As analyzed in 3.3.1, the assumption that the representative bank treats all firms with
0   equally, affects the response of the economy to the negative technology shock.
Here we test the effects of increasing this upper limit from  to . That is, we recalibrate
the parameters underlying the relationship between the capital requirements risk weights
 and firms’ ratio of capital expenditures to net worth 0 - see equation 3.16 in Section
3.2 - such that a zero risk weight is assigned to firms with 0   and a maximum risk
weight of  is assigned to firms with 0  . Besides, we consider, in the computational
procedure, maximum values for the external finance premium and for the default threshold
value (derived from the optimal contracting problem FOCs when 0  ), and assume that
those values hold for all firms with 0  . We then solve the new calibrated steady
state model, considering both Basel I and Basel II capital requirements, and analyze the
effects of a negative technology shock assuming a countercyclical return on bank capital,
as before.
The amplification effect underlying the Basel II capital requirements remains at work
in this new context: the economy is characterized by a large fraction of highly leveraged
In fact, the results obtained in Section 3.2 indicate that # varies negatively with  in both variants
1 and 2 (see the effects of an increase in  in the general equilibrium steady state model).
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firms in steady state and, consequently, the required return on lending by the bank in-
creases more, after the shock, under Basel II than under Basel I (despite the decrease in
the average ratio of capital expenditures to net worth). Therefore, the decrease in aggre-
gate loans and in firms’ capital expenditures is more amplified under the new regulatory
framework. It is worthwhile to mention that, as before, the decrease in the average ratio of
capital expenditures to net worth, immediately after the shock, is mainly driven by a de-
crease in the fraction of highly leveraged firms in the economy (firms with 0  ) which
move to the preceding category (  0  ). However, as we assume here a higher value
for the upper limit of 0, the average capital requirement risk weight (), the average de-
fault threshold () and the average external finance premium () follow the same path of
the average ratio of capital expenditures to net worth (0), in contrast with the previous
experiments.
3.4 Concluding Remarks
As argued by Lowe [65], Allen and Saunders [3] and Amato and Furfine [6], the
banking sector is intrinsically procyclical, regardless of the design of capital requirements.
Indeed, in the presence of financial market frictions, concerns about loan quality and re-
payment probability lead banks to decrease lending in bad times, exacerbating the eco-
nomic slowdown, as firms and individuals that cannot easily substitute bank loans with
alternative sources of funding decrease their investment activity. In good times, in turn,
banks tend to increase lending, possibly exacerbating the initial boom. Despite the widely
recognized effort of the new Basel Accord to deal with the shortcomings of the previous
accord, some concerns have been raised that Basel II may accentuate the procyclical ten-
dencies of banking, with potential macroeconomic consequences.
Focusing on the relationship between the banking sector and credit constrained firms,
this last essay provides a framework which can be used to evaluate the potential procycli-
cal effects of Basel II, by introducing a simplified version of the new capital requirements
rules into a heterogeneous-agent model, in which firms have different access to bank credit
depending on their financial position and, consequently, on their credit risk. It thus allows
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a fuller account of Basel II rules than the model developed in Chapter 2, by considering
that credit risk varies, not only along the business cycle, but also across firms.
The general equilibrium model in steady state illustrates that the introduction of reg-
ulatory capital requirements under both Basel I and Basel II has a negative effect on the
economy’s aggregate output. As households require a liquidity premium to hold bank
capital in their portfolios, this asset is more costly to raise than deposits, as in Chapter 2.
The introduction of regulatory capital requirements, by forcing banks to finance a fraction
of loans with bank capital, thus increases the banks’ loan funding cost and, consequently,
banks’ lending rates, thereby leading to a lower aggregate amount of loans granted to
firms and, thus, to lower physical capital accumulation and output. This result should,
however, be cautiously interpreted, bearing in mind that the model abstracts from some
positive features of banking regulation, which may counteract the aforementioned effect.
We ignore, for instance, the role of bank capital regulation in avoiding financial crises,
which certainly affects the macroeconomic equilibrium.
In a stationary equilibrium characterized by a significant fraction of high credit risk
firms, the former effect is stronger under Basel II than under Basel I. As the minimum
capital requirements, under Basel II, become a function of each borrower perceived credit
risk, banks with a relatively high risk asset portfolio will have to finance a higher fraction
of loans with bank capital than under Basel I. Again, the resulting additional cost faced
by those banks under the new accord is passed on to borrowers through an increase in the
firms’ financing costs, leading to a decrease in the average leverage ratio and exacerbating
the negative effects of the introduction of regulatory capital requirements on physical
capital accumulation and output. This result is in line with one of the outcomes of a very
recent paper by Zhu [99], according to which the impact of the changeover from Basel I
to Basel II capital requirements may differ substantially across banks depending on the
risk profile of their loan portfolios: according to the model developed by Zhu, Basel II
will lead to a higher ratio of bank capital to loans for small and also more risky banks.
Nevertheless, we should bear in mind that, due to the focus on business cycle implications,
our model leaves out some positive effects and externalities which should emerge with the
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introduction of Basel II and which should positively affect the steady state equilibrium,
counterbalancing our result.
The model developed in Chapter 3 allow us to conclude that the small (and also
more leveraged) firms are the ones that will lose more with the introduction of the new
risk-sensitive capital requirements, supporting the concerns that have been raised that the
new regulation may raise the financing costs of small and medium-sized enterprises -
due to banks’ perception that these firms are riskier - and the special treatment given to
these firms by the last version of Basel II. We also found that a permanent increase in the
technology level has positive effects on steady state aggregate output, especially under
Basel II, indicating the existence of potentially stronger procyclical effects under the new
regulatory framework.
To the extent that it is more costly to hold bank capital in bad times and that the rep-
resentative bank’s loan portfolio is characterized by a significant fraction of highly lever-
aged firms, the introduction of an aggregate technology shock into a partial equilibrium
version of the former heterogeneous-agent model supports the former outcome, that is,
supports the Basel II procyclicality hypothesis. By considering that the liquidity premium
required by the households moves countercyclically (based on Chapter 2 results) and it
is, therefore, more costly for the bank to raise bank capital during an economic down-
turn, the introduction of Basel II capital requirements exacerbates the (countercyclical)
response of the firms’ financing cost to an aggregate technology shock, leading to a more
amplified decrease in firms’ physical capital accumulation and output.
This amplification effect rests, not only on the countercyclical liquidity premium,
as in Chapter 2, but also on the risk profile of the bank’s loan portfolio. The model
predicts that the financing cost of highly leveraged firms is very sensitive to changes in the
required return on bank capital. As the economy’s stationary equilibrium is characterized
by a significant fraction of this type of firms, yielding a minimum ratio of bank capital
to loans higher under Basel II than under Basel I, the average financing cost faced by
firms responds more strongly to the aggregate technology shock under Basel II, leading
to more amplified effects on capital accumulation and output. We may thus conclude that,
according to the model developed in Chapter 3, the amplification effect underlying Basel
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II tends to hold in an economy characterized by a significant fraction of small firms, which
usually cannot easily substitute bank loans with alternative sources of funding and have
higher perceived credit risk than large firms.
This result supports Kashyap and Stein [56]’s argument that Basel II capital require-
ments have the potential to create an amount of additional cyclicality in capital charges
that may be quite large, depending on a bank’s customer mix. The Basel II procyclical
effect should be greater, the greater the fraction of firms who begin with relatively high
leverage ratios, that is, with relatively high credit risk. The distribution of firms over their
leverage ratio, which in the model proxies for the credit risk, is therefore crucial to eval-
uate the potential procyclical effects of the new bank capital requirements rules. Besides,
the Basel II procyclicality hypothesis holds even if the predictability view - which con-
siders the possibility of measured credit risk being relatively high (low) when times are
good (bad) - is confirmed. That is, the decrease in the average leverage ratio, that follows
the negative aggregate shock in the model economy, is not sufficient to offset the ampli-
fication effect. Therefore, the adoption of the predictability view of the business cycle
may thus not be sufficient to counteract the procyclical effects of Basel II, depending on
the bank’s customer mix and on how costly it is for banks to hold bank capital during a
recession.
A clear lesson to be drawn is that the potential procyclical and across firms effects
should be taken into account when designing a bank capital regulatory framework. Al-
though not analyzed in this work, we believe that a well regulated, sounder and less prone
to systemic risk banking system improves the financing of efficient firms across the econ-
omy. But it is no less true, as our work implies, that overregulation, leading to large and
procyclical capital requirements, may counteract those positive aspects and, on top of that,
may impose a stronger penalization to the financing of smaller and more leveraged firms,
which, in many instances, coincide with the more dynamic and innovative segments of
the economy.
Overall, the theoretical models developed in Chapters 2 and 3 predict that the intro-
duction of regulatory bank capital requirements tends to amplify the effects of technology
and monetary and fiscal policy shocks in the economy, taking into account that raising
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bank capital is costly, especially during economic downturns. Chapter 2 builds a bank
capital channel into a dynamic general equilibrium model, and finds that it amplifies the
real effects of monetary policy shocks and business cycle uctuations, through a liquidity
premium effect. Thus, introducing bank capital seems to enhance the role of financial fric-
tions in the propagation of shocks, in line with the arguments in related literature. Chap-
ter 3, by embedding the bank-borrower relationship into a heterogeneous-agent model,
shows that the amplification effects may be stronger under Basel II capital requirements,
supporting the Basel II procyclicality hypothesis, depending on the banks’ customer port-
folios. That is, even if the new Basel Accord may be more effective than the previous one
in reducing the riskiness of the banking sector, it may accentuate the procyclical tenden-
cies of the banking sector and, consequently, amplify the business cycle uctuations.
However, none of the models was designed to capture the effectiveness of Basel I
and Basel II in preventing bank failure. Economic policy conclusions should thus be
drawn carefully. As mentioned throughout the dissertation, our analysis has not been
concerned with questions such as whether bank regulation is itself optimal. We abstract
from risk and incentives that support the introduction of regulatory capital requirements
and, therefore, our analysis does not support any normative conclusions regarding bank-
capital regulation.
Nevertheless, it will be possible to capture, in future work, some of the positive
externalities associated with banking regulation - in systemic risk prevention, for instance
- and analyze to what extent those effects may counteract the main results of Chapters 2
and 3.
Another positive way forward will be to introduce the aggregate technology shock
considered in Chapter 3 in a general equilibrium heterogeneous-agent model, which will
allow the endogenous derivation of the behavior of the required return on bank capital
by the households throughout the business cycle. As mentioned, we did not pursue this
methodology here due to the large number of state variables considered, which renders
the model developed in Chapter 3 very slow to converge. One way to overcome this
technical difficulty is to abstract from the external adjustment costs in physical capital
accumulation, as the financial accelerator effect of Bernanke et al. [17] seems to be of
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second-order importance when the focus is on evaluating the procyclical effects of Basel
II vs Basel I in the context of the model in Chapter 3. In fact, and in contrast with the
model developed in Chapter 2, the amplification effect of Basel II in Chapter 3 rests
exclusively on loan supply effects, being independent of the financial accelerator effect
associated with the borrowers’ balance sheet channel.
Further research could also introduce entry and exit of firms in the heterogeneous-
agent model. This should avoid the possibility that the entrepreneurial sector accumulates
enough net worth to be fully self-financed and permit to abandon the assumption that each
entrepreneur consumes, in every period, a constant fraction of his resources. Finally, it
may prove interesting to give more emphasis to the role of households’ consumption, in
which case labor should be introduced in the framework developed in chapter 3.
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3.5 Appendices
Appendix A: Optimal Contracting Problem
Following BGG, and in order to solve equations (3.6) and (3.7) derived from the
FOCs of the contracting problem, we made the following assumptions (to simplify the
notation we now drop the  superscript):
Assumptions
  

   



.
Therefore,    and
   
 E   
 E

where  is the c.d.f. of the standard normal, F is the p.d.f. of the standard normal,
and E is related to  through
E 
   
 

Let
?  E    
  
 

Under these assumptions it is straightforward to compute:
1. The expected gross share of profit going to the lender, ! 
By definition,
!  
 

  



     #$     #$  
Therefore,
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 !      #$    #$  
Since,
       #$       #$     
    #$        #$  
 !  and !  can be rewritten as
 !         #$    #$   
     #$   

 E   
 E
 

 E 
!   E       E  ?    E 
2.  
  
 

      #$   
 
 E   
 E
 E  E     ?
3. ! 
!  

 
FE      E

 
FE 


 
F?   E

 
FE
4.  
  

 
FE    

 
F?
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As derived in Section 3.2, the contracting problem, which determines the division
of the expected gross project output )       between the
borrower and the lender (ignoring the covariance between  and , may be written
as:
	







 !

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
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
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Taking equation (3.2) into account, the expected gross project output can be rewritten
as
)


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


   	

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
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and the contract problem becomes
	







 !


 
	



   )



3
! 


 
	



   )



 	



 


Solving the contract, with respect to  and 

, renders the following FOCs:
  

 !


 
	

   )




G
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	
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
 G
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


 



 
G  

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

 
	
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
   )



	

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
 

  
where G is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint that the bank earns its
required rate of return in expectation. These FOCs yield, in turn, equations (3.6) and (3.7)
in 3.2.1.
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Appendix B: Aggregate Consistency Condition
To derive the aggregate consistency condition - equation (3.24) in 3.2.4 - we first
compute the total amount of assets held by each entrepreneur, at the end of time .
Entrepreneurs that do not default at time 
For this type of entrepreneurs, the amount of assets held, at the end of time , is given by
  

)



  



  

Entrepreneurs’ assets, in turn, are allocated to consumption, to the payment to the
bank and to net worth, that is,
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that the entrepreneur pays the bank )







 and keeps the remaining
 .
Net worth is then used to buy capital (). Since     the entrepre-
neur must borrow to buy capital:    

  



.
We may then conclude that,
 if )
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  



  



)



 



 

)



  



  
 
   



)



 



 

 

  

 (3.26)
 otherwise
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Entrepreneurs that default at time 
As above, for this type of entrepreneurs, the amount of assets held, at the end of time , is
given by
  
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Entrepreneurs’ assets are allocated to consumption, to the payment to the bank and
to net worth:
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If   



 we assume that the entrepreneur pays the bank
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and keeps the remaining  .
Net worth is then used to buy capital (). Since     the entrepre-
neur must borrow to buy capital:    

  




In this context,
 if   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
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 otherwise
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Aggregate consistency condition
Aggregating equations (3.26), (3.27), (3.28) and (3.29) over firms, we get80
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where " is the distribution of firms over the state space   at the end of time
, ( 

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
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with ) = set of borrowers that do not default and for which
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	Recall that we are assuming a continuum of firms, producers of manufactured goods, of total measure
one.
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 = set of borrowers that do not default and for which
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 = set of borrowers that default and for which
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The realized bank’s profits are, in turn, given by
  Bank Revenues 	  	  MonitoringCosts
Rearranging the preceding equation we get
Bank Revenues 
 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
   	

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Substituting this last expression into equation (3.30) yields
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Finally, using the bank’s balance sheet constraint,
    
and the household’s budget constraint,
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we get equation (3.24):
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Appendix C: Computational Procedure81
1 Choose a discrete grid of points in the (, ,) state plane:  >$, >$ and >$.
We consider 30 grid points for from  , 30 grid points for from   and
10 grid points for  from  .
2 Create a discrete grid for the idiosyncratic shock and compute the probability associ-
ated with the realization of each value in the grid.
Note that  is an idiosyncratic disturbance to the capital return of type  firms, inde-
pendently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) across time and across firms, and follows a
log-normal distribution with   . To approximate this distribution we proceed as
follows:
a) Create a grid for : @/ (with size 2   from  )
b) Compute the lognormal cumulative distribution function ($HI), considering the
calibrated value for the standard deviation of ,  , and taking into account
that    
c) To discretize $HI and compute the probabilities associated with each , we first cre-
ate another grid ( >$), with the same size of @/, and whose points are placed in be-
tween the points of @/ according to the following procedure:
 >$  @/
 >$  @/  
@/ @/ 

, for     2.
To simplify the notation we now drop the  superscript.
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We then compute the probabilities associated with each grid point of  >$ as follows:
8/%<  
8/%<  $HI $HI , for     2
Note: since 8/%<  , the first grid point is ignored in simulations.
3 Using the grids defined in step 1, compute 0  
 , the ratio of capital expendi-
tures to net worth at the end of time  . This procedure may generate firms whose
capital expenditures are less than their net worth (0  ), that is, firms that don’t need
external funds to finance their capital expenditures. The model’s calibration guaran-
tees that the fraction of this type of firm is relatively small.
4 Compute, for each type of firm, the bank capital requirements weight  (equal to one,
under Basel I, or dependent on the ratio of firms’ capital expenditures to net worth, un-
der Basel II, as depicted by equation 3.16). As mentioned in 3.2.5, we assume, under Basel
II, that all firms with 0   are assigned the maximum level of   , which is in
line with the assumptions made concerning the contract established between the bank and
each entrepreneur (see step 8, below) and avoids unrealistic values of . Self-financed
firms, in turn, are assigned  equal to zero.
5 Given the calibrated discount factor, compute the steady state value of	 , the return on
bank capital, using equation (3.23).
6 Guess an initial steady state value for 	, the return on deposits (constant in steady
state).
7 Compute the required return on lending by the bank to each type of firm, 	 , as im-
plied by the FOCs of the bank’s optimization problem. Here we must also take into
account the existence of self-financed firms (0  ). In particular, this possibility mod-
ifies the bank’s optimization problem: we assume that when firm’s net worth exceeds its
capital expenditures, the entrepreneur deposits the difference in the bank and receives,
in the next period,  	, where	 is the return on deposits. Therefore, finan-
cial intermediation consists now in collecting funds from households () and self-
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financed entrepreneurs () and granting loans to the leveraged entrepreneurs (). The
bank’s objective is then given by:
	








	

"
	   	
s.t.


"    

   (balance sheet constraint)




"
  (binding capital requirements),
where represents the deposits held by the self-financed entrepreneurs, from  to 
,
 



  





"
 is the set of entrepreneurs that borrow from the bank and is the set of self-financed
entrepreneurs. The FOCs of this problem lead to the same results obtained in 3.2.2.
8 Compute, for each 0, the associated external finance premium required by the bank
  	

 J	



and the cutoff value for the idiosyncratic risk , using the FOCs of the
optimal contractual arrangement problem between each firm and the bank
There are two technical difficulties which we must deal with.
First, although the contractual problem is defined for firms with 0  , the grids defined
in step 1 allow for self-financed firms (with 0  ), that is, firms with  .
For those firms, and since they don’t need to borrow from the bank to buy capital, we as-
sume    (there is no risk of default) and    (there is no external finance pre-
mium required by the bank)
Second, the grids defined in step 1 also allow for highly leveraged firms. Consequently,
the FOCs of the optimal contractual arrangement problem yield very high values of  for
those firms. To avoid these unrealistic values, we define maximum values for  and
for  (derived from the optimal contracting problem FOCs when 0  0), and assume that
those values hold for all firms with 0  0 (we consider 0  ). In sum, we are assuming
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that the bank treats equally all the firms with 0  0.
Note that the former steps 4, 7 and 8 are required to compute , derived from the con-
tract between the bank and each entrepreneur at the end of time , which, in turn, en-
ters the law of motion of the entrepreneur’s net worth (see equation 3.8).
9 Guess an initial value of 	 for each type of firm in the state space ( , ,  , ).
10 Compute the decision rule for the capital stock,      and for the
price of capital,      :
a) Recall equation (3.2), which defines the expected marginal return to capital,
	 
) 
     


and let @  )    . Therefore, taking equation (3.2) into
account yields, @  	.
b) Guess initial values of @ for each point in the state space ( , , , )
c) Use stepwise linear interpolation to compute @ for values of ( , , , ) out-
side the grid
d) Solve equation
	  @
taking into account that
 

=

   

 


This process allow us to compute the decision rule for capital,     
e) Update the guess for @,
@  ) 
     
where      ,   &

 

 

and
     . Go back to step 10.c) until convergence
f) Compute the decision rule      , from the FOC derived from
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the capital producers optimization problem:
 

=

   

 


with      
11 Compute the law of motion for the net worth     , as defined by
equations (3.8) and (3.10).
Taking into account the assumptions described above (see step 7), the net worth of each
self-financed entrepreneur combines profits accumulated from previous capital invest-
ment, the endowment   and the return on deposits:
   

)



  



  
    



 	



12 Update the guess for 	:
a) Using the decision rules for  and  and the law of motion for  , compute
0    



b) Following the procedure described in steps 4 and 7, compute, for each type of firm, 
and 	
c) Compute  and , following the procedure described in step 8
d) Update the guess for 	 : 	  
	. Go back to step 10 - considering
the last update for @, computed in step 10. e), as the initial guess in step 10. c) - until
convergence.
13 Using the decision rules for  and , the law of motion for  , and the distribution
of  (defined in step 2), find the steady state distribution of firms over the state space
 :
a) Guess an initial distribution ", such that
 


"     
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b) Compute the distribution of next period:
"    



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

   
    

     #$"   


where #$ is the probability of realization of  at time  and  ,  and 
 are
the following indicator functions:
     

, if      
, otherwise 
     

, if      
, otherwise 

     

, if      
, otherwise 
c) Iterate until convergence, that is, until "/   "/
After computing the stationary distribution of firms, it is straightforward to compute
the aggregate level of capital, output, firms’ net worth, entrepreneurial consumption,
loans, deposits and bank capital.
14 Compute bank’s demand for the household’s deposits:  

", with  



 "
15 Compute the amount of deposits held by the representative household:
a) Compute household’s consumption using the aggregate consistency condition (3.24):82
  (

 
 





"

 



"MonitoringCosts
b) Compute the amount of deposits held by the representative household using the Euler
equation evaluated in steady state (equation 3.22):
 

 !	

16 Update the guess for	, such that the bank’s demand for the household’s deposits equals

The introduction of self-financed firms does not change this condition. Detailed derivation, similar to
the one in Appendix B, is available upon request.
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the amount of deposits held by the representative household. Go back to step 7 until
convergence.
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